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Preface
This book deals with some aspects of Japanese labor markets. It is not about
Japanese management practices or about the "Japan-As-Number-One" syn
drome. Nor does it aim to be a comprehensive treatment of Japanese labor
market phenomena; instead, it presents an economic analysis of certain aspects
of Japanese labor markets. As such, most empirical materials are examined
from a particular analytical perspective. To formulate the analytical framework,
I incorporate ideas from transaction-cost economics into the human capital
theory. This approach, it will be argued, can potentially accommodate the
analysis of how cultural and traditional factors interact with the influences of
economic growth. This aspect of the theory is especially attractive for study
ing labor market institutions in Japan, because, in my view, such interactions
likely helped shape many of the Japanese labor market practices during the
country©s economic development.
For institutional materials and data, I will rely heavily on existing studies,
many of which are in English. Much of the quantitative evidence has been
developed specifically for this project, though I draw on research findings
reported in my previous works either alone or with John Raisian. Although
the focus is on the Japanese scene, I will try as much as possible to place the
analysis in a comparative perspective with the United States.
I wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge my indebtedness to some of
the many individuals who have influenced the intellectual orientation of this
book: my teachers, Gary S. Becker and Jacob Mincer, who encouraged me
to analyze Japanese labor markets; Yoram Barzel, Steven N.S. Cheung, Levis
Kochin, and Keith B. Leffler, who taught me what transaction-cost economics
is about; Ben T. Yu, who collaborated with me on a paper which set the direc
tion for this research; Masatoshi Kuratani, who, through his Ph.D. disserta
tion in the early 1970s and through subsequent contacts, sparked my interest
in applying human capital theory to Japan; and John Raisian, my co-author
on many of the papers on Japan-U.S. labor market comparisons, for many
years of productive work together and for letting me use in this book some
of the material we developed together.
Some of the related materials were presented to the conferences held in Santa
Clara (1986), West Berlin (1986), Yokohama (1986), Brussels (1988),
Washington, D.C. (1989), Madison (1989), and New York (1990). I would
like to take this opportunity to thank the organizers and commentators of these
conferences: Ernst W. Stromsdorfer, Peter T. Chinloy, and Duane E. Leigh
(Santa Clara); Robert A Hart, John P. Martin, and Peter McGregor (West
Berlin and Brussels); Kazutoshi Koshiro, Fumio Ohtake, Akira Ono, and Yoko

Sano (Yokohama); Robert E. Litan, Alan S. Blinder, and Richard B. Freeman
(Washington, D.C.); Jozef M.M. Ritzen and Michael Feuer (Madison); and
David E. Bloom, Linda N. Edwards, and Aloysius Siow (New York) for hav
ing provided me with the opportunity to present my research findings and to
benefit from their useful comments and suggestions. Seminar and workshop
participants at the Meiji Gakuin University, The Ohio State University,
Yokohama National University, the University of Cincinnati, the Upjohn In
stitute for Employment Research, the University of Chicago, and the Univer
sity of Costa Rica offered many useful comments.
At about the time this manuscript was being edited, I began investigating
the training and employment practices at the Japanese automobile transplants
in the U.S. Midwest. By mid-August, 19901 had visited and interviewed the
key personnel at two companies Subaru-Isuzu Automotive Inc. (SIA) and
Diamond-Star Motors (DSM) and made a preliminary visit to Honda of
America Manufacturing (HAM), as well. I have incorporated some of what
I learned from these visits into the relevant discussions, especially in chapter
5. I wish to thank these companies for agreeing to participate in my study.
Many people read portions of this manuscript and related papers and of
fered useful comments and discussions. I wish to thank Yoram Barzel, Gary
S. Becker, Barbara L. Brugman, Linda N. Edwards, Yoshio Higuchi, H. Allan
Hunt, Susan N. Houseman, Todd L. Idson, Fuchun Jin, Jacob Mincer, Hajime Miyazaki, Alice Nakamura, Donald O. Parsons, Robert G. Spiegelman,
and Ben T. Yu. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for reading the
entire manuscript and offering many constructive comments. I relied on Reiko
Aoki and Tatsuro Ichiishi for mathematical advice and Paul Evans for advice
on time-series analysis, all of whom graciously offered their help on the spot.
I wish to acknowledge the competent research assistance by Apurva Mathur
and Fuchun Jin. Since I refer to some of the evidence developed in my previous
works, it is appropriate to acknowledge the funding received from the U.S.
Department of Labor (Office of Assistant Secretary) and the Hoover Institu
tion (National Fellowship) to help finance them. The Ohio State University
also provided partial summer research support in 1987, 1988, and 1990.1 also
wish to acknowledge my gratitude to Katharine G. Abraham, Yoshio Higuchi,
Takatoshi Ito, Kazutoshi Koshiro, Machiko Osawa, and Haruo Shimada for
facilitating my collection of materials. Judith K. Gentry©s conscientious editorial
supervision is gratefully acknowledged. My sons, Barry Masanori and Jef
frey Masayuki, helped uplift my spirits, and my wife, Barbara Brugman, not
only offered emotional support and encouragement throughout this project,
but also served as precious advisor. Finally, to those who helped me along
the way but whose names I may have neglected to mention, I offer my sincere
apologies along with gratitude.
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SUMMARY
This book develops a unified understanding of some of the notable Japanese
labor market features in a comparative perspective with the United States. In
Japan, as compared to the United States, for example, levels of employment
tenure are high, employer-employee attachment strong, and earnings-tenure
profiles steeply sloped. Layoffs and dismissals are used much less frequently
in Japan than in the United States, with adjustments in hours of work and in
ventories assuming a greater importance. Industrial relations in Japan contain
some unique institutions, such as joint consultation and consensus-based decisionmaking, and work organization exhibits a great deal of flexibility. Not
to be overlooked is the phenomenon of Japanese employers and employees
spending a great deal of informal time together after work hours. This expen
diture of time is viewed here as an investment in the employment relation
ship, and reflects the overall greater investment in the employment relation
ship in Japan than in the United States. This investment difference results in
a stronger employer-employee attachment in Japan than in the U.S., as evidenc
ed by the considerably smaller number of days lost in labor disputes in Japan.
To bring together these phenomena in a single conceptual framework, a
theory is formulated which incorporates transaction-cost considerations into
human capital theory. Transaction costs in this analysis denote costs of com
municating information between the employer and the employee as well as
among the employees, including the costs of convincing the other party of the
information©s veracity. The theory draws the distinction between two types
of investments: investments in firm-specific technical skills and investments
in the reliability of information exchanged between the employer and employees
and among employees. It is this latter type of investment that takes place in
the Japanese joint consultation system, quality control circles, and consensusbased decisionmaking, as well as in the time spent with co-workers in
restaurants and bars.
This book hypothesizes that there are more investments in Japan than in
America because, for various reasons, the investment costs are lower in Japan.
An autonomous increase in the investment in information reliability is found
to encourage the investment in technical skills. Similarly, an autonomous in
crease in the investment in technical skills stimulates the investment in infor
mation reliability. Most important, the investments in both technical skills and
in information reliability may be stimulated by technological progress, and
the stimulation is greater the more elastic are the cost functions underlying
these investments. It is argued that the cost function associated with the in
vestment in information reliability is more elastic in a lower transaction-cost
environment.
vn

Based on the above results, the book argues that cultural-traditional in
fluences, which shape the transaction-cost environment, likely interacted with
technological progress in shaping many of the uniquely Japanese labor market
phenomena. In particular, the productivity enhancement campaign (seisansei
undo) that began with the establishment of the Japan Productivity Center in
1955 encouraged rapid technological progress, which in turn stimulated the
investment in firm-specific technical skills. The increased investment in
technical skills encouraged the investment in information reliability, and this
whole process was boosted by the low-transaction cost environment that prevail
ed in Japan. The increased information reliability further stimulated the in
vestment in technical skills. As a result, the employer-employee attachment
became strengthened, and it became manifest in such labor market institutions
as joint consultations, consensus-based decisionmaking, and enterprise unions,
all of which became widespread in Japan after the late 1950s.
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Introduction
Japan and the United States today represent the two most successful free
market economies in the world. These two economies share many
similarities: both operate in highly competitive and open markets; both
have enjoyed strong positions in manufacturing and high technology
industries; and both have experienced significant sectoral shifts in
employment since the early 1970s. These and other similarities, how
ever, should not make one overlook important differences between the
two economies. It is these contrasts that offer fertile bases for new
insights. Whether the differences are due to cultural, traditional, or
economic factors, it seems undeniable that they ultimately manifest
themselves in the conduct of employers and employees, and in the labor
market institutions.
Many of the differences have already been noted in the literature.
They include the following:
1. In Japan, long-term employment is more prevalent, employeremployee attachment is stronger, and employee tenure in a firm has a
more substantial effect on worker earnings when compared to the United
States (Hashimoto and Raisian 1985, 1989; Mincer and Higuchi 1988).
The labor-management relationship is evidently more cooperative in
Japan than in the United States turnover rates are considerably lower,
and the number of days lost in labor disputes much smaller. !
2. The Japanese and U.S. economies differ in the ways that employ
ment, hours of work, and inventories adjust over the business cycle.
Layoffs and dismissals are extremely rare in Japan. Instead, adjustments
in hours of work, wages, and inventories assume a relatively greater role
over the business cycle in that country than in the United States (Gordon
1982; Hashimoto and Raisian 1987, 1988; Abraham and Houseman
1989). 2
1
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3. The two economies have typically coped differently with declining
manufacturing industries. Since the 1970s, workforce reductions in
Japan were achieved with less reliance on outright dismissals than in the
United States.
4. In the Japanese wage system, workers typically receive a signifi
cant portion of earnings in bonuses, whereas bonuses received by U.S.
workers are rarely significant (Hashimoto 1979; Freeman and
Weitzman 1987). In addition, wage bargaining in Japan is synchronized
to the annual spring offensive (shuntd)— an arrangement that helps make
wages more flexible there than in the United States (Gordon 1982;
Taylor 1989).
5. Japanese labor contracts are brief, leaving much room for continu
ous adjustment by mutual consent of the parties involved (Hanami
1981). Labor and management engage frequently in joint consultations,
and major decisions are arrived at after an extensive sharing of informa
tion and the consensus-building procedure called nemawashi. 3
6. Unions in Japan are enterprise-based. Although most unions be
long to national-level federations, the basic issues of wages, working
conditions, and like factors are negotiated at a firm level. Unlike the
local of an American industrial union, the Japanese enterprise union,
which typically includes white-collar nonsupervisory employees as well
as blue-collar workers, is not merely an administrative unit of a national
union. 4
The book argues that many of the differences in labor market practices
between the two countries or for that matter among any countries
reflect contrasts in the investment made in the employment relationship.
What factors determine the investment differences? To answer this ques
tion, one might expect the theories of employment contracts, which have
been the focus of many recent theoretical studies, to offer some guidance. 5
As they now stand, unfortunately, employment contract theories in the
literature are not particularly suited for cross-country studies, as most
were motivated by labor market phenomena in the United States.
For example, the main prediction from the implicit contract theories,
first introduced by Azariadis (1975), Baily (1974), and Gordon (1974),
and subsequently elaborated on by a number of researchers, is that in the
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long-term employment relationship wages will be rigid, with workers
facing a positive probability of layoff during economic downturns. This
prediction seems to conform to the tendencies toward wage rigidity and
the frequent use of layoffs that characterize the U.S. labor market. 6 It is
not consistent, however, with the experience of Japan, known for its
long-term employment relationships. There, workers in the shushin
koyo (permanent employment) system rarely experience U.S.-type
layoffs, and their wages are quite flexible, as they contain semi-annual
bonuses and are renegotiated every year. The implicit contract theories
may have the potential to accommodate Japanese phenomena, but such
an extension is not obvious.
Clearly, a theory is needed that can help achieve a unified understand
ing of such labor market phenomena as labor turnover, earnings, and the
strength of the employer-employee attachment. An important aim of
such a theory should be to explain contrasts among labor market
practices in different countries. Implicit contract theories, however, not
having been designed to address the turnover issue, would have diffi
culty in achieving this aim. For example, one may assert, as the implicit
contract theories do, that a typical firm has the incentive to offer a longterm employment contract, but what is there to prevent workers from
leaving for another job during the life of the contract?
In fact, many U.S. workers do change jobs frequently, though job
separations decline with years of tenure, typical Japanese workers
appear more reluctant than their U.S. counterparts to separate for the
purpose of taking another job. 7 Clearly, it is desirable for a theory of
employment contract to treat the separation incentives of the employer
and the employee as they relate to earnings and other characteristics of
the employment relationship. In this vein, the potential usefulness of the
theory of firm-specific human capital seems obvious, as it can account
for how turnover and earnings change with tenure in the firm. 8 As Rosen
(1985) stated, "some consideration for differences in firm-specific
human capital, labor mobility, and quasi-fixed factor ideas are required
to fully account for international differences in labor market phe
nomena" (p. 1165).
It will be argued that cultural/traditional influences likely interacted
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with technological progress in shaping many of the uniquely Japanese
labor market phenomena. To analyze this interaction, chapter 2 dis
cusses a theory that combines transaction-cost considerations with
human capital theory. Transaction costs in this theory refer to the costs of
communicating and verifying relevant information between employer
and employees, and they are viewed as playing a central role in shaping
many of the labor market institutions. Since culture and tradition can be
interpreted as influencing transaction costs, the proposed theory offers a
way of bringing these noneconomic factors into economic analysis.
In previous works, I have argued that positive transaction costs are the
key factor in the sharing theorem of the human capital theory, and
proposed that wage flexibility enhances the value of contracts involving
firm-specific human capital (Hashimoto 1979,1981; Hashimoto and Yu
1980). Here, I extend those analyses and offer a conceptual framework
for a comparative study of Japanese and American labor markets. I
postulate that the employer and employee invest in the employment
relationship in order to enhance their mutual well-being. I distinguish
between two types of investments: investment in the employee©s tech
nical skills and investment in the reliability of all types of information
exchanged within the firm. The effect of investing in the employee©s
technical skills on productivity is obvious. The investment in the relia
bility of information reduces mistrust, disputes, and inefficient deci
sions, and thereby promotes cooperative industrial relations and pro
ductivity. In my framework, the usual term training, or firm-specific
human capital, refers to the package of these investments. The greater
these investments the more productive the employment relationship.
An increased investment in technical skills stimulates the investment
in information reliability and vice versa. The independent variables are
the costs associated with these investments and the worker propensity
for mobility. The cost of investing in technical skills is a function of
how well the formal education system prepares students for training by
imparting positive attitudes for learning as well as by teaching basic
skills. The cost of investing in information reliability reflects the
transaction-cost environment, which in turn is affected by the degree of
cultural heterogeneity of the workforce, the attitudes of the management
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and workers, and the workers© abilities to function cooperatively as a
group. Finally, a high worker propensity for mobility reduces the
returns to these investments and so discourages training.
I hypothesize that there are more investments in Japan than in the
United States because, for various reasons, the investment costs and the
mobility propensity are lower in Japan. One of the theorems that
emerges is that economic growth and technological progress can stimu
late both types of investment and that each type, in turn, reinforces the
other. Japanese investments in employment relations became pro
nounced in the 1960s, coinciding with that economy©s rapid tech
nological change and accelerated economic growth.
It might be said also that to fully understand labor market differences
between countries, one would have to pay attention to differences in the
laws regulating the labor markets and in the institutions of industrial
relations. But laws and institutions are themselves endogenous, and a
complete investigation must go even further by analyzing the manner in
which they are shaped by exogenous factors such as culture and tradi
tion. It is hoped that this study makes a contribution to future investiga
tions by suggesting how influences of culture and tradition may be
incorporated into an economic analysis.
Economists tend to shun invoking the influences of culture and
tradition in explaining real-world phenomena, but it would seem inap
propriate to deny the influence of these factors altogether, especially in
cross-country comparisons. At the same time, an explanation based on
culture and tradition alone would seem unsatisfactory, especially if it
suggests unchanging persistence over time in labor market features. A
more productive approach would be to investigate how traditional and
cultural factors shape labor market characteristics in response to chang
ing circumstances.
In studying Japanese-U.S. differences in labor markets, one hesitates
in appealing solely to culture and tradition, because some of the labor
market differences appear to have emerged rather recently. For exam
ple, (1) Japanese labor turnover appears to have been quite high from the
early 1900s through the early 1950s (Taira 1970; Shimada 1983; Gor
don 1985); (2) the often-noted wage rigidity in the United States appears

6

Introduction

to have emerged after the end of World War II, when a drastic decline in
the responsiveness of wages to economic conditions took place (Gordon
1982); and (3) the Japanese style of industrial relations became preva
lent after the late 1950s when the rate of economic growth began to
accelerate as a result, in my opinion, of the productivity enhancement
campaign (seisansei undo) launched in 1955.
Although labor market flexibility has been a topic of considerable
recent interest, there have been only a few analyses of the underlying
causes of differential flexibility across countries. 9 It is hoped that the
theory presented in this book will contribute to closing this gap. Also,
the existing literature on transaction costs lacks an explicit model of how
transaction costs affect behavior, though many of the discussions are
thoughtful and provocative (e.g., Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978;
Williamson 1975, 1985). An important contribution of this book is to
incorporate transaction costs explicitly into the theory of firm-specific
human capital. 10

Employment Categories in Japan
Let me end this chapter by discussing the definitions of employment
categories in Japan. The Japanese labor force includes persons 15 years
of age or older, in contrast to the U.S. labor force for which the youngest
age is 16 years. Employed persons in Japan are classified into those at
work and those not at work (kyugyoshd). This latter category consists of
persons who are not currently working but are kept on payroll and
counted as employed persons. 11 Some of the workers in this category
may, in fact, be on temporary layoff (Hashimoto 1990c). If so, they
would be classified as being unemployed rather than employed were
they in the United States.
Whether at work or not, employed persons are categorized by
employers as self-employed workers, family workers, and/or employ
ees (see dotted line in table 1.1). The employee category, in turn, con
sists of regular workers, temporary employees, or day workers. Selfemployment has the same meaning as the U.S. definition, and family
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workers those who work in an unincorporated enterprise operated by a
member of the family may be paid or unpaid.
In 1988, self-employed and family workers amounted to about 18.8
percent of all nonagricultural employment, a much larger proportion
than the U.S. figure of about 8 percent. 12 Japanese women are more
likely to be family workers than are men. In 1988, 13 percent of
employed females in the nonagricultural sector belonged to the familyworker category, as compared to 1.9 percent for males. The proportion
for self-employment in the nonagricultural sector was 11.2 percent for
females and 13.5 percent for males.
Much of what one reads about the uniqueness of the Japanese labor
market refers to regular workers. Regular workers are under employ
ment contracts with an unspecified length of employment duration, and
many of them, especially in large firms, are in the shushin koyo (lifetime
employment) system with nenko (tenure-based) wage schedules. 13
Their earnings consist of regular wages and the famous twice-yearly
bonuses, which sometimes amount to about 30 percent of their total
receipts. 14 Among male nonagricultural employees, 94.6 percent were
regular workers in 1988, as compared to 80.6 percent of the females.
Male regular workers have been a significant human resource in Japan,
at least in the marketplace, with the employment practices for this
category of worker serving as models for other workers in Japan.
Temporary workers have contracts with a period of employment
lasting more than a month but less than one year, and day laborers with
an employment period lasting less than a month. These contracts are
renewable. Casual observations suggest that temporary workers in
Japan tend to work for the same employers. 15 Many of these workers in
effect may have more than transitory attachments to their employers. It
is difficult to make a similar distinction in the U.S. data. A student hired
for a summer job, for example, is indistinguishable from a young
household head with a permanent job. 16
Employed Japanese women are more likely than men to be family
workers, temporary workers, or day laborers. Also, almost 29 percent
of female employees in the nonagricultural sector, as compared to 6.2
percent of males, worked fewer than 35 hours per week in 1988. Thus,
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Employment Categories in Japan
(1,000 persons in 1988)

Table 1.1

Labor Force (15 years and older)
(98,490)

Not in Labor Force
(36,350)

Totally Unemployed
(1,550)
^ /
1
/^
1
1

At Work
(59,290)
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

\\

\ ^v

\

\

\

\

\\

Not At Work (Kyugyoshd)
(810)
\

Family Workers
(5,430)

Regular Workers
(40,530)

Temporary Workers
(3,600)

SOURCE: Japan Productivity Center, Katsuyo Rodo Tokei (Practical Labor Statistics) 1990, p.
238.
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Japanese women do appear to have a weaker attachment to the labor
market than men. 17 It should be noted, however, that the proportion of
females who are family workers has been declining in Japan. In 1965,
the proportion stood at 36.8 percent, but by 1975 it had declined to 25.7
percent. In 1986, it was 19.4 percent. This decline is one of the key
factors behind the decline in female labor force participation in Japan
that took place in spite of rising female wages during the postwar years
(Hill 1983; Shimada and Higuchi 1985; Osawa 1988). According to
these authors, participation of females in paid sectors experienced an
upward trend, as expected, throughout most of the postwar years. It is
the declining importance of family workers that contributed to the
lowering of the overall participation rate for Japanese women.
NOTES
1 The two countries have been diverging from each other in the number of days lost due to labor
disputes. The days lost in Japan started to follow a downward trend around 1960, but in the United
States the trend has been moderately upwards during most of the postwar years. See chapter 3.
2 The weaker reliance on outright dismissals for workforce reductions undoubtedly is a factor
in the lower unemployment rates in Japan as compared to those in the United States (Ito 1984).
3 Nemawashi literally means digging around the roots of a tree and trimming them in advance
to ensure a successful transplant or to promote the bearing of abundant fruits. Its figurative meaning
is to take every necessary step by communicating with individuals who are involved to bring about a
desired outcome. Joint consultation is the primary channel through which management and labor
deal with such issues as recruitment, dismissal, transfer and promotion, changes in production
techniques and in management policies, plant closings, and industrial safety. Expediting commu
nication and promoting harmonious relationships are the major objectives of this approach. Both
the nemawashi and joint-consultation practices prevail throughout the economy, not just in the
unionized sector. See chapter 3 for additional discussions.
4 The reader is warned against drawing any conclusions about which of the two countries
is the odd man on the block. Many European countries, for example, have works councils
(Betriebsr&te) whose operations resemble Japan©s joint consultation, and these countries appear to
have more harmonious labor-management relations than the United States. Also, bonus payments
exist in such countries as Belgium, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands to a greater extent than
in the United States, though on average the proportion of bonus to total compensation is only about
10 percent in those countries about half as large as in Japan. See chapter 3 for more details.
5 For informative surveys of many of the recent developments in this literature, see Rosen
(1985) and Parsons (1986).
6 Note, however, that Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980) criticize implicit contract theories by
demonstrating that they do not adequately explain layoff unemployment, as the proponents of these
theories claimed. Also, just how rigid U.S. wages are seems to be controversial. Recent findings by
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Stockman (1983), Bils (1985), and Hashimoto and Raisian (1987a,b) suggest that U.S. wages may
not be as rigid as some have claimed. In contrast, there is little controversy surrounding the
flexibility of Japanese wages.
7 Nothing remains the same forever. There is evidence that job mobility may increase in Japan
in the near future. See "Japan Cuts the Middle-Management Fat," The Wall Street Journal,
8 August 1989.
8 Firm-specific human capital refers to factors such as technical know-how, skills, and
organizational knowledge, which raise worker productivity in a particular firm more than in others.
The concept was first formalized by Becker (1962). See also Hashimoto (1981) for an extension of
the analysis.
9 See, for example, Chinloy and Stromsdorfer (1987); OECD (1986); Freeman (1987);
Koshiro (1986); Hart (1988); and Tachibanaki (1986).
10 The transaction-cost literature stresses the importance of contract-specific capital mostly
physical capital in generating ex post opportunistic behavior. Obviously, the same considerations
apply to firm-specific human capital.
11 The Labor Standards Law specifies that those who became kyugyosha through fault of their
employer must be paid at least 60 percent of their usual pay (Japan Labor Standards Bureau 1988).
The official description simply states that these are (1) workers who are absent from work but who
received, or are to receive, wages or salary for time off, and (2) self-employed workers whose
absence from work has not exceeded 30 days. See Japan Statistics Bureau, Management and
Coordination Agency, Annual Report on the Labour Force Survey (1988), 196. According to table
27 of that publication, in 1988 fully 89 percent of these workers were in nonagricultural industries.
Among those, the highest proportion were in services (28 percent), followed by manufacturing (22
percent), trade and eating and drinking establishments (22 percent), and construction (14 percent).
The remaining workers were distributed thinly among fisheries, electric and gas supply, transporta
tion and communication, and government. Almost 75 percent of kyugyosha in nonagricultural jobs,
and over 81 percent in manufacturing, were employees rather than self-employed persons. Slightly
more than 58 percent in nonagricultural pursuits and 50 percent in manufacturing were males. It
appears, therefore, that most of these workers are bonafide members of the employed class in
nonagricultural sectors. See Hashimoto (1990c) for related discussions.
12 The Japanese data for the discussion of the employment categories are from Japan Statistics
Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, Annual Report on the Labour Force Survey
(1988), tables 26, 27; and the U.S. data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of
Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2340 (1989), table 21.
13 Employment contracts lasting for more than a year are illegal in Japan. Exceptions occur in
cases where a project is known to end in, say, three years and craftsmen are hired for that duration,
or when employers obtain special permission from their prefectural authority to put workers in onthe-job training programs.
14 See Hashimoto (1979) and Freeman and Weitzman (1987) for analyses of Japanese bonuses.
15 For example, the president of a medium-sized Japanese manufacturing firm told me that the
same farmers from a certain farming region return to his firm year after year during off-seasons as
temporary employees.
16 There is, however, a growing temporary help industry in the United States. This industry is
made up of establishments supplying temporary help to businesses, and currently accounts for
about 1 percent of total nonagricultural employment. Also, the U.S. data categorize employment
into part-time and full-time components. In 1988, 82 percent of nonagricultural wage and salary
workers (16 years or older) worked at full-time jobs, though an additional 1.6 percent, who usually
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work full time, worked at part-time jobs for economic reasons. In Japan, about 12 percent of
employment consists of part-time workers, in contrast to the U.S. magnitude of 17 to 19 percent.
17 In 1988, the labor force participation rate in Japan was 48.9 percent for women and 77.1
percent for men (for those 15 years and older). In the United States, the comparable rates were 56.6
percent and 76.6 percent, respectively, for women and men. The Japanese data are from the Japan
Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, Annual Report on the Labour Force
Survey (1988), table 1; andtheU.S. figures, fromtheU.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbookof
Labor Statistics (1989), table 1.

A Theory of Investments in the
Employment Relationship
Labor markets in Japan exhibit characteristics that are quite different
from those in the United States. Three observations about the Japanese
features motivate the theory discussed in this chapter. First, many of the
Japanese labor market traits became pronounced only after the late
1950s when the Japanese economic growth began to accelerate. 1 The
influences of tradition and culture alone, therefore, would seem to be
insufficient for explaining why these features became consolidated and
widespread at that particular time. Second, the same characteristics
have not emerged in other countries that have experienced rapid eco
nomic growth. Obviously, economic growth alone cannot explain the
postwar emergence of these Japanese features either. Third, the appar
ently cooperative character of Japanese industrial relations is not
costlessly achieved, as management and labor spend a great deal of
time, mental energy, and money on smoothing out relationships with
each other. 2 Since this phenomenon has persisted for some time in
many Japanese firms, the gains presumably justify the transaction
expenditures.
This chapter presents a theory for bringing the various labor market
features into a unifying framework of analysis. Figure 2.1 summarizes
the hypothesized relationships. The theory discussed in this chapter
concerns the relationships shown in the shaded area. I argue that many
of the observed labor market phenomena in Japan, indicated at the top of
figure 2.1, reflect investments in the employment relationship or in what
is known as firm-specific human capital, undertaken by its labor force.
This investment consists of two separate parts, one in technical skills
and the other in information reliability. Symbols are used in the text to
represent various quantities, and they are shown in figure 2.1: the
13
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amounts of capital created by the investments are indicated as h and z,
and the returns from these investments by M and R, respectively. The
variables h,z,M, and R are endogenous in the analysis; in other words,
they are determined in the model. The effect on productivity of investing
in the employee©s technical skills is straightforward. The investment in
the reliability of information promotes cooperative industrial relations
by reducing mistrust, disputes, and inefficient decisions. An important
result of the analysis is to demonstrate that the two investment compo
nents interact with each other: an increased information reliability
stimulates the investment in technical skills, and vice versa.
Exogenous variables variables determined outside the model are
the costs associated with the two investment activities. The cost of
investing in technical skills is determined primarily by how well the
formal education system prepares students for on-the-job training by
instilling positive attitudes for learning and by teaching basic skills.
The cost of investing in information reliability is determined by the
transaction-cost environment, which in turn reflects the influences of
tradition and culture, ethnic homogeneity, effectiveness of education in
fostering workers© abilities to function cooperatively as a group, and
worker propensity to change jobs.
Of particular focus in this study is the transaction-cost environment.
Transaction costs are costs that Robinson Crusoe would not have in
curred before he met Friday. 3 Transaction costs here connote the diffi
culty of communicating all sorts of information between employer and
employees, and among employees themselves. These include the costs
of convincing the relevant parties of the information©s veracity. With low
transaction costs, parties can respond flexibly to changing circum
stances without having to undertake a costly verification of information.
In contrast, high transaction costs reduce the reliability of information
exchanged, discourage quick responses, and cause a dissipation of the
gains from working together. Figure 2.1 indicates that the transactioncost environment is shaped by, among other things, ethnic homogeneity.
Indeed, it is sometimes claimed that the relative homogeneity of the
Japanese population explains how firms are organized in that country
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Figure 2.1 Hypothesis: Japanese Labor Market Phenomena
Flexible Contracts (joint consultations, nemawashi)
Cooperative Employment Relations (low rate of labor disputes)
Enterprise Unions
Long-Term Employment (shushin koyo)
Rare Use of Layoffs
Seniority-Based Earnings Profiles (nenko joretsu)
Bonuses

Investment in ,
Technical Skills (/z)
[Returns=M;|

l&loirwlioa Reliability.{«)

Basic Education

! Transaction-Cost Environment

Tradition and Culture, Ethnic
Homogeneity, Education
h
II

ji
H

Observable
Consequences

I
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I____I
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Variables

J" ~ ~ ~ ~ 1
i____j
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Variables

NOTE: The shaded area denotes the domain of the analysis in this chapter, and the symbols h, z, M,
and R indicate the notations used for the respective magnitudes in the text. The (+) and ( ) signs
indicate, respectively, positive and negative influences.
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(Aoki 1988, chap. 2). The theory discussed below suggests that this
claim may have some validity.

Returns to and Scale of Investment in Technical Skills
Let us begin by laying out the building blocks necessary to construct
the theoretical relationships in this model concerning the investment in
technical skills. To develop the returns function associated with the
investment in technical skills, it is necessary to discuss contract flexibil
ity. The term refers to the degree to which contracts permit adjustments
to newly emerging conditions. The ideal contract, completely flexible,
would stipulate that all of the relevant new developments be incorpo
rated immediately into contractual arrangements without rewriting the
contract. The fixed, or rigid, contract would stipulate that none of the
new developments be incorporated until the contract comes up for
renewal. Between these extremes is the flexible contract, in which some
adjustments to new developments are made automatically during the life
of the contract.
For simplicity, let us assume that there are two periods in an employ
ment relationship. In the first period, the employer and the employee
decide how much to invest in the employment relationship and how to
share the benefits of such investment. The sharing decision determines
the employee©s wage in the second period. 4 Investments are made with
respect to firm-specific technical skills and to information reliability. At
the beginning of the second period, relevant productivity information is
revealed, and the parties decide to stay together or to separate.
A key aspect of the model is that in the second period there is a
potential wealth loss caused by postcontractual (or ex post) oppor
tunistic behavior. As Williamson has noted, the value of a transaction
that is subject to ex post opportunism will be enhanced by devising ex
ante appropriate safeguards (Williamson 1985, 48). In this model, the
safeguards are the investment made in the reliability of information and
the sharing arrangement for the benefit and costs of investments. 5
Postcontractual opportunistic behavior may occur at the second pe-
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riod because the values of the worker in the firm and outside inevitably
are subject to information asymmetry: the employer is likely to be better
informed about the value of the employee in the firm and the employee is
better informed about his or her value outside the firm. As a result, the
parties may have incentives to misrepresent their information. In partic
ular, if the contract calls for sharing the realized value of the investment,
the employer will have the incentive to understate the value of the
employee©s contribution, and the employee to overstate his or her outside
productivity. As a result, the parties may engage in haggling and may
even end up separating, even though they would be jointly better off not
separating. Such separations are clearly inefficient.
The parties have the incentive to reduce the likelihood of wasteful
haggling and of inefficient separations by optimally sharing the benefit
of the relationship. 6 The parties make relevant decisions in the first
period by comparing what they expect to be the value of the contract.
They are assumed to have no difficulty in the first period agreeing on the
probability distributions of the productivity outcomes: they share com
mon knowledge about the past influences of business cycles and other
sources of economic fluctuations. To characterize the contractual solu
tions chosen by the parties in an effort to minimize the adverse effects of
information asymmetry, the model will be formulated in terms of wage
flexibility. The analysis of flexibility along other dimensions, such as
task assignments, promotions, and related personnel matters, will be
similar in spirit, however.
We are now ready to discuss the relationships that underlie the
investments in technical skills and in information reliability. The discus
sion will be kept to a nontechnical level, but a judicious use of symbols to
represent the key building blocks of the theory will add concreteness to
the argument. 7
The building blocks are represented by the following symbols:
M*:
Ml :
M2 :
a:

value of the ideal contract to the parties
value of the fixed-wage contract to the parties
value of the flexible-wage contract to the parties
errors associated with the agreements about the productivities (a is
the parameter indicating the maximum amount of errors)
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M:
h:
z:
R:
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marginal returns to the investment in technical skills
quantity of technical skills
quantity of information reliability
total returns on the investment in information reliability

Suppose that the parties could freely agree on the realized productiv
ity values. This situation would be as if the parties were a single
individual, and there would be no transaction-cost-related problems. In
particular, the ideal wage contract would be feasible, because each
party©s separation decision would follow exactly the efficient separation
criterion, namely, that a separation takes place only when the employee©s
value elsewhere exceeded his or her value with the current employer. 8
Therefore, the distinction between layoffs (dismissals) and quits would
be meaningless, as all separations would be mutually desired. 9 Let us
denote the value of the employment relationship under the ideal contract
by M*. This value can be computed as the weighted average of the
expected value of entering into an employment relationship that would
accrue if the parties were not to separate and the expected value that
would accrue if they were to separate, where the weights are the
probabilities of not separating and of separating. 10
If information is asymmetric, and if transactions are costly between
the employee and the employer, the ideal wage contract will not be
feasible. As noted above, the problem is that neither party may have the
incentive to reveal his or her respective information truthfully to the
other. To illustrate, suppose that the employer knows only the realized
value of the inside productivity, and the employee only the realized value
of the outside productivity. The parties in this case may face difficulties
in communicating to each other their respective productivity values to
determine the division of the gains from the relationship. Difficulties
arise precisely because each party may have an incentive to misrepresent
what he or she knows in order to increase his or her gains at the expense
of the other.
Even with this difficulty, it is in the parties© interest to reach an
agreement, however imprecise it may be. Employers want employees to
accept their claims of employees© productivity; in turn, employees want
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to persuade employers of the value of their outside productivity. Each, in
turn, wants to verify the other©s claim. Persuasion and verification take
time and energy and are therefore costly. An agreement, however, will
confer some gains by enabling the parties to respond to changing
circumstances and, thereby, reduce the chances of making inefficient
decisions. The gains from reaching an agreement may be large enough
to justify incurring the cost of reaching such an agreement.
At one extreme, of course, an agreement may not be cost-effective:
employer and employee may foresee that they will never be able to
accept each other©s claims of realized productivities. In this case, the
natural thing to do is to agree in advance that the second-period wage
will be determined solely in terms of the expected, or average, values of
the productivities. The result is a fixed-wage contract, because the
second-period wage is independent of the realized values of
productivities.
In the fixed-wage contract, each party follows his or her own separa
tion criterion, each being different from the criterion for an efficient
separation. As a result, some inefficient separations inevitably occur. It
should be noted, however, that, in this model setup, when a separation is
efficient it will always take place. 1 1 The problem is that a separation may
take place even when it is inefficient. The resulting efficiency loss
reduces the value of this employment contract, and thereby reduces
the incentive to invest in the relationship. Let us denote the value of
the employment relationship under the fixed-wage contract by Ml . 12
Clearly, M*, the value of the employment relationship under the ideal
contract, is greater than M15 since there are no inefficient separations
associated with M* (Hashimoto 1990b).
The parties could reduce the loss from inefficient separations if they
were to agree on at least the approximate values of the realized pro
ductivities. 13 Whatever agreements they reach would be imperfect be
cause the agreed-upon values would deviate from the true values the
deviations are referred to as errors of measurement, or just errors. The
extent of the errors, denoted by a in this model, would be greater the
higher the transaction costs. 14 A contract that uses such agreements is a
flexible-wage contract, and the value of the employment relationship is
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denoted by M2 . 15 The value, M2 , turns out to have the following
important relationship:
M2 =M*-/(a),/(a)>0

(1)

which indicates that M2 is smaller than M*, the value of the ideal
contract, by the quantity/(a). The preceding discussion suggests that
the quantity/(a) is zero if the errors, a, associated with the agreement
are zero, and increases if a increases. 16 This last relationship is intu
itively obvious: the larger a, the higher the frequency of inefficient
separations and therefore the greater the efficiency loss. Put another
way, a reduction of a, if that were possible, would increase M2 .
We now have the basic building blocks to construct the returns to the
investment in technical skills. Assuming that the ideal contract is infeasible, the parties choose between the fixed-wage and the flexiblewage contracts by comparing the associated contract values. This
choice problem can be expressed as:
M=Max(Ml5 M2),

(2)

which states that the value of entering into an employment relation, M,
is either Mt or M2 , whichever is larger. The resulting value of M
constitutes the returns to investing in technical skills.
Consider the decision on how much to invest in technical skills. The
quantity of technical skills created by the investment is denoted by h.
The value per unit of h is M. Therefore, the optimum scale of h is
determined by equating M with the marginal cost of producing h.
Marginal returns (M)=Marginal cost,

(3)

where the marginal cost of investment is assumed to increase with h.
This cost is incurred at the time the contract is signed.
Figure 2.2 portrays the optimum decision: the optimum quantity of
investment is determined to be h*, where the marginal cost curve
crosses the marginal return curve, M. Clearly, the optimum h will
increase if either the value of employment relations increases so that M
shifts upward or the marginal cost curve shifts downward, or both. In
particular, suppose that a flexible-wage contract were chosen so that M
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Figure 2.2 Optimum Investment in Technical Skills (h)

Marginal Cost

Marginal Returns

13

h*
Investment (h)

equals M2 . A reduction of errors, a, would increase M, causing it to shift
upwards in figure 2.2. As a result, the optimum h would rise. If a fixedwage contract were chosen instead, so that M equals Ml , a reduction in a
would not affect M, and so the optimum h would not be affected either.
To summarize, optimum decisionmaking can be illustrated by the
following scenario. Assume for the moment that the errors, a, are
exogenously given. First, given a, the contract type and the associated
value, M, are chosen by using equations (1) and (2). Then in figure 2.2,
M is equated with the marginal cost to obtain the optimum h.
Investment in Information Reliability (Reduction in Inaccuracy)
In the analysis above, the reliability of information exchanged was
assumed to be exogenous. Clearly, the parties may take steps to increase
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information reliability by reducing the errors, a. To achieve this goal,
resources must be spent on screening job candidates, reducing the
asymmetry of information, and, more generally, improving the quality
of communication among employees and between management and
workers. To incorporate these considerations into the model, it is neces
sary to treat a as endogenous.
The parties are assumed to spend resources to reduce a. I will refer to
this activity as an investment in information reliability. The quantity of
this investment is denoted by z, defined as:
z=a-a, 0<z<a,

(4)

where a is the fixed parameter denoting the value of a that would prevail
if no resources were spent on reducing it. Equation (4) makes clear that
an increase in z is equivalent to a reduction in a. In other words, the
larger the z the greater the reliability of information. The variable, z, is
bound between zero and a: the smallest value of z is zero, which obtains
when no resource is spent on reducing a, i.e., a is equal to a, and the
largest attainable value of z is a, which occurs when a is reduced to zero.
The total returns from investing in z is given by:

R=R(z, h)=Mh-(cost of/z),

(5)

where R is the total return from investing in z, and Mh may be thought of
as the total value (unit value, M, times the quantity h) of the employment
relationship. Equation (5) states that R depends on z and h, with the term
Mh revealing that z affects R via M because a affects M. The preceding
discussions make clear that R increases when z increases (i.e., a de
creases). 17 Finally, as in the case for the investment in technical skills,
the parties face a cost function of investing in z.
The parties choose the optimum values of a and h by maximizing the
following objective function:
TT =R(z, h) - (cost of z).

(6a)

By substituting equation (5) into (6a), one obtains:
ir=Mh- [(cost of h) + (cost of z)].

(6b)

The optimum values of h and z are determined from equation (6b) by
satisfying the following two relations:
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Marginal returns from h= Marginal cost of h,

(7a)

Marginal returns from z= Marginal cost of z.

(7b)

The optimum amount of h is determined from equation (7a) in the
same manner as indicated in figure 2.2. Figure 2.3 illustrates how
optimal z is obtained from equation (7b). To simplify, the marginal
returns function for z is assumed to be linear. 18 The marginal returns
become zero once z reaches the maximum value of the errors, a: there
are no more returns to be had from investing in z once the errors are
reduced completely. Two outcomes are depicted in figure 2.3, depending
on the location of the marginal cost function. If the marginal cost is
MCa , the parties reduce a entirely (i.e., z=o) and adopt the ideal
contract. If the marginal cost is either MCb or MCb', the errors are
reduced by z*. (The difference between these marginal cost curves will
be discussed in the next section.)
In a competitive equilibrium, the investment costs as well as the
returns are shared between the parties to make the respective profit zero
in the long run. Employees may pay for their share of the cost either by
accepting a lower wage than their productivity warrants in the first
period, or by paying an entrance fee at the time of employment. 19

Discussion
The implications of the above model are straightforward. Other
things being equal, lowering the marginal cost of investing in informa
tion reliability increases the investment in information reliability and,
therefore, increases contract flexibility. An autonomous increase in
technical skills stimulates the investment in information reliability as
well as affects the choice of contract. 20 In particular, lowering the
marginal cost of investment in technical skills, other things being equal,
not only will increase the investment in technical skills but also the
investment in information reliability by shifting upwards the marginal
returns function in figure 2.3. Thus, it is possible for a fixed-wage
contract to be chosen initially, but for a flexible-wage contract to be
chosen later in response to an increased investment in technical skills.

24

A Theory of Investments in the Employment Relationships

Figure 2.3 Optimum Investment in Information Reliability (z)
Marginal Cost = MC b

Marginal Cost =

-1

Investment (z)

This theory argues that the cost function associated with the invest
ment in information reliability is shaped by the transaction-cost environ
ment. In a lower transaction-cost environment one incurs lower mar
ginal cost in increasing the reliability of information exchanged among
team members. As a result, more is invested in information reliability
and in technical skills. These investments promote cooperative indus
trial relations. I hypothesize that the transaction-cost environment in
Japan has been more favorable to investing in information reliability
than it has in the United States, and that this difference has played a role
in many of the Japanese-American differences in labor market
arrangements.
An interesting implication of the theory concerns the effects of
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technological progress on the incentive to invest in the employment
relationship. The effects of technological progress on Japanese invest
ments in firm-specific human capital and earnings have received some
attention in the literature (Tan 1987; Mincer and Higuchi 1988). Here, I
identify the channel through which technological progress stimulates
investments in human capital. A uniform productivity increase, wide
spread throughout the economy, may increase the incentive to invest in
both technical skills and information reliability, as well as raise the
likelihood that a flexible-wage contract is chosen. This possibility is best
illustrated with a simple case of a neutral technological progress, by
which the productivities of all activities rise in equal proportion
throughout the economy. 21 In this case, it can be shown that the marginal
returns functions in figures 2.2 and 2.3 shift upward. Costs of invest
ments remain unaffected, as both the productivities and input prices rise
in the same proportion. 22 As a result, investments in both technical
skills and information reliability are increased, raising the likelihood
that a flexible-wage contract dominates a fixed-wage contract.
An important point to note is that an increase in the investment caused
by an upward shift of the marginal returns function is greater the more
elastic flatter— the cost function. In figure 2.3, for example, MCb' is
more elastic than MCb . Clearly an upward shift of the marginal returns
function would increase z more if the marginal cost were MCb' than if it
were MCb . A similar argument can be made for the marginal cost
function in figure 2.2. In a lower transaction-cost environment, the
marginal cost function for investing in information reliability is likely
not only to be lower in figure 2.3, but also to be more elastic. The greater
cost elasticity in a lower transaction-cost environment underscores the
fact that the parties could expand investment without incurring a sharp
increase in the cost. What this analysis shows, then, is that an improve
ment in the returns stimulates the investment in information reliability
more in a lower transaction-cost environment. In other words, an
improvement in the returns interacts with the transaction-cost environ
ment in affecting the investment.
It was noted elsewhere that low transaction costs alone cannot explain
Japanese labor market phenomena, if only because labor turnover was
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high in the early 1900s and early 1950s (Hashimoto and Raisian 1988).
One naturally wonders why low transaction costs were not operating to
reduce turnover during those years. We suggested then that a compre
hensive understanding of Japanese labor markets may require an analy
sis of the interaction of economic growth and transaction costs rather
than of their separate effects. The discussion above suggests that tech
nological progress that accompanied economic growth may have inter
acted with the low transaction costs in bringing about many of the
Japanese labor market phenomena.
In particular, the post-World War II prevalence of these phenomena in
Japan can be interpreted as having been stimulated by the rapid eco
nomic growth and the technological progress that took place after the
late 1950s. Such Japanese practices as joint consultation, consensusbased decisionmaking, and enterprise unionism became widespread
after that period. This development coincided with the launch of a
campaign to raise productivity and international competitiveness by
importing modern technologies from the United States and Europe
(Hashimoto 1990a). 23 The effort was coordinated by the Japan Produc
tivity Center, established in March 1955.
Labor unions and leftist politicians initially opposed the campaign
vigorously, fearing that modern technologies would displace labor and
cause high unemployment. The drive eventually gained support from
unions and politicians based on three principles: (1) to prevent unem
ployment of workers whose jobs would be made redundant by new
technologies (the principle of job security); (2) to promote joint con
sultations between management and labor concerning the introduction
of new technologies and related matters; and (3) to promote fair shar
ing of the gains of new technologies among employers, workers, and
consumers.
Clearly, the prevention of unemployment and joint consultations have
become firmly entrenched in the Japanese industrial relations system.
The campaign helped guide private industries to acquire modern West
ern technologies, thereby contributing to the double-digit growth rate of
the country©s economy during the 1960s. 24 Given the historical back
ground of the campaign, it is reasonable to view the economic growth
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and technological change of the late 1950s as exogenous for my model,
though the employment relations system eventually must have had
feedback effects on economic growth subsequently.
The theory developed in this chapter may offer the key to understand
ing some of the Japanese industrial relations practices within the frame
work of the present theory. Japanese workers, on average, invest more in
the employment relationship, and they have more flexible contracts,
than American workers (Hashimoto and Raisian 1987a,b and 1988;
Mincer and Higuchi 1988). Also, work organization and industrial
relations in Japan are more flexible than in most other developed coun
tries. 25 Flexible work organization is supported by the job-rotation
system, whereby a typical worker is rotated among different tasks
during his or her career so that he or she may acquire a wide range of
skills (Koike 1984; Aoki 1988, chap. 2, 1989). The result is that
workers become proficient in a multitude of tasks, a characteristic which
facilitates a quick and flexible response to changes in work requirements
and enables them to understand and correct the conditions giving rise to
defective products and mechanical failure (Aoki 1988, 35-37). This
way, the job-rotation system helps promote the zero-, or low-defect
production process. The prevalance of these practices can be viewed as
resulting from the low costs of investing in both technical skills and
information reliability.
Large Japanese investments in information reliability are indicated by
such time-consuming measures as joint consultation and consensusbased decisionmaking. The Japanese educational system instills in
pupils skills and attitudes that promote effective group functioning and
continuous learning as well as preparing them for such basic general
skills as reading, writing, and arithmetic. As a result, the costs of
investment in the employment relationship are likely to be lower in
Japan than in the United States.
The relatively homogeneous labor force in Japan, along with an
absence of the attitude of individualism, has been cited as being respon
sible for the cooperative industrial relations there. 26 Our theory would
have to be extended to permit a comprehensive examination of this issue.
Let me indicate how such an extension might proceed.
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As is clear by now, investment in firm-specific human capital is a key
factor behind cooperative industrial relations. Suppose that the degree
of employee homogeneity refers to how similar the cost functions are
among job applicants. Although our theory has been formulated in
terms of a one-on-one employment contract, in reality an employer must
negotiate with numerous employees. If employees were homogeneous,
the employer could invest in technical skills and information reliability
on the same scale for all employees. If the employees were heteroge
neous, the employer might want to take into account individual differ
ences and adopt different investment policies for different employees.
If the heterogeneity were large, however, it might be too costly to
devise different investment policies for each and every employee. 27 In
that case, a fixed-wage contract fixed with respect to the realized
productivity values and individual differences in them might be chosen
for all employees. Since such a contract inevitably reduces the gains
from the employment relationship, the investment in firm-specific
human capital would be discouraged. An extension along this line must
also take into account the adverse selection problem as well. Employers
would have to devise a mechanism by which job applicants sort them
selves according to the costs functions. 28
The Japanese employer typically screens job applicants with much
care, a phenomenon that can be viewed as reflecting the attempt to
homogenize the workforce. 29 A homogeneous workforce facilitates the
adoption of a single investment policy. In this connection, it is interest
ing to note that quality control circles usually consist of homogeneous
membership. 30
Finally, the relevance of my theory at first glance may appear limited
to the male career workforce in Japan the so-called male regular
workers, who typically have lifetime employment. 31 The theory is much
more generally applicable than what such appearance would suggest,
however. As pointed out in chapter 1, male regular workers have been a
significant human resource in Japan, as regards the marketplace. More
over, employment practices associated with this category of worker have
served as models for other workers in Japan. For example, smaller firms
in Japan try to emulate the industrial relations practices of large firms:
investments in employment relations evidently occur among smaller
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firms judging by the significant length of employment tenure among
workers in small Japanese firms. 32 Therefore, knowledge about the
employment relationship for male regular workers is crucial in under
standing the performance of the Japanese industrial relations system.
Also, temporary workers in Japan tend to work year after year for the
same employers (see chapter 1). These workers in effect may have more
than casual attachments to their employers. If so, they and their employ
ers will have the incentive to invest in their employment relationships,
though surely on a smaller scale than in the case of regular workers.
To test the theory presented in this chapter, it would be useful to have
some direct evidence on the magnitude of transaction costs in Japan and
the United States, but transaction costs are difficult to measure directly.
As a result, the skeptical reader may be inclined to discredit any
evidence offered in support of the proposition that transaction costs are
lower in one country than in the other. The problem of not being able to
observe certain variables in a model is not new. Indeed, the theory of
human capital shares the same attribute in that such capital, or the gains
and costs in the underlying investment decisions, is not directly observ
able. Human capital theory has proven highly useful in spite of this
attribute because it has generated many testable propositions about labor
market arrangements and offered a unified understanding of such phe
nomena as tenure-earnings profiles, labor turnover, and unemployment.
A useful theory is one that yields testable propositions, those that can
potentially be rejected on the basis of observable phenomena. Viewed
this way, the fact that transaction costs themselves are not directly
observable is not a serious flaw of the theory developed in this chapter.
The real issue is how useful this theory is in promoting an understanding
of the labor market differences between Japan and the United States. The
next two chapters examine the evidence that bears on the transactioncost difference between Japan and the United States, as well as the
cultural and economic conditions that are assumed by the theoretical
argument just presented.
NOTES
1 As will be seen in chapter 3, before World War II many of the contemporary features of the
Japanese labor markets, such as long-term employment, bonus payments, and enterprise unions,

30

A Theory of Investments in the Employment Relationships

were not prevalent. An excellent glimpse into some aspects of the prewar labor market in Japan is
contained in Taira (1970), Gordon (1985) and Odaka (1984).
2 For example, it is well-known that workers of various ranks often spend several hours
together during evenings, drinking and eating. These gatherings are designed to promote mutual
understanding and to develop a consensus. The nemawashi procedure, whereby a consensus
decision is slowly developed, also consumes time and energy.
3 In this definition, information and transportation costs are not necessarily transaction costs.
Steven Cheung offered me this informative definition of transaction costs several years ago. See also
Cheung (1969).
4 Thus, the issue under analysis is the determination of the second-period wage, which
amounts to the same thing as deciding on the division of the returns to the investments. The firstperiod wage is determined in a straightforward fashion once the second-period wage is known from
the zero-profit condition for a competitive equilibrium. See the discussion on competitive equi
librium later in this chapter.
5 The determination of the sharing ratio was analyzed previously (Hashimoto 1979; 1981;
Hashimoto and Yu 1980).
6 This result is the famous sharing theorem in the human capital literature (Becker 1962;
Hashimoto 1981). Inefficient separations occur when the parties separate from each other even
though both taken together are better off not separating.
7 The technical formulation can be found in my working paper (Hashimoto 1990b).
8 In this model, the only source of inefficiency is the separation decision. An earlier discussion
on this point appears in Hashimoto (1981).
9 This proposition suggests a test of this theory. See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of such a
test.
10 See the appendix, available upon request, for an explicit mathematical form for M*.
11 See Hashimoto (1990b) for technical details.
12 M, can be computed as the weighted average of the expected values under the three mutually
exclusive and exhaustive outcomes: no separation; no quits but separation; and dismissal, where
the weights are the respective probabilities.
13 The parties also may reduce the loss from inefficient separations by deciding on the optimum
sharing of the returns to the investments. For an earlier discussion on this point, see Hashimoto and
Yu (1980).
14 For simplicity, errors associated with the agreements for inside and the outside productivities
are assumed to be the same. This assumption is made only to simplify the expression without loss of
generality. This assumption implies that the parties share equally in the returns to the investments.
The derivation for this result is available from the author upon request.
15 See Hashimoto (1990b) for the mathematical expression for M2 .
16 In other words,/(0)=0 and df/da>0.
17 Hashimoto (1990b) contains technical details.
18 The assumption that the marginal returns function is linear turns out to be innocuous. See
Hashimoto (1990b) for technical details on this point.
19 The zero profit theorem states that both the worker©s and employer©s profits be zero. This is the
familiar sharing theorem in firm-specific human capital (e.g., Becker 1962; Kuratani 1973;
Hashimoto 1981).
20 It can be demonstrated mathematically that the marginal revenue schedule in figure 2.3 shifts
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upward as a result (Hashimoto 19905). Thus, if a has not already been reduced to zero, an increase
in h will lead to a further reduction in a.
21 It seems innocuous to focus on a neutral technological progress, since one does not know
which bias, if any, the actual technological changes contained.
22 This argument is strictly correct if time is the only input in these activities. If nontime inputs
are involved, and if their prices remain unchanged or even fall, costs will decrease, thereby
reinforcing the positive effects on investments. The argument here is basically the same as the one
advanced by Becker (1962) and later elaborated on by Welch (1970) regarding the effects of neutral
technological progress on the incentive to invest in human capital.
23 An extensive treatment on the history of this campaign appears in a report issued by Japan
Productivity Center (1988). I am grateful to Haruo Shimada for bringing my attention to this
publication, which is unavailable to the general public, and sending me a copy of it.
24 The activities of the campaign included conferences and seminars in which top-level indus
trialists, bankers, scholars, and bureaucrats participated; numerous visits by Japanese managers
and unionists to the United States and Europe, as well as visits by Western specialists to Japan; and
active information dissemination. Between 1955 and 1956, for example, 42 missions, involving
481 members, were sent to observe various U.S. industries. See Japan Productivity Center (1988,
chap. 4).
25 Tachibanaki (1986) contains a useful comparison of labor market flexibility in Japan, the
United States, and Europe.
26 Japan is remarkably homogeneous in race, ethnicity, religion, and culture. Cole (1980, 25)
argues that Japanese managers view the average worker as not so different from themselves and that
this attitude is critical in understanding the willingness of these employers to invest in the training
of, the provide responsibility for, blue-collar employees. Aoki (1988, chap. 2) notes that the ethnic
homogeneity of Japanese workers may have been a crucial factor in the development of the typical
Japanese organization of firms.
27 One way to mitigate the problem of employee heterogeneity is to screen job candidates.
Japanese employers, particularly those in large firms, are known for the care with which they
screen new hires. The screening device includes extensive background checks and exclusive
reliance on selected schools from which to recruit. Shimada (1988, chap. 2) reports that American
workers who were hired at Honda in Ohio also reported having gone through lengthy interviews in
the presence of executives and vice presidents. As will be discussed in chapter 5, my preliminary
research also has revealed that some of the Japanese automobile transplants engage in a much more
intensive screening of job applicants than do their parent companies. (See Business Week, October
3, 1989, for similar evidence on an intensive screening at Mazda in Michigan and Diamond-Star [a
joint venture between Chrysler and Mitsubishi] in Illinois.) Sorting employees into subgroups may
be another way of reducing the number of different policies that must be devised. Sorting is costly,
however. A full analysis of this consideration would take us into the issues of hierarchical structure
in firms and the optimum number of departments within organizations.
28 Such an analysis might follow the approach by Miyazaki (1977) on the structure of wage
contracts offered to heterogeneous workers.
29 Some Japanese automobile transplants in the U.S. Midwest tend to emphasize the screening
of job applicants much more than do their parent companies. This tendency is understandable,
given the greater heterogeneity of the American than Japanese labor force. See chapter 5 for a
related discussion on the Japanese transplants.
30 See chapter 3 for quality control circles. It should be noted that population heterogeneity per
se doesn©t lower transaction costs. Rather, the homogeneity in work attitudes, willingness to learn
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skills, and ability to function cooperatively in a group are what matter. See chapter 5 for a related
discussion.
31 In 1988, male regular workers constituted 59.8 percent of all employees, and 94.6 percent of
all male employees, in the nonagricultural sector. (The comparable figures for females were 29.7
percent and 80.6 percent, respectively.) Although the data are not available, the value of output
produced by male regular workers is certain to be large in Japan.
32 According to Hashimoto and Raisian (1985), median years of tenure among workers in small
firms (one to 9 employees in Japan and one to 25 employees in the United States) are eight and two
years, respectively, for the two countries.

Macroeconomic and Institutional
Conditions
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the evidence that bears on the theory presented
in chapter 2. This chapter focuses on macroeconomic and institutional
conditions that provide the background for the theoretical argument in
chapter 2, and the next chapter addresses the theory©s implications.
This chapter discusses some facts regarding differences in labor
market behavior between Japan and the United States, and emphasizes
features regarded as unique in Japanese industrial relations. Rather than
being an exhaustive treatment, the discussion concentrates on the eco
nomic and cultural conditions that underlie the book©s theme, i.e., the
interaction of tradition and culture with economic growth in shaping
labor market institutions. 1
After examining the historical origins of some of Japan©s labor market
features, the chapter concludes that an explanation based on historical
continuity in the institutions of Japanese industrial relations is an in
complete one for the country©s postwar labor market. Japanese employ
ment and wage systems as we know them today were not prevalent
before World War II. It was not until the early 1960s that such systems
became widespread throughout the economy. This and other related
considerations suggest that the influences of culture and tradition alone
are not responsible for the Japanese employment and wage systems.
Instead, a plausible explanation suggests that culture and tradition
interacted with economic growth in shaping these systems.
Macroeconomic Comparisons
Let us begin by comparing the recent macroeconomic performances
of Japan and the United States, focusing on productivity growth rates
33

34

Macroeconomic and Institutional Conditions

and unemployment rates. It will be made clear that, measured by these
indicators, Japan has been experiencing greater improvement in eco
nomic performance than the United States in recent decades.
Output and Productivity Levels and Growth Rates
One might easily get the impression from the popular press that the
Japanese economy is far more productive than the American. Such an
impression is not accurate: as of the mid-1980s, the United States
enjoyed an overall advantage in productivity levels. Consider that, in
1985, the gross national product per labor force member was a shade
below $34,000 for the United States and a little over $22,000 for Japan, a
difference of about 51 percent. The average hourly earnings for a
production worker in manufacturing in 1985 were $9.52 in the United
States and $6.03 in Japan, a difference of almost 58 percent. 2 Needless
to say, such crude aggregate measures conceal productivity differences
among sectors. According to Jorgenson and Kuroda (1990), in 1985, of
the 28 industrial sectors studied, 16 showed productivity gaps in Amer
ica©s favor, 10 in Japan©s favor, and 2 showed the two countries to be about
equal. 3
There are, of course, some industries in which Japan excels. Drucker
(1990) notes that Japanese automobile plants of Honda, Nissan, and
Toyota turn out 2 to 3 times more cars per worker than comparable
American or European plants. 4 Abegglen and Stalk (1985) note that
high Japanese productivity is limited to certain types of manufacturing
processes. In general, they note, the Japanese labor productivity advan
tage is enormous in high-volume assembly processes where a huge
number of interdependent steps must be coordinated, but in simpler
processes, the Japanese advantage is small. 5 They go on to state:
. . .despite all that is said about management style and organiza
tional effectiveness, Japanese organization in such fields as services
and distribution have low levels of productivity (p. 65).

The above remark is particularly noteworthy since the relative impor
tance of the service sector is growing in the economies of both countries.
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This development by itself portends a widening gap in the productivity
level between the two countries in favor of the United States.
What is striking is not the difference in the level of productivity
between the countries, but rather the difference in the growth in produc
tivity in Japan©s favor during the post-World War II years. Consider, for
example, the contrasts in the output growth rate in the manufacturing
sector. Japanese real output in that sector grew at an average annual rate
of a little over 10 percent during the period from 1950 to 1988, while the
U.S. real output grew only at about 3.5 percent. Figure 3.1 portrays the
movement in the growth rate of output-per-hour a standard measure of
productivity in manufacturing between 1950 and 1986. Clearly, pro
ductivity growth in manufacturing was greater on average in Japan than
in the United States. 6
There has been a narrowing of the differential in productivity growth
rates between the two countries in recent years. As is well-known, the
growth rate of Japanese real GNP fell from double-digit levels during
the 1960s to a rate of around 5 percent in the 1970s and 1980s. In
contrast, GNP for the United States has grown at an annual rate of only
about 3 percent throughout the same three decades. As a result, the
differential in the growth rates between the two countries narrowed
considerably during the 1970s and 1980s. In manufacturing, the output
growth rate has become rather similar in the two countries. 7 The fall in
the growth rate in Japan reflects the rather low growth rates experienced
during the 1985-87 period caused by the rising value of the yen.
According to Jorgenson et al. (1987), Japan©s higher rates of growth in
capital and intermediate inputs were largely responsible for the greater
growth in the country©s output between 1960 and 1979. Growth in these
inputs, in turn, must have raised labor productivity. In fact, differential
growth in labor productivity rather than in labor supply appears to have
been the key factor in the difference in output growth between the two
countries. For example, the civilian labor force grew steadily in Japan
after 1960 at an annual rate of about 1.2 percent, well below the
corresponding U.S. figure of 2.2 percent. As of the early 1980s, the
growth in real GNP per labor force member (a measure of productivity)
was about 4 percent in Japan and 1 percent in the United States. In

Figure 3.1 Annual Growth in Output-Per-Hour (%)
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manufacturing, the growth in real output-per-hour held steady in the
United States at about 2.6 percent per year, while in Japan it declined
from about 10 percent in the 1950s to about 7.5 percent in the early
1980s. Even with the declining trend, the growth rate of Japanese labor
productivity remains higher than the U.S. growth rate. 8
How closely is the difference in output growth related to the differ
ence in the growth of labor productivity? To shed light on this question,
figure 3.2 presents a scatter diagram relating Japanese-American con
trasts in productivity growth (vertical axis) and output growth (horizon
tal axis) during the period from 1951 to 1988. This figure clearly shows
a positive association between the two difference measures, and the
correlation coefficient of 0.42 indicates the strength of this association.
This correlation coefficient suggests that over 17 percent (square of
0.42) of the contrast in the growth rate of manufacturing output is
accounted for by the difference in the growth rate of productivity
between the two countries.
The discussion above is based on a simple correlation derived from
figure 3.1. A fuller analysis would require a multivariate technique.
Towards this end, I used the data for 28 manufacturing industries
reported in Jorgenson et al. (1987, table 2) to estimate a regression of the
output-growth difference between Japan and the United States on growth
contrasts in labor, capital, and intermediate inputs. The results indicate
that growth differences in capital and intermediate inputs had statis
tically significant influences on output-growth difference, but that the
growth contrast in labor inputs did not. This finding amounts to indirect
evidence that growth difference in labor productivity has had a signifi
cant influence on growth difference in output between the two
countries. 9
Finally, it should be remembered that the conventional measure of
output may not reflect the true measure. For example, the hypothesis of
this book implies that Japanese workers spend more hours on job-related
activities than reported hours of work would indicate. This implication
in turn might be used to infer that the measured productivity, i.e.,
output-per-hour, overstates the true productivity. Such an inference must
be drawn with caution, however, since the data on output are imperfect.
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Figure 3.2 Japan-United States Differences (1951-88) in
Manufacturing Performance
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The investment of time by Japanese workers must pay off in terms of a
more comprehensive measure of output, for example, including the
quality dimension; otherwise, the country wouldn©t be so successful in
the international marketplace. The question remains open, however, as
to whether or not Japanese workers have been investing too much of
their time. Perhaps, it will become possible to deal with this question in
the near future as we observe the effects of the country©s recent move
ment to shorten work hours.

Unemployment Rates
We now turn to the comparison of unemployment rates as indicators
of labor market performance. As is well-known by now, unemployment

Macroeconomic and Institutional Conditions

39

rates are higher in the United States than in Japan. As figure 3.3
indicates, unemployment rates in both countries trended upwards
through the mid-1980s. Why are unemployment rates so persistently
low in Japan? Let me outline some of the major factors responsible for
the unemployment rate difference between the two countries. An ex
haustive analysis of this question, which would require the construction
of an unemployment series for Japan on a comparable basis with the
U.S. series, is beyond the scope of this book. 10
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports Japanese unemployment
rates modified to conform to the U.S. definition. n In particular, unpaid
family workers working fewer than 15 hours per week are excluded
from the employed category for Japan, just as they are in the U.S.
definition. 12 Even with the BLS modifications, the adjusted and the
original Japanese unemployment rates differed little for the 1959-88
period. 13 The similarity between the original and modified series sug
gests that the adjustment procedure, for whatever reasons, ignored
many of the important conceptual and labor market differences between
the two countries. Below are some of the relevant factors that the
adjustment evidently did not take into account.
An important reason for the unemployment rate difference, in my
opinion, is that separations are much fewer in Japan than in the United
States. In Japan, employers try to avoid outright dismissals or disciplin
ary dismissals. 14 Employers dismissing workers for reasons of poor
economic conditions potentially face high costs of doing so. Should the
dismissed workers sue, the courts determine the validity of dismissals
for economic reasons by examining how grave the firm©s financial
situation was, and whether the employer made serious efforts to avoid
dismissals by using other means. 15 Perhaps for this reason, the separa
tions that do take place tend to be quits or retirements rather than layoffs
or dismissals. Figures 3.4 through 3.6 indicate that the rate of separa
tions is lower and that the ratio of quits to dismissals higher in Japan than
in the United States. 16
The two countries also differ in the treatment of laid-off persons and
the job search period stipulated in the unemployment definition. In
Japan, persons on layoff awaiting recall (ichiji, or temporary, kyug-
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Figure 3.4 Rate of Separation: Manufacturing
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SOURCES: The Japanese rate of separations are annual averages of monthly labor turnover data
from the Maigetsu Kinro Tokei Chosa (Monthly Labor Survey), as reported in Japan Policy
Planning and Research Department, Ministry of Labour, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various
years. The U.S. data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, various
years, and are also annual averages of monthly labor tunover data. The data are available only for
manufacturing. The U.S. series was discontinued as of 1981.

yoshd) are classified as employed, while in the United States they are
counted as unemployed. Even if laid-off persons were to be counted as
unemployed in Japan, however, unemployment rates would be increased
by only about 10 percent, and this would not alter the substantial
difference in unemployment rates between the two countries. 17 The
main reason layoffs fail to narrow the gap more is that they typically
amount to only about 0.2 percent of the labor force, as compared to
about 1.0 percent in the United States. 18 Layoff is simply not as common
a practice in Japan. 19 Ito (1984, table 2) also found that the differential
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Figure 3.5 Ratio of Quits to Dismissals (Layoffs)
All Industries
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SOURCES: The Japanese data are from the Koyo Doko Chosa (Survey on Employment Trend), as
reported in Japan Policy Planning and Research Department, Ministry of Labour, Yearbook of
Labour Statistics, various years, and refer to employees separated during the year, cross-classified
by reasons for separation. The U.S. data for all industries are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics (1985), table 32, and pertain to unemployed persons by
reason for unemployment (job-losers vs. job-leavers). For manufacturing, the U.S. data are the
ratio of the quit and layoff rates from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and
Earnings, various years, figure 5. U.S. data collection for manufacturing turnover was discon
tinued as of 1981 for budgetary reasons.

incidence of temporary layoffs accounts for about 25 percent of the
unemployment rate differences between the two countries in recent
years.
Another difference relates to the duration of job search activity used
to define the state of unemployment. In the United States, anyone who
has searched for a job during the four-week period preceding the survey
date is counted as unemployed, but in Japan only those who have looked
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Figure 3.6 Ratio of Quits to Dismissals (Layoffs)
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SOURCES: The Japanese data are from the Koyo Doko Chosa (Survey on Employment Trend), as
reported in Japan Policy Planning and Research Department, Ministry of Labour, Yearbook of
Labour Statistics, various years, and refer to employees separated during the year, cross-classified
by reasons for separation. The U.S. data for all industries are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, (1985), table 32, and pertain to unemployed persons by
reason for unemployment (job-losers vs. job-leavers). For manufacturing, the U.S. data are the
ratio of the quit and layoff rates from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and
Earnings, various years. U.S. data collection for manufacturing turnover was discontinued as of
1981 for budgetary reasons.

for jobs during a single reference week qualify as unemployed. As a
result, the Japanese definition excludes from the unemployed category
those who engage in job search activity infrequently, whereas such
persons are more likely to be counted as unemployed in the United
States. According to Hamada and Kurosaka (1984, table 2), an adjust
ment for this definition difference would raise the Japanese unemploy
ment rate only a little for males but by about 55 percent for females,
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presumably because females are more likely to engage in discontinuous
search activity.
There are notable differences between the countries in unemployment
and labor force activity for youths those younger than 25 years of age.
As Raisian and I have found, not only are there twice as many youths in
the labor force in the United States as in Japan, but they are also more
likely to be unemployed than their Japanese counterparts (Hashimoto
and Raisian 1988). As a result, the U.S. unemployment rate for adults,
excluding youths, was only about twice as high as the rate in Japan in
1979, but the overall U.S. unemployment rate was three times higher
than the Japanese rate. 20
To summarize, the evidence on productivity growth and unemploy
ment indicates that Japan indeed has experienced a relatively high level
of economic performance in recent decades. The growth rate in produc
tivity remains higher in that country, though the difference with the
United States has narrowed in recent years. As for unemployment rates,
a significant contrast persists between the two countries even after
adjusting for differences in layoffs, length of job search, and labor force
composition, or even after counting all of the kyugyoshas as unem
ployed persons. The unemployment rate difference narrowed in the late
1980s, when Japan experienced rising unemployment rates caused by
the strengthening of the yen as the United States enjoyed falling unem
ployment rates.

Labor Market Institutions and Practices
There are many interesting labor market institutions and practices in
Japan that bear on the theory developed in chapter 2. This section will
focus on mandatory retirement practices, industrial relations practices,
unionism, and the importance of labor disputes, as well as on the
historical and cultural background of some of the Japanese labor market
practices.
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Private Sector Firms with Mandatory Retirement Systems
in Japan

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Firms with Uniform Retirement Arrangements*
Percent of
Percent with Retirement Age of:
Year All Firms Percent** Age 55 Age 56-59 Age 60 Age > 60
(1)

(2)

1967
1974
1980
1989

66.6
82.2
88.5

1964
1974
1980
1989

100.0
99.5
99.1

1964
1974
1980
1989

99.0
99.9
99.8

1964
1974
1980
1989

94.3
98.3
99.6

1964
1974
1980
1989

90.4
93.7
96.2

1964
1974
1980
1989

55.0
76.5
84.8

All Firm Sizes (30 or More Employees)
63.2
14.2
20.6
65.7
52.0
12.3
32.4
73.0
39.5
20.1
36.5
93.0
20.7
17.0
57.6
Giant Firms (5,000 or More Employees)
74.5
21.7
2.8
38.0
51.0
11.0
69.9
35.3
37.1
27.6
79.4
4.9
8.7
86.4
94.2
Large Firms (1, 000-4,999 Employees)
80.0
14.7
5.4
55.8
42.7
37.4
19.2
70.6
38.9
36.5
22.8
10.4
14.5
74.0
95.9
Medium-Sized Firms (300-999 Employees)
77.7
11.0
10.3
60.9
49.5
27.7
22.1
70.5
45.1
28.6
25.1
93.3
15.6
19.0
62.8
Moderate-Sized Firms (100-299 Employees)
71.7
7.0
18.1
59.8
53.4
17.0
26.9
70.3
44.4
22.3
30.8
92.4
20.0
18.5
57.9
Small Firms (30-99 Employees)
75.0
4.8
18.9
70.1
52.3
6.4
37.3
74.5
37.1
17.7
40.4
93.0
21.8
16.3
56.4

1.5
3.0
3.2
4.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.7
1.7
1.1
0.6
0.7
1.0
2.6
1.3
2.6
2.4
3.4
1.2
3.7
3.7
4.8

SOURCES: Japan Productivity Center, Katsuyo Rodo Tokei (Practical Labor Statistics) 1990;
Sangyo Rodo Chosa Sho (Research Agency for Industrial Labor) Chingin Choki Keirei 50 Nen
(The 50-Year Long-Term Wage Series) 1988.
* Firms without any discriminatory (by sex, for example) retirement systems.
** Firms with uniform retirement system relative to all firms with mandatory retirement systems.
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Mandatory Retirement and Labor Force
Participation of Older Workers
Unlike the case in the United States, mandatory retirement has been
gaining popularity in Japan (table 3.1, column (2)). Larger firms use
mandatory retirement more frequently. Column (3) shows that Japanese
firms in increasing proportion have moved away from discriminatory
(by sex, for example) retirement practices. 21 Thus, the proportion of
firms with a uniform retirement system, in the population of all com
panies using the mandatory retirement system, has risen for firms of all
sizes. Most mandatory retirement used to take place at around age 55,
but the retirement age has been advancing: by the late 1980s, the
majority of firms with uniform mandatory retirement systems retired
workers at age 60 or older (columns (4) through (6)). Interestingly, the
proportion of firms retiring workers at ages greater than 60, conditional
on companies having mandatory retirement, tends to be higher in
smaller firms (column (6)). An inspection of columns (4) through (6)
reveals that this tendency may be a reflection of smaller companies
having a greater dispersion in the distribution of the mandatory retire
ment age.
It is noteworthy that the U.S. mandatory retirement age of 65 years in
the recent past is higher than the average Japanese retirement age of
approximately 60. 22 This difference would appear contrary to the pat
tern predicted by the argument that Japanese workers invest more in
firm-specific human capital than U.S. workers: one would expect work
ers with more firm-specific human capital to stay longer with their firms.
The determination of the retirement age reflects many factors, including
longevity and worker productivity, so that a comparison of the age level
may not be meaningful. For example, life expectancy was lower in
Japan than in the United States in the 1950s when the retirement age of
55 years became prevalent. 23 The fact that the age of mandatory retire
ment has been increasing in Japan may reflect the increasing life expec
tancy, among other factors, but it is also consistent with the human
capital hypothesis if firm-specific human capital has been increasing
there. 24
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Why is there a mandatory retirement system in Japan, and why has
the typical mandatory retirement age been increasing? One finds three
explanations in the literature for the mandatory retirement practice. The
first argument hinges on the idea that senior workers near retirement
receive wages higher than their current productivities. For example, in
Lazear©s (1979, 1981) work-effort model, senior workers are overpaid
relative to their current productivity to compensate for their having been
underpaid when they were junior workers. Such a payment scheme is
designed to reduce shirking and other unproductive behaviors. In effect,
workers post bond in earlier years, receive the interest payments over
the years as part of their wages, and reclaim the bond at the time of
retirement.
Senior workers may also be overpaid as part of the promotion-ladder
scheme to reduce inefficient separation of workers who receive training
in firm-specific human capital (Carmichael 1983a). In this scheme,
sometime after the training is completed, workers are promoted to
wages that exceed their current productivities on the basis simply of
seniority. This arrangement eliminates the employer©s incentive to dis
miss a trained worker prematurely: the employer does not gain from
such action because another trained worker will fill the vacated slot on
the basis of seniority. Eventually, there comes a time when it is efficient
to separate, either because worker productivities have fallen or the
values of their leisure time have risen to make it inefficient for them to
remain employed. In both Lazear©s and Carmichael©s models, the work
ers have the incentive to continue being employed, since their wages are
higher than their productivities. Thus, mandatory retirement must be
imposed to effect efficient separations.
The second argument, the productivity-dispersion hypothesis, argues
that the dispersion in individual productivities increases with age for
health reasons (Oi and Raisian 1985). Measuring, sorting, and reassign
ing become unprofitable for older workers, who decline in productivity
and whose remaining working lives are short. Therefore, it becomes
economical to retire all workers when they reach a certain age rather
than to ascertain which of these workers are worth keeping.
The third argument for a mandatory retirement system hinges on the
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heterogeneity in the age of hire (Parsons 1988). Parsons claims that
mandatory retirement is designed for those who are hired late in life.
Because of cost considerations, employers and incumbent workers may
be unable to prevent those newly hired old workers from sharing in the
rents wages that exceed worker productivity which typically accrue
to those with seniority. Mandatory retirement is a way of limiting the
newly hired old workers from sharing in the rents, according to Parsons.
For young new hires, Parsons argues, mandatory retirement is unnec
essary because age-based pension plans can be designed to induce them
to retire at an optimum wage. He finds evidence that in the early 1970s
U.S. workers with low tenure in late middle age, who presumably had
been hired late in life, had stronger desire for working beyond the
mandatory retirement age of 65. Parson©s hypothesis may explain why
mandatory retirement is more prevalent in larger firms. 25 The prediction
of this hypothesis appears to conflict with the situation in Japan, how
ever, where the age of hire tends to be homogeneous but mandatory
retirement takes place nevertheless, and it, in fact, has become in
creasingly popular.
Let me note three possible factors behind the rise in mandatory
retirement age in Japan. First, as mentioned above, an increased invest
ment in firm-specific human capital may apply. Second, an environment
of rapid technological change where skills become obsolete quickly,
thereby necessitating retraining may lower the optimum mandatory
retirement age. It may not be profitable to keep retraining older workers
whose remaining working life is short. 26 This argument may be relevant
for explaining why the mandatory retirement age has risen in Japan, as
that country©s pace of economic growth and technological change has
slowed in the 1970s and 1980s. The technological factor may also be
relevant for the Japanese-American contrast if technological progress
has slowed more in America than in Japan. The elimination of man
datory retirement in the United States effectively raised the mandatory
retirement age infinitely. Third, a demographic trend may apply. The
rapid aging of the labor force in recent years surely must have exerted
pressures to accommodate aging workers by extending their working
years. 27 Note that the demographic pressure has been greater in Japan.
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In the United States, those over 60 years amounted to a little under 16
percent of the total population in 1980, but by 1988 their proportion had
grown by 6.5 percent. In Japan, the comparable proportion grew by
nearly 27 percent, from 13 percent in 1980 to 16 percent in 1988. 28 The
question that remains unanswered, therefore, is why more Japanese
firms are adopting the mandatory retirement system in the first place,
rather than doing away with it in response to the demographic pressure.
An interesting topic for future research is why mandatory retirement has
been gaining popularity in Japan, with the retirement age steadily rising,
while it has been eliminated in the United States albeit by legislation.
A related issue is the Japanese redundancy practice, whereby many
Japanese firms tend to separate senior and trained workers through
discharge and early retirement when demand declines. 29 This practice
has raised the concern that experienced and productive workers are
being forced out of employment, causing a large loss to the economy
(Koike 1987). This practice, however, may be an employer©s rational
response to a demand decline.
Carmichael (1983b) shows that it is less costly to lay off older,
experienced workers than young workers who are in the process of
receiving training. The reason is straightforward: a layoff does not
shorten the time required for training, but it does reduce the total
working lifetime of a worker. Thus, the productivity loss is always from
an experienced worker whose lost output is evaluated at the current
depressed product price. For a young worker in training, his or her lost
output is evaluated at a price averaged over good and bad times. As a
result, the expected value of a young worker©s training is less sensitive to
current economic conditions than the actual value of an experienced
worker©s training. 30 Thus, while not ruling out the possibility of waste
caused by the redundancy practice, Carmichael©s argument does suggest
that this practice may be a rational one.
Even with the prevalence of mandatory retirement, the labor force
participation rates of older workers remain higher in Japan than in the
United States (table 3.2). For example, almost 36 percent of Japanese
males who are 65 years of age or older were in the labor force in 1988,
while only about 17 percent of U.S. white males in the same age group
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Table 3.2 Labor Force Participation Rates
for Older Workers in Japan and the United States
(1988)
Age

Japan
50-54
55-59
60-64
65 and older
United States (Whites)
55-64
65 and older

Males (%)

Females (%)

96.0
91.3
71.1
35.8

63.3
50.9
38.6
15.7

67.9
16.7

43.6
7.7

SOURCES: Japan Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, Annual Report on
the Labour Force Survey (1988), table 2; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor
Statistics, Bulletin 2340, (August 1989), table 5.

were in the labor force. Japanese women often enter the labor force after
their husbands retire. Table 3.2 indicates that almost 16 percent of
Japanese females who are 65 years or older, in contrast to the less than 8
percent for comparable U.S. white females, were in the labor force in
1988.
Many of Japan©s retired male workers continue to work in the same
firm at reduced pay, or they may find employment in subsidiary and
subcontracting firms. In 1988, 89.5 percent of nonagricultural male
employed workers, 65 years or older, were engaged mainly at gainful
work; the proportion for males 70 years or older was 85.2 percent. The
remaining workers were attending schools, and/or doing housework in
addition to working, or were leading the life of kyugyosha. 31 For
females, the comparable figures were 43.9 percent for those 65 years or
older and 41.7 percent for those 70 years or older. 32

Flexibility in Work Organization
This section discusses some of the salient features of the Japanese
industrial relations system: how management and labor in Japan com-
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municate with each other; how they resolve differences and disputes;
how effective these practices are; and how the Japanese practices com
pare with those in the United States. The purpose of the discussion is to
examine how these features bear on the transaction-cost differences
between the two countries.
One notable feature in Japan is said to be the flexibility in work
organization and industrial relations. Flexible work organization is
facilitated by the job-rotation system whereby typical workers are
rotated among different tasks so that they may acquire a wide range of
skills (Koike 1984; Aoki 1988, chap. 2). Aoki notes, for example, that
[T]he multifunctionality of workers fostered by a wide range of job
experience (and job rotation in particular) may enable each shop to
adjust job assignments flexibly in response to the requirements of
the downstream operation.. . .Further, workers trained in a wide
range of skills can better understand why more defective products
are being produced and how to cope with the situation as well as
prevent it from recurring... (pp. 36-37).

To be sure, flexible job structures based on cross-training have existed in
U.S. firms as well. For example, Jacoby (1989) views such practices
prevailing in the late 1920s among some large firms as a key part of their
attempts to stabilize employment. As Aoki (1988) notes, however, U.S.
companies in the postwar years have tended to emphasize fine-task
specialization and sharp job demarcation, and these are the charac
teristics that make it difficult to train workers to be multifunctional. In
contrast, Japanese firms encourage workers© sharing of knowledge and
tasks on the shop floor, thereby enabling them to cope with local
emergencies effectively. 33
Not to be overlooked, of course, is the likelihood that workers trained
for a multitude of tasks are less resistant to an introduction of a labor
saving technology. Unless the new technology reduces the demand for
labor in all tasks, a worker is unlikely to suffer unemployment.
Industrial relations in Japan exhibit considerable flexibility along
many dimensions, more so than in most other developed countries (e.g.,
Aoki 1989; Koshiro 1986; Morishima 1982, 132; OECD 1986, chap.
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3). Aoki (1989) notes, for example, that "at the Japanese factory,
emerging contingencies are often coped with on site by operating
workers without authority and/or expert interventions, and the essence
of workers© incentive package is to nurture their capabilities to do so..."
(p. 7). He notes further (1988) that for this procedure to work smoothly,
... operating jobs and emergent tasks (such as spotting, fixing, and
preventing the recurrence of, problems) have to be integrated.
However, strong property ownership over jobs, as observed under
American "job control unionism," hinders such flexible and fluid job
assignments (Chap. 2).

It is noteworthy that the Japanese automobile transplants in the U.S.
Midwest also insist on having flexibility over job assignments, produc
tion plans, etc., even at UAW-organized Diamond-Star Motors and
Mazda Motor Manufacturing. (See chapter 5 for a related discussion.)
Another manifestation of flexibility is in Japanese collective agree
ments, which tend to be short, abstract, and often obscure (Hanami
1981, chap. 2). The brevity of contracts underscores their flexibility:
there must be an implicit understanding among the parties involved that
contract terms can be changed easily in response to newly emerging
circumstances, thereby making detailed stipulations unnecessary. Con
tract flexibility in Japan is not limited to industrial relations. Rather it
underlies most economic and other relationships, as Hanami points out:
... Westerners consider it important to describe in as precise and
detailed a manner as possible the standards which are to be applied
in every possible disagreement. They feel that there is no way to
settle conflicts without reference to a complete description of the
rights and obligations of both parties. Japanese think it is both
impossible and unnecessary to provide such an extensive written
description and make provisions for every possible eventuality. They
believe that no matter how detailed the clauses of a contract may be,
some unanticipated developments are bound to occur, and that it is
more important to establish mutual understanding and trust.. .
Since economic deals in Japan are affected by emotional and senti
mental factors, the parties to a contract always expect some flexibil-
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ity in implementation. The detailed enumeration of specific contract
provisions would be fatal to this flexibility (p. 53).

Although the description above refers to contracts in general, its ap
plicability to employment contracts seems obvious. 34

Unionism, Labor Disputes, and
Industrial Relations Practices
The aspect of industrial relations that is particularly indicative of low
transaction costs is enterprise unionism and its function. Unions in Japan
are often referred to as enterprise unions. 35 The enterprise union is by
far the dominant form of union organization in Japan. In 1985, the latest
year for which the relevant data are available, there were almost 12.5
million union members (about 23.4 percent of the total labor force), of
which more than 91 percent were in enterprise unions. 36 Although most
unions belong to national level federations, the basic issues of wages,
working conditions, and like factors are negotiated at the company
level. 37
An enterprise union acts independently in bargaining with manage
ment. It differs from the locals of U.S. industrial unions in that it is not
merely an administrative unit of a national union. Indeed, unlike the
case in the United States, Japanese workers must become employees of a
firm before they can join the union, and a typical union includes whitecollar nonsupervisory employees as well as blue-collar workers. 38 An
enterprise union is not a company union, but is a bonafide trade union. It
engages in collective bargaining and has the legal right to strike and to
engage in other job actions. 39
Japanese unions also engage in collective bargaining, but unlike in the
United States, a major collective bargaining takes place at a specific time
of the year that is known to everyone, i.e., spring offensive or shunto.
The spring offensive confers economies of scale in information gather
ing and transacting, so both sides can concentrate on collecting, ex
changing, and verifying information at that time. 40 A noteworthy aspect
of Japanese collective bargaining is that details are worked out at the
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enterprise level rather than at the level of national union federations, as
in the United States. Because of the simultaneous wage adjustments that
take place annually, shunto has been viewed as being responsible for the
prevalent wage flexibility in Japan (Gordon 1982; Hashimoto and Raisian 1987a,b; Taylor 1989).
An interpretation suggested by the theory outlined in chapter 2 is that
the Japanese style of unionism is an institutionalized mechanism
through which employer and employees invest in information reliability.
Viewed this way, the enterprise union is an endogenous phenomenon,
which became consolidated about the time that other Japanese labor
market phenomena were becoming prevalent.
Employer and employee share common interests to a greater extent in
an enterprise union system than in industrial or craft unions. As Taira
(1970) put it, "The Japanese type of collective bargaining necessarily
makes the union so conscious of the business conditions of the firm that
the enterprise union is, for all practical purposes, just another manage
ment in the firm" (Taira 1970, p. 169). The enterprise union controls
members© shirking and malfeasance as well as guards against employers©
actions that are harmful to workers. The union has the incentive to
monitor its members within an enterprise to uphold the reputation of its
members as well as protect their interests from being deflected by the
employer. These monitoring functions may be served more effectively
by a union organized within firms rather than across firms. To promote
mutual well-being, major decisions are made after close consultations
between management and unions.
All this is not to say that labor and management seldom disagree in
Japan, but disagreements seem to be less frequent in Japan than in the
United States. As an indication, consider the extent of industrial dis
putes. The number of labor cases reaching public dispute settlement
procedures, e.g., labor relations commissions or courts, is much
smaller in Japan than in other industrialized countries (Hanami 1984).
In 1976, for example, 0.407 cases per 1,000 labor force members were
brought to the U.S. National Labor Relations Board for settlement, but
in Japan the comparable figure was only 0.079 cases brought before
either the Labor Relations Commission or the courts (Hanami 1984,
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table 9). 41 Even the courts tend to rely heavily on compromise and
conciliation rather than on issuing decisions.
Also, the two countries differ a great deal in the speed with which
disputes are resolved. Typically, there are fewer cases of labor dispute
and the resulting productivity loss is smaller in Japan than in the
United States. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 indicate the extent of resource loss, as
measured by the number of days lost, caused by labor disputes in each
country. Noting the difference in the scale on the vertical axis between
the two countries, one is easily struck by the much greater resource loss
in the United States.
In 1981, for example, there were 955 labor disputes in Japan involv
ing 247,000 workers. These disputes resulted in 554,000 working days
lost, or 220 days per 100 affected employees, or 14 days lost per 1,000
employees economywide. In the United States there were 2,568 disputes
involving 1,080,000 workers, resulting in 24,700,000 working days
lost. The U.S. experience translates to 2,290 days lost per 100 affected
employees or 276 days lost per 1,000 employees economywide, much
higher figures than for Japan. 42
Note that in figure 3.7 the number of days lost in Japan were rather
high in the 1950s, with the declining trend setting in only after 1960. In
contrast, figure 3.8 indicates an upward trend in the number of days lost
in the United States. The Japanese pattern coincides remarkably with the
spread of enterprise unionism starting in the late 1950s. Obviously,
cooperative industrial relations in Japan are a rather recent phe
nomenon. This observation will be referred to shortly with the discus
sion regarding the interaction of the influences of culture and traditions
with economic forces.
One of the reasons that Japanese strikes are so short-lived is that they
often occur at an early stage in the bargaining process, whether or not
negotiations are deadlocked. Thus, strikes or other acts of dispute
simply demonstrate that the unions disagree with the management
(Matsuda 1983, 193-195). Indeed, a distinguishing feature of the men
tality of Japanese workers is said to be their reluctance to cause any
serious damage to the firm in which they work (Shirai 1983, 135-140).
Finally, it should be noted that in Japan, as in the United States, the

56

Macroeconomic and Institutional Conditions

Figure 3.7 Days Lost by Labor Disputes in Japan
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SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics (1983), table 147.
NOTES: The Japanese data exclude agricultural strikes, political strikes, and workers indirectly
affected by a dispute in their own establishment, or by disputes lasting less than four hours.

rate of unionization has been on the decline. The proportion of union
members in nonagricultural employment stood at 35 percent in 1970,
but by 1985-86 it had fallen to 28 percent (Freeman 1989, exhibit 1).
The reasons for the decline are not well-understood, though two expla
nations have dominated the literature. According to Freeman (1989),
this decline is due partly to the fact that an increasing number of newly
established firms do not have unions. Freeman hypothesizes that the
Japanese decline, as the similar American decline, was caused largely
by the increased management opposition to unionism. 43 The other
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Figure 3.8 Days Lost by Labor Disputes in U.S.A.
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SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics (1983), table 147.
NOTES: The U.S. data exclude disputes involving fewer than six workers or lasting less than a full
day or shift. After 1981, the United States no longer collected data for disputes involving fewer than
1,000 workers, and as a result, U.S. data are not suitable for international comparisons.

explanation is offered by Neumann and Rissman (1984), who argue that,
increasingly, government actions and policies have offered benefits
which were traditionally the domain of the unions and that this trend has
reduced the attractiveness of unionization. They present evidence indi
cating that state legislation, ensuring that discharges occur only for just
cause, as well as increased social welfare expenditures have contributed
to the decline of unionization. Whether this latter explanation is valid for
the Japanese experience or not, or which of the two explanations is more
relevant for Japan, is a subject for future study.
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Dispute Settlement, Joint Consultations, and Nemawashi
As discussed above, the number of days lost due to labor disputes an
indicator of transaction costs is low in Japan and started to trend down
in the early 1960s, when enterprise unionism became prevalent. In the
United States, however, not only are labor disputes numerous but the
trend, if anything, has been upwards during much of the post-World War
II period. Unions and management appear to work closely with one
another in Japan. For example, they have a strong tendency to settle
legal disputes through negotiation or mutual understanding. At the same
time, grievances with no legal basis are handled by superiors in an
informal way. 44 As noted above, the number of labor cases reaching the
public office for dispute settlement is considerably smaller in Japan than
in other industrialized countries. Even for cases reaching that stage,
there is a heavy reliance on compromise and conciliation rather than on
formal decisions. Compromise and conciliation obviously are more
easily reached the lower the transaction costs.
Management and labor in many firms consult with each other
throughout the year via the joint consultation system and, to a lesser
extent, during grievance settlement procedures. Although grievance
settlement procedures exist outside Japan, the joint consultation system
is often thought to be unique to Japanese employment relations. 45 The
meetings take place according to regularly set schedules for some firms,
and as needs arise for others. It is noteworthy that this system exists even
in nonunionized sectors, though it is more prevalent in the unionized
sector. 46
Table 3.3 reports the frequency of joint consultations and grievance
settlement procedures, from a 1984 survey. The last row of column (2)
indicates that of 1,802 unions, 1,068 (or 59 percent) had joint consulta
tions. Among unions in large firms (1,000 or more employees), the
proportion of unions using joint consultation was 71 percent. Even
among very small firms (29 or fewer employees), the proportion was 34
percent.
Joint consultation is the primary channel through which the manage
ment and the union deal with problems unsuitable for bargaining
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Table 3.3 Number of Enterprise Unions with Joint Consultations and
Grievance Settlement Procedures: Japan 1984
Total

Do Not Exist

Exist
(1)
Firm Size
(Employment)
1,000+

100-999

689
(100)

30-99

414
(100)

29 or less

154
(100)

All Groups

(2)
All

545
(100)

1,802
(100)

Grievance
Procedures

Joint Consultations

(3)
Griev.
Proc.
Exist

384
(71)
[100]
434
(63)
[100]
198
(48)
[100]
52
(34)
[100]

262

1,068
(59)
[100]

624

[68]
257
[59]
79
[40]
26
[50]

[58]

(4)
All
161
(30)
[100]
25,5
(37)
[100]
216
(52)
[100]
102
(66)
[100]
734
(41)
[100]

Exist

(5)
Griev.
Proc.
Exist

(6)

29

291
(53)

[18]
29
[11]
22
[10]
6

286
(41)
101
(24)
32
(21)

[6]
86

710
(39)

[12]

SOURCE: Calculated from Japan Ministry of Labour, Saishin Rodo Kyoyaku No Jitsujo (The
Latest Status of Labor Agreements) 1984, table 6-1.
NOTES: Magnitudes in () and [ ] are percentages.

recruitment, dismissal, transfer and promotion, changes in production
techniques and in management policies, plant closings, industrial safety,
and the like (Shirai 1983; Hanami 1984; Sugeno and Koshiro 1987). 47
More important, however, is the raison d'etre of this system. In the
survey underlying table 3.3, 86 percent of the unions listed expediting
communication, and 83 percent listed promotion of harmonious rela
tionships as the major objectives of joint consultations. 48
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Another notable phenomenon in Japan is consensus-based decisionmaking, whereby important decisions are made only after a consensus
has been achieved through an extensive sharing of information and the
practice known as nemawashi. As discussed in chapter 1 (note 3) this
practice refers to the procedure of digging around the roots of a plant
and trimming excessive roots in order to successfully transplant a tree
later or to promote the bearing of abundant fruits. The term has come to
mean taking every necessary step to realize an objective. This phe
nomenon is said to prevail throughout the economy and not just in the
unionized sector. It would not be an exaggeration to state that joint
consultation and consensus-based decisionmaking are two of the unique
features of the Japanese industrial relations system.
Interestingly, the proportion of Japanese unions with formal grievance
settlement procedures is lower than that for joint consultations, perhaps
underscoring the preference of the Japanese to solve disputes informally.
Thus, according to the last row of column (6) in table 3.3, 39 percent of
unions, regardless of firm size, had such procedures. The proportion for
large firms was 53 percent, and that for very small firms, 21 percent.
These statistics are indicative of the minor role played by grievance
procedures in Japanese industrial relations. In fact, this evidence can be
viewed as indicating the effectiveness of joint consultations in reducing
the number of disputes. 49
In contrast, grievance procedures appear to be used widely in the
United States. An overwhelming proportion of major U.S. labor agree
ments contain their own grievance and arbitration procedures designed
to resolve disputes over contract interpretations (St. Antoine 1984,
253). It should be kept in mind, however, that in both countries, many
grievances are resolved among the parties involved rather than by
reliance on third parties. 50
Grievances that are not resolved by the parties are referred to a third
party, notably the Labor Relations Commission in Japan and arbitrators
in the United States. American arbitrators are selected by the parties
involved or are referred by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service (FMCS) or the American Arbitration Association (AAA). De
cisions by the arbitrators are binding. In Japan, there are no counterparts
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to FMCS or AAA for providing these services. 51 Instead, the Labor
Relations Commission usually acts as the third party. 52 Even if a dispute
ends up with the Commission, most cases 92 percent in 1981 are
resolved through reconciliation. 53 In 1980, U.S. arbitrators referred by
FMCS issued 7,539 decisions (Sloan and Whitney 1988,246). It can be
stated with confidence that at least an equal number of decisions were
issued by arbitrators referred by AAA and by those selected by the
parties involved. 54 The sheer magnitude of the U.S. settlements dwarfs
the Japanese experience of fewer than 2,000 cases settled, both between
the parties and with the help of third parties, in 1980.
The frequencies of grievance settlement procedures and joint con
sultations appear to be correlated in Japan. A comparison of columns (2)
and (4) in table 3.3 makes it clear that the proportion of unions with
grievance settlement procedures is decidedly larger for unions with,
than for unions without, joint consultations. This evidence does not
necessarily contradict the implication of the above argument that they
are substitutes for each other. Rather, it may reflect the influence of a
third factor lower transaction costs on both. In other words, these
practices, together, reflect the phenomenon of low transaction costs in
Japanese industrial relations.

Quality Control Circles
Another institution reflective of low transaction costs in Japan is the
celebrated quality control (QC) circle. The Japanese quality circles
were adopted from the concept of statistical quality control pioneered in
the United States in the 1950s by W. Edwards Deming. 55 The practice
spread widely after the Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers
began publication of the magazine Genba to QC (Quality Control for
Foremen) in 1962, and by the early 1980s there were about a million
circles there (Cole 1979, chap. 5; Blair and Ramsing 1983). Quality
control circles in Japan are not limited to manufacturing: they exist
among department stores, railways, retail shops, auto and television
repair services, airlines, hotels, and even among municipal govern-

62

Macroeconomic and Institutional Conditions

ments (Juran 1975). This practice has been imported to the United States
since the mid-1970s with mixed results (see chapter 5 in this book).
The quality control circle is conceptually similar to joint consulta
tion, but in practice there are important differences. In a QC circle only
a handful of production workers doing related work directly participate.
Rather than meeting in response to specific problems, a quality circle is
a continuous-study process involving the issues of quality and produc
tivity (Cole 1980, 26). In contrast, joint consultations involve both
white- and blue-collar workers, not all of them doing related work, and
deal with a much broader range of subjects than do quality circles.
Usually, there is more than one quality circle within a firm, and each
deals with productivity issues specific to a particular stage of produc
tion. However, any worker not belonging to a circle can contribute to
improved productivity by passing on his or her suggestions. Blair and
Ramsing (1983, 492) note that "group cohesion and capacity for selfcontrol is encouraged through team building exercises, limiting group
size (3 to 10), and usually choosing homogeneous membership. The
group derives status through the quality and value of its output." Re
wards to participating in the quality circle are largely nonfinancial,
being stated in terms of contribution to the company and selfdevelopment (Cole 1979, chap. 5). Such rewards, undoubtedly, are
more effective where a longer-term employer-employee attachment
exists.
It should be noted, however, that quality control circles in Japan have
not always been successful. Many firms experienced problems with
them for a few years after their introduction. In some firms workers felt
that they were coerced into quality circles, and in others the emphasis on
productivity made the participants doubt the value of the circles to
themselves personally, with the result that their participation may have
been a mere ritualistic behavior (Cole 1980). Moreover, whether or not
quality control circles have had direct effects on productivity and quality
remains an unanswered question: many firms already had the reputation
for high quality by the time they adopted quality control circles (Hayes
1981).
How do these Japanese institutions fit into the theory developed in
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chapter 2? I hypothesize that these institutions are the reflections of the
investments that employers and employees make in the industrial rela
tions system. These investments are encouraged by the underlying
environment of low transaction cost a low cost of investing in informa
tion reliability in Japan. For example, the smooth functioning of joint
consultation and consensus-based decisionmaking would seem impossi
ble unless transactions between labor and management could take place
at low cost. Viewed this way, it might be argued that transaction costs are
high in the United States, as industrial relations there tend to be adver
sarial, and neither joint consultation nor consensus-based decisionmak
ing has been their central feature. Heavy reliance on formal grievance
settlement procedures and on the well-developed institution of arbitra
tion in the United States reflect the adversarial industrial relations there.

Cultural-Traditional Factors and Economics
Japan differs from the United States in many labor market charac
teristics. As will be seen in the next chapter, Japan has a greater
prevalance of long-term employment and a more steeply sloped earn
ings-tenure profile. The country also has exhibited greater wage flexibil
ity and less reliance on layoffs, greater use of bonus payments, and
smaller resource loss from industrial disputes. These and other labor
market contrasts underscore the unique characteristics of the Japanese
wage and employment systems.
To what extent are the influences of culture and traditions responsible
for the uniqueness of these labor market practices? This is an important
but difficult question, which has consumed the energy of many scholars
studying Japan. 56 For the purpose of the present analysis, one may
search for clues to this question in the historical roots of the key
institutions of Japanese industrial relations, and ask what evidence there
is of continuity in the notable characteristics of the country©s wage and
employment systems. The literature on the history of the labor markets
following the Meiji Restoration of 1868 is an obvious place to look. 57
The history of the Japanese employment system points to the conclu-
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sion that the forces of culture and tradition alone are not responsible for
the prevalance of the unique features of the country©s industrial relations
system. Data on employment tenure and turnover indicate that longterm employment was much less prevalent in early years of moderniza
tion. For example, Gordon (1985, chap. 3) discusses various measures
that firms in heavy industries adopted bonuses to reward seniority,
regular pay raises, etc. to cope with the prevailing high labor turnover
on the eve of World War I. According to Taira (1970, chap. 6, table 19),
the proportion of employees in manufacturing with employment tenure
of 10 years or more increased from around 3.7 percent in 1918 to 16.2
percent in 1924 and 23.8 percent in 1933, but dropped to 9.3 percent in
1939. These magnitudes contrast sharply with the almost 50-percent
figure for 1980. Similarly, the rate of separation averaged 5.6 percent
between 1916 and 1925, a shade below 4.3 percent between 1926 and
1933, and 3.9 percent during 1934-36. In contrast, as figure 3.4
indicates, the rate of separation during the post-World War II years was
well below 3 percent. Finally, Saxonhouse (1976) reports that the
average length of service of a female worker in the Japanese cottonspinning industry was considerably shorter in the pre-World War II
period (less than 44 months) than in the postwar period (63 months). He
attributes the increased employment tenure in the postwar period to the
spread of industrial training during that time.
The practice of lifetime employment (shusin koyo) began to appear,
albeit sporadically, during the early years of industrialization, when a
reduction of employment turnover, particularly of skilled workers,
became the primary concern among employers. This practice became
widespread during the high growth era of the late 1950s perhaps for the
same reasons as in the prewar years. 58 The prevalance of this practice
varied over the course of Japanese economic development, suggesting a
rejection of the proposition that it was influenced primarily by culture
and tradition.
Enterprise unionism is another Japanese phenomenon that is rela
tively new in history. In fact, trade unions were not recognized in law
though not outlawed either until the Supreme Command for Allied
Powers (SCAP) decreed their existence at the end of the Second World
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War. 59 There were labor movements, and unions did exist, to be sure,
before World War II, but they were neither strong nor extensive, accord
ing to Taira (1970, 163). In 1936, when trade-union membership
reached its peak, for example, collective bargaining was nearly absent
except for seamen and workers in marine transport industries (Taira
1970, 147).
Some enterprise unions that did emerge in the early 1920s were
mostly among large firms in state-owned and private industries. 60 And
membership grew steadily until the demise of unions in 1938, when they
were forced to dissolve and to be organized into Sampo, a wartime
patriotic labor organization dedicated to the promotion of workers©
devotion to the war effort. 61 Unlike their postwar unions, however,
prewar enterprise unions were confined to blue-collar workers (Shirai
1983, 124). In the early post-World War II years, unions began appear
ing at the factory level, but the tendency was for them to be formed
separately for blue- and white-collar workers (Gordon 1985, chap. 9).
During post-World War II years and throughout the 1950s, as noted
earlier in figure 3.7, resource loss from industrial disputes was high,
and only after the early 1960s did cooperative industrial relations
emerge in Japan.
Similar histories can be told regarding the seniority wage (nenko
joretsu) system and the practice of bonus payments. Both of these
practices emerged after the process of industrialization was well on its
way. In the early years of industrialization, seniority wages were limited
to management level workers, while in modern Japan wages for even
blue-collar workers follow the nenko pattern. Interestingly, bonuses,
when they existed, had significant incentive elements in early years. For
example, they were paid to individuals or groups of individuals who
worked without absence for a whole month or other meritorious
achievements. 62 In the modern Japanese corporate sector, bonus pay
ments don©t appear to be incentive payments, at least directly, as their
magnitudes relative to the base pay do not appear to vary from indi
vidual to individual (Hashimoto 1979). Also, typical employment con
tracts do not specify the determinants of the magnitude of bonus pay
ments, contrary to what one would expect if bonuses were incentive

66

Macroeconomic and Institutional Conditions

payments. 63 It is clear that the nature of bonus payments is quite
different in the modern Japanese economy from that of the early years of
industrialization.
To summarize, prototypes of lifetime employment, seniority wages,
and bonus payments were all developed in order to meet the need for
stabilizing the employment of skilled workers as the process of indus
trialization accelerated and acute labor shortages, accompanied by high
turnover, developed (Nakamura 1971, chap. 4; Taira 1970, chap. 5).
Even as late as the interwar years, however, lifetime employment was far
from being the reality in industrial relations. To be sure, large firms did
develop a complex internal labor market during that period, with the
prototype of the nenkojoretsu system of wage payments (Shirai 1983,
124). 64 But the Japanese employment and wage systems, as we know
them today, were not prevalent phenomena before World War II. 65 In
fact, it was not until 10 to 15 years after the end of the Second World War
that many of these features became widespread throughout the Japanese
economy. 66
The preceding discussions suggest that many of what appear to be
uniquely Japanese features of industrial relations are, as Dore (1962) put
it, "in fact fairly recent innovations, supported by traditional values to be
sure, but consciously designed for good profit-maximizing reasons" (p.
120). Most of these features certainly don©t appear to have been carried
over from feudal Japan. One might insist on historical continuity and
argue that the development after the late 1950s reflects a consolidation
of the practices that had roots from the early years of industrialization
(Gordon 1985, chap. 9). Even then, one is left with the question of what
factors prompted the consolidation at that particular time. An answer to
this question is suggested by the theme of this book: the rapid pace of
economic growth interacted with cultural and traditional factors in
shaping the labor market institutions in postwar Japan. 67
Let me end this chapter by discussing the key assumption of the
present theory: transaction costs have been lower in Japan than in the
United States. It goes without saying that it would be useful to have
direct evidence on the magnitude of transaction costs in both countries,
but transaction costs are difficult, if not impossible, to measure directly,
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and one would have to rely on circumstantial evidence. For example, a
difference between Japan and the United States in a worker©s typical
response to a foreman©s request that the rivet be placed from the left side
rather than from the right is suggestive of the transaction-cost differ
ence. Japanese workers are said to comply with such a request without
argument, but American workers, who typically demonstrate strong
individualism, tend to resist it out of a sheer stubbornness. 68 As dis
cussed in chapter 2, however, it is not a fatal flaw of the theory that
transaction costs are not directly observable.
Although the task of assembling such anecdotal evidence is left for a
future study, it is worth pondering the important question of why
transaction costs may be lower in one country than in the other. This
question inevitably would involve the influences of culture and tradition.
What kinds of traditional and cultural factors might one consider in light
of the theory presented in chapter 2? Let me mention two phenomena in
Japan, both related to agriculture, that may bear on this question.
Traditional agriculture appears to have influenced the shape of mod
ern Japanese society along many dimensions. One is the sharing of
decisionmaking. It seems reasonable to view such an approach as a low
transaction-cost phenomenon. Aoki (1983, 25-26) traces the Japanese
affinity for shared decisionmaking to the rice agriculture. Japanese
terrain is mountainous, and rain water quickly flows away to the ocean
unless steps are taken to conserve it. This situation led to the necessity
for controlling and sharing irrigation water among rice farmers. As
agriculture developed and the number of farmers sharing the water
increased, it became necessary to devise "simple and egalitarian con
ventions" to economize on transaction costs. According to Aoki, these
conventions became deep-rooted and were carried over to modern
Japan.
The Japanese agricultural legacy also bears on the importance of
family relationships based on the household, or the ie. One view holds
that the resource base is essential to understanding the ie system in
agriculture. 69 The ie system was the basis not only of agricultural
activities but also of many commercial and manufacturing firms (Fruin
1983). In this system, even non-kin members were accepted as members
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of this family. Even now, employment relationships in Japan share the
characteristics of family relationships more than in the United States
(Hanami 1981). Japanese workers, for example, tend to identify
strongly with their employers, to the point that they expect their superi
ors to be involved even in their personal matters. It is telling that
Takezawa and Whitehall (1981, 119) found that only 5 percent of
Japanese, but 74 percent of American workers surveyed thought that
their superiors should not be involved in their decisions about marriage.
Their survey indicated, moreover, that 80 percent of Japanese, but only
15 percent of American respondents thought that their superiors should
offer personal advice if requested. It seems reasonable that costs of
communicating and transacting are lower in family-style relationships
than in other types.
Undoubtedly one may identify more phenomena relating to the trans
action-cost issue. Whatever they may be, I believe that an explanation
based on the transaction-cost consideration opens a way of incorporat
ing many of the influences of tradition and culture into a choice-theoretic
framework of economic analysis.
NOTES
1 Some of the material presented in this chapter, although developed in my previous research
with John Raisian, has been updated. For further discussions on the Japanese macroeconomy, the
reader may consult Nakamura (1981); Uchino (1983); and Minami (1986), all in English.
2 These magnitudes were calculated from the data contained in Japan Productivity Center
Katsuyo Rodo Tokei (Practical Labor Statistics) 1987, table 1-7, and 1988, table 1-6. Ellenberger
(1982) claimed the American productivity advantage over Japan in the 1970s to be at 30 percent.
3 Industries in which America enjoyed a productivity advantage are agriculture-forestryfisheries, construction, food and kindred products, textile mill products, printing-publishing-and
allied products, petroleum refining and coal products, fabricated metal, furniture and fixtures,
rubber and miscellaneous plastic products, stone-clay-glass products, motor vehicles and equip
ment, transportation equipment, apparel and other fabricated textiles, service, finance-insurancereal estate, and electric utility and gas supply. Industries in which Japan had the productivity
advantage are mining, lumber and wood products, paper and allied products, chemical and allied
products, leather and leather products, primary metal products, electric machinery, precision
instruments, miscellaneous manufacturing, and transportation and communication. The two
countries are tied in machinery and wholesale and retail trade. See Jorgenson and Kuroda (1990,
table 5).
4 Curiously, Drucker©s claim appears to be in conflict with the finding by Jorgenson and Kuroda

Macroeconomic and Institutional Conditions

69

(1990) that the U. S. motor vehicle industry enjoyed a productivity advantage over its counterpart in
Japan in 1985 and that the gap is likely to grow in the future.
5 According to these authors, in automobile manufacturing, Japanese workers in stamping and
assembly plants are twice as productive as U.S. workers; in engine and transmission manufacture,
they are 50 percent more productive; and in iron foundries, 20 percent more productive. They note,
however, that higher labor productivity in complex manufacturing has been achieved only since the
late 1970s by Japanese firms (Abegglen and Stalk 1985, 61-62).
6 The coefficient of variation (the standard deviation as percent of the mean) is 0.81 for the
United States and 0.64 for Japan for the entire 1950-88 period. This finding does not agree with our
earlier finding that productivity is more cyclically variable in Japan than in the United States
(Hashimoto and Raisian 1987a). The present finding, which includes the data for most of the 1980s,
suggests an opposite conclusion.
7 By the period 1985-88, the Japanese growth rate in manufacturing output fell to about 3.3
percent per year, somewhat lower than the U.S. growth rate of 3.9 percent. However, if we extend
the period back by one year, i.e., 1984-88, the Japanese growth rate turns out to be 5.4 percent, and
the U.S. growth rate, 5.1 percent. These are the geometric averages of output growth rates
calculated from the data in the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics
(1989), table 146.
8 Jorgenson et al. (1987) also found that differences in the growth rates of labor input were not
pronounced between the two countries during the post-World War II years.
9 See Hashimoto 1990a for details.
10 For further discussions on Japanese and American unemployment rates, see Moy and
Sorrentino (1981); Taira (1983b); Tominomori (1985); Sorrentino (1976, 1981, 1984); Ito (1984);
and Hamada and Kurosaka (1984, 1986).
11 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2217 (June
1985), table 126, published both reported and modified Japanese unemployment rates. The last
year for which the data are reported is 1983. The next and most recent edition of the Handbook,
Bulletin 2340 (August 1989), table 143 only reports modified unemployment rates. Reported
unemployment rates for Japan continue to be available in Japanese publications, however.
12 This adjustment raised Japanese unemployment rates by, at most, one-tenth of a percentage
point in the early 1980s.
13 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) adjustment procedure evidently had little impact on the
Japanese unemployment series. During the 30-year span between 1959 and 1988, the modified and
the official series differed from each other during only 10 of these years. Curiously, all of these
differences amounted to one-tenth of one percentage point.
14 The major grounds for dismissal are misrepresentation by employees of educational back
ground or previous employment experiences, markedly poor records of performance, outright
insubordination, serious misconduct relating to duties, and criminal conduct in private life (Sugeno
andKoshiro 1987, 135).
15 Sugeno and Koshiro (1987, 135) report that in 1983 there were 1,270 suits filed by workers
involving employment relations. Almost half of them were initiated to challenge employment
termination.
16 For the economy as a whole and for manufacturing, the ratio of quits to dismissals (or layoffs)
is typically more than twice as large in Japan as in the United States. Total separations, quits plus
dismissals (or layoffs), tend to be unrelated to economic conditions in both Japan and the United
States. The reason for this phenomenon is different in the two countries, however. In Japan neither
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quits nor dismissals are related to economic conditions. In the United States, quits rise, but layoffs
fall, during upswings, and as a result total separations exhibit unclear movements (Hashimoto
1990b). As is well-known, the distinction between quits and dismissals (or layoifs) may not be
clearcut. Still, the contrast between the two countries is revealing.
17 See Hashimoto (1990c) for details. See also Moy and Sorrentino (1981) and Hamada and
Kurosaka (1986) for informative discussions on this issue. Comparing unemployment rates
between Japan and the United States entails all sorts of difficulties. For example, according to Taira
(1983b), Japanese unemployment rates would rise by 80 percent if they were made consistent with
U.S. definitions. He reaches this conclusion by using specially tabulated series, which are available
only for the late 1970s. Sorrentino (1984) disagrees with Taira and argues that he should not count
as unemployed persons who are without jobs and waiting to report to new jobs within 30 days. In the
United States such persons are counted as unemployed only if they are available to begin work
immediately. To the extent Taira could not distinguish those who could begin work at once, he might
have overestimated the unemployed pool in Japan. See Hashimoto (1990c) for a discussion on
kyugyosha and the calculation showing that the Japanese-American unemployment rate difference
would not narrow substantially even if all of the kyugyosha workers were to be counted as
unemployed persons.
18 This phenomenon may be due in part to the Japanese unemployment insurance law. There,
unemployment compensation is available to workers on short-time schedules, but in the United
States such workers are not eligible for compensation (Sorrentino 1976, 22). Thus, there should be
a greater incentive in Japan to use short-time rather than layoffs during downturns.
19 It should be noted, however, that some U.S. labor contracts restrict the use of layoffs to meet a
decline in labor demand. For example, a U.S. Steel Corporation agreement in the early 1970s
specified that layoffs would not be used until hours of work fell below 32 per week. The United Auto
Workers had a similar provision stating that layoffs could be used only after hours of work were
maintained at less than 32 per week for four weeks or more (Koike 1977, 81 and 100; Akiyama et
al. 1984).
20 According to Ito (1984), the low teenage unemployment in Japan accounts for 20 to 25
percent of the Japanese-American difference in unemployment rates.
21 The 1986 Equal Employment Opportunity Law prohibits sex discrimination in vocational
training, fringe benefits, retirement, and dismissal. For an informative discussion on this law, see
Edwards (1988).
22 Mandatory retirement has been eliminated by the age discrimination law in the United States.
23 The remaining life expectancy at age 20 for a Japanese male was 48.47 (52.25 for females) in
1955 in contrast to 50.1 (55.8 for females) for white persons in the United States. In 1987, a
Japanese male who had lived to age 20 could expect to live an additional 55.74 years (61.20 years
for females), and a comparable U.S. white male could expect to live an additional 53.3 years (59.8
years for females).
24 Carmichael©s (1983a) model potentially addresses this issue, but the effect of a greater
amount of firm-specific human capital on the retirement age is not clear in his model. As will be
discussed shortly, the rising retirement age in Japan may also reflect the rapid aging of the
population.
25 Presumably, it is more costly for larger firms to differentiate the wage scheme between those
who were hired early and those who were hired late in life. Mandatory retirement may be the least
costly method of preventing those late arrivals from extracting the rents.
26 This point was suggested by Jacob Mincer in a private conversation.
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27 As evidence of the demographic pressure, note the repeated attempts by the Japanese
government to alleviate the budgetary burden by raising the eligibility age for the social security
program from 60 to 65. As of summer 1990, the opposition has succeeded in blocking the
implementation of this change. I thank Machiko Osawa for providing me with information on the
current debate on this issue in the government.
28 The U.S. magnitudes were calculated from the data in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States, 1990, table 13, and the Japanese magnitudes from Japan Statistics
Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1989, table 2-9.
29 Koike (1987,84-92) reports that large Japanese firms have tended to resort to the redundancy
measure after two years of continuous losses.
30 Note that an implicit assumption in Carmichael©s argument is that there is a prospect of
recovery in the future. Without such a prospect, it may not make sense to continue training a
worker.
31 These magnitudes are only slightly less than the 98.7 percent figure for male nonagricultural
employees, 40-54 years old. These data are from Japan Statistics Bureau, Management and
Coordination Agency, Annual Report on the Labour Force Survey (1988, table 14).
32 The comparable magnitude for females 40-54 years old is 58.9 percent.
33 See chapter 4 for an additional discussion on Japanese training practices.
34 Thus, Hanami (1981) goes on to say, "The reluctance to have one©s rights and obligations
clearly defined is to be found not only in the individual relationship between an employee and his
employer but also in the relationship between unions and employers. The situation in industrial
relations does not differ markedly from the description of personal or business contracts..." (p.
53). For a comprehensive treatment on Japanese labor relations, see also Sugeno and Koshiro
(1987).
35 Industrial or craft unions are rare in Japan. The only significant craft union is the Zen Nihon
Kaiin Kumiai (All Japan Seaman©s Union).
36 The remaining members were divided primarily between craft unions (1.3 percent) and
industrial unions (5.5 percent). As is true for the United States, unionism is more prevalent in larger
Japanese firms. In 1989, for example, over 52 percent of union members worked in firms with
1,000 or more employees and only about 5 percent were in firms with 100 or fewer employees.
These magnitudes were calculated from the data contained in Japan Productivity Center, Katsuyo
Rodo Tokei (Practical Labor Statistics) 1990, 168-169.
37 Japanese enterprise unions resemble works councils (Betriebsrdte) in West Germany. For
example, both use joint consultation along with collective bargaining. There are important
differences between the two, however. For example, Betriebsrdte is required by law and is financed
by employers. Japanese unions are not required by law, but are voluntary associations of workers,
and are not financed by employers. Betriebsrdte cannot strike and engage in other job actions as
Japanese unions do. For more details, see Shirai (1983) and Koshiro (1983a,b), which contain
excellent discussions of Japanese enterprise unions.
38 Enterprise unionism began to appear during the interwar years among large firms. Pre-World
War II unions consisted largely of blue-collar employees. Also, unlike the case in Japanese
enterprise unions, a foreman in a U.S. factory is not a member of the local (Koike 1977, 38-40).
39 Enterprise unions belong to industrial federations, which in turn belong to national con
federations. The main functions of federations and confederations are collection and dissemination
of information and involvement in political activities. Until November 20, 1987, there were three
major confederations: the left-oriented Sohyo (General Council of Labor Unions), founded in
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1955, with close to 4.1 million members in 1987; the right-oriented Domei (Japanese Confedera
tion of Labor), founded in 1964, with over 2.1 million members in 1987; and Churitsuroren
(Independent Confederation of Unions), founded in 1956, with over 1.6 million members in 1987.
Both Domei and Churitsuroren were disbanded on November 20, 1987, when Rengo (Japanese
Private Sector Trade Union Confederation), with almost 5.6 million members, was inaugurated.
Sohyo, too, merged with Rengo in late 1989. Rengo now includes both private- and public-sector
employees. These data were gathered from Hanami (1981); The Japan Times, 5 December 1987,
Weekly Overseas Edition, and Japan Productivity Center, Katsuyo Rodo Tokei (Practical Labor
Statistics) 1988, 161.
40 The spring offensive was first launched in 1956 by Sohyo (General Council of Labor Unions)
in order to develop a common labor front on wage bargaining. Spring was chosen presumably
because that is the time when new employees are hired and wage increases implemented, and when
the new fiscal year begins on April 1. See Seike (1986) for an interesting analysis of the effects of the
1986 shunto on wage increases.
41 In West Germany, the comparable figure is over 15 cases brought before the labor courts.
Japan does not have a German-style system of labor courts.
42 The same general conclusion obviously holds for other years as well, as indicated in figures
3.7 and 3.8. After 1981, the U. S. data on labor disputes refer only to membership larger than 1,000
workers and are not comparable to the Japanese data. One word of caution is in order when
interpreting the Japanese data: the information on disputes used here does not include more subtle
forms of work stoppages, such as "go-slow" or "work-to-rule" methods. These informal practices
are believed to be more widely used in Japan than in the United States. Indeed, these practices are
unpopular in the United States. (See, for example, Hanami and Blanpain 1984, part IV by Hanami
and part V by St. Antoine.)
43 A piece of anecdotal evidence for his hypothesis was offered by a Japanese president of a mid
sized firm (about 800 employees), who told me that he started a friendship club in his firm to
promote the exchange of information between management and labor, hoping to forestall unioniza
tion of his workforce. See also Machiko Osawa (1988a) for an interesting discussion on the recently
emerging issues of Japanese industrial relations.
44 It is interesting to note that union and management representatives at Chevrolet and Fleetwood once emphasized that one of the best signs of a healthy employment relationship is the
willingness to resolve disputes through informal oral discussions rather than by resorting to official
written grievances. (See St. Antoine 1984, 312-313.)
45 As pointed out in chapter 1, works councils (Betriebsrate) in West Germany also use joint
consultations.
46 According to a survey taken by the Ministry of Labor in 1977, almost 83 percent of unionized
establishments and slightly over 40 percent of nonunionized establishments had joint consultations
(Shirai 1983,143). For informative discussions of joint consultations, see also Koshiro(1983a) and
Sugeno and Koshiro (1987).
47 According to Sugeno and Koshiro (1987), joint consultation provides the parties with
"channels for intimate communication with the result that many matters which might otherwise
develop into shop floor disputes are agreed upon in advance and peacefully implemented" (p. 143).
48 Other objectives mentioned are the maintenance and improvement of working conditions (77
percent), improvement in productivity (63 percent), participation in management activities (38
percent), and other (20 percent). This information is from Japan Ministry of Labour, Saishin Rodo
Kyoyaku NoJitsujo (The Latest Status of Labor Agreements) 1984, table 5-3. A case study may be
an effective way of appreciating the workings of joint consultations and grievance procedures. An
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interested reader is referred to an illuminating case study of the Japan Steel Corporation and the
Postal Service by Sugeno and Koshiro (1987).
49 Sugeno and Koshiro (1987, 137-140) present additional evidence that in Japan grievance
procedures are much less prevalent than joint consultations. In fact, they state that joint consulta
tions reduce the number of grievances.
50 This point is easily established for Japan from published sources. In 1981, for example, over
87 percent of the disputes that were actually settled were between the parties involved (Hanami
1984, table 1). Comparable data for the United States could not be found. The author©s conversation
with an experienced arbitrator suggests that the U.S. proportion may also be high.
51 This absence presumably reflects Japanese aversion to reliance on outsiders to make deci
sions affecting their well-being. In contrast, the United States has experienced an increased use of
arbitration in the settlement of labor disputes (St. Antoine 1984, 267).
52 In 1981, of 261 settlements handled by third parties, 249 were decided by the Labor
Relations Commission (Hanami 1984, table 1).
53 Japan may not be unique in having mediation and conciliation as the major channels of
dispute settlement. Although comparable data could not be found for the United States, St. Antoine
states that mediation and conciliation are the first steps to conflict resolution by the arbitrator (St.
Antoine 1984, 262).
34 This information was received during a private conversation with an experienced arbitrator in
the United States.
55 See Cole (1979,1980), and Blair and Ramsing (1983) for additional details on the history and
practices of quality circles in Japan. In chapter 5, I briefly discuss quality circles in the United
States.
56 See, for example, Dore (1962) and, more recently, Hamilton and Biggart (1988).
57 After 1639, Japan pursued a policy of isolationism, shunning foreign contacts except with
Holland, which, on the grounds that it was Protestant rather than Catholic, was permitted to engage
in trade under strict control on the island of Deshima in Nagasaki. Isolationism ended 220 years
later in 1859, when the feudal Tokugawa government opened the ports of Kanagawa, Nagasaki, and
Hakodate to Russia, Great Britain, France, Holland, and the United States (Morishima 1982, 5759). With the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan formally abandoned the feudal system and returned
to the imperial system. The Meiji Restoration is a momentous juncture in Japanese history because
"it laid the foundation for the building of a modern state on the Western model" (Morishima 1982,
chap. 2). Japan experienced a period of severe inflation after the Satsuma Rebellion (1877), which
resulted in the so-called Matsukata deflation (1881-84), establishing a new monetary system. The
gold standard was adopted in 1897. It was during the period from 1886 to 1900 that modern
industries became firmly established in Japan. For further details, see Minami (1986); Morishima
(1982); Nakamura (1971, 1981); Nishikawa (1980); and Taira (1970), all in English.
58 An established opinion among Japanese scholars is that Japan entered the period of "excess
demand for labor" in the beginning of the 1960s (Nakamura 1981, 158). Interestingly, this time
period more or less coincides with the period in which long-term employment became increasingly
prevalant (Hashimoto and Raisian 1985).
59 The government often suppressed labor movements using the Public Peace Police Law
(1900) as a legal basis. In 1926, this law was modified to weaken the government©s power against the
labor movement, but a new law, the Peace Maintenance Law, instituted at the same time, was
designed to suppress communistic movements. The government used this law to continue suppress
ing unionism. Garon (1987) contains informative discussions of the history of Japan©s social policy
and labor movement.
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60 State-owned industries with enterprise unions included arsenals, naval shipyards, the tobacco
monopoly, and municipal street railways. Private industries included mining, steel, machinery,
engineering, shipbuilding, copper refining, textile, and electricity and gas supply (Shirai 1983,
124). See Gordon (1985) for an illuminating discussion on union movements in Japanese heavy
industries during early years of modernization.
61 According to Shirai (1983, 124), membership in enterprise unions grew during the 1920s to
reach the point where, by early 1930s, nearly half of all union members were in enterprise unions.
62 "The bonus sometimes took the form of exemption from boarding charges for workers" or "a
remittance of additional cash directly to the homes of the workers in the hope that parents might
become instrumental in encouraging their children to cultivate regular work habits" (Taira 1970,
120-21). Gordon (1985, 101) states that in the early 1920s bonuses were "part of the continuing
effort to control work more directly, tighten discipline, and encourage efficiency. Only men
considered models of conduct were eligible and in many cases a good rate of attendance was a
prerequisite."
63 The magnitude of bonus payments is a subject of annual collective bargaining, shunto.
64 In the early 1930s, large firms began using increasing numbers of temporary workers.
Gordon (1985) attributes the use of temporary workers during these years to "the chaos of high
labor turnover and pirating of skilled workers that accompanied the World War I boom as well as the
subsequently bloated payrolls of the 1920s bust," all of which increased the tendency to designate
many of the new employees "temporary," who received a yearly contract renewable at company
discretion (pp. 135-36). Taira©s description resembles that often given for temporary workers in the
postwar period. For example, he states that the temporary worker was "identical to the regular
workers in all aspects of work on the shop floor, but he was considered a miscellaneous worker
employed for a short fixed term, sometimes on a day-to-day basis, at rates of pay markedly inferior
to those of the regular worker. Not only were temporary workers© deprived of fringe benefits within
the firm, but they were not counted as factory ©operatives© protected by the Factory Law and related
measures" (Taira 1970, 161-63).
65 See Taira (1970,164). It appears also that it took a while for the nenkojoretsu system of wage
setting to take hold after World War II. Nakamura (1981, 166) observes that large firms showed a
trend toward an increasingly steeper slope in their seniority wage curves during the late 1950s. A
chapter by Ono in Nishikawa (1980) contains a related discussion of postwar changes in the
Japanese wage system.
66 Recall also that the separation rates were rather high until the late 1950s, when the declining
trend set in (figure 3.4). It is worth noting also that the famous kanban (just-in-time) system,
pioneered by the Toyota Motor Company, began to be used in many manufacturing plants only in
the late 1970s. Under this system, materials, parts, and components are produced and delivered just
when they are needed. For an informative discussion of the kanban system, see Abegglen and Stalk
(1985).
67 This argument doesn©t deny the role played by the reforms in legal and political framework
introduced by the Occupation; rather, it focuses on the economic forces that made these reforms
take effect.
68 This episode was conveyed to me during a private conversation with a Japanese manager, who
operates factories in both Japan and the United States. Fucini and Fucini©s (1990) observation that
"American workers balk at remaining at the office after five to wait for an important phone call, or
refuse to come to the plant on weekends to work on a rush project..." (p. 131) is also indicative of
high transaction-cost that must be incurred in coping with fluctuations in production plans.
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69 In fact, the ie system has been a point of controversy among anthropologists and others
interested in Japanese society. An ongoing debate exists on the existence and importance of the
economic basis in the ie system. According to Moore (1985), upstream areas in a northern Japanese
village, having greater resources than downstream areas, had a higher rate of household formation
during the 108-year period. He also discusses the controversy surrounding the ie system.

Evidence Bearing on the
Theory©s Implications
This chapter begins with a test of the proposition that transaction costs
are lower in Japan than in the United States. It will then look at some of
the observed phenomena related to the implications of the theory dis
cussed in chapter 2: the importance of bonus payments in Japan; the
structure of compensation; and the differences between Japan and
the United States in on-the-job human capital investments, and in the
adjustments of employment, hours of work, and inventories to fluctua
tions in product demand.
Is there evidence that transaction costs in fact are lower in Japan than
in the United States? As discussed in chapter 2, this is not an easy
question to answer, as transaction costs are not directly measurable.
However, even with the paucity of data, it is possible to shed light on this
issue by posing the question, if transaction costs in the labor market
were lower in Japan than in the United States, what kinds of phenomena
would one expect to observe? This question is addressed here by
focusing on how the quit-dismissal distinction may be related to eco
nomic conditions in the two countries.

Distinction Between Quits and Dismissals
Our theory suggests that the lower the transaction costs between
employer and employees, the less clear the distinction between quits and
dismissals will be. Indeed, if transaction costs were zero, such a distinc
tion would be meaningless, as both employee and employer would make
exactly the same, and efficient, separation decisions. In this case, it
would be inconsequential whether a separation is labeled as a dismissal
77

78

Evidence Bearing on the Theory©s Implications

because the employer initiated it, or as a quit because the employee was
the initiator. If transaction costs were positive, the employer©s separation
decision would be different from the employee©s, and neither decision
would be efficient. (See Hashimoto and Yu 1980 for an elaboration.) As
a result, the efficiency implication of a separation would depend on who
initiates the separation, and the quit-dismissal distinction would be
clear. The higher the transaction costs, the lower the frequency of
efficient separations relative to inefficient separations will be, and there
fore the higher the likelihood that the quit-dismissal distinction is
meaningful. Our theory posits transaction costs to be higher, and there
fore the quit-layoff distinction to be more pronounced, in the United
States than in Japan.
Whether or not the quit-layoff distinction is meaningful has been
investigated recently by three labor economists in the United States
(McLaughlin 1987; Peters 1986; Antel 1985). McLaughlin began by
asserting that the distinction doesn©t matter, and claimed to have found
evidence for his assertion for the U.S. labor market. However, the
version of his paper made available to me did not spell out what one
would expect to find if the distinction mattered. As a result, his study
does not seem to be a direct test of how meaningful the distinction is.
Peters used a similar argument as the one underlying my previous
model (Hashimoto 1981) and examined transaction costs in the U.S.
divorce market. She concluded that divorce tends to occur when it is
efficient, i.e., transaction costs in the divorce market are low. Finally,
Antel developed a test of my earlier model (Hashimoto 1981), which he
applied to the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey. His findings indicate
that the quit-layoff distinction is meaningful in the U.S. labor market,
thereby confirming that transaction costs are positive there. The reader
is left to evaluate the relative merits of these studies; to my knowledge,
there have been no studies on this issue using Japanese data.
It would be interesting to replicate Antel©s test using microdata for
Japan, but unfortunately such data are unavailable. Instead, one must
rely on aggregate data to investigate this issue. The hypothesis exam
ined here is that the quit-dismissal distinction in Japan is less closely
related to economic conditions than it is in the United States. One would
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expect that in Japan, where transaction costs are hypothesized to be low,
it would be unclear as to which party initiated separation in a large
number of the cases. As a result, the reported distinction in Japan would
tend to be arbitrary and independent of economic conditions. In the
United States, where transaction costs are hypothesized to be high, the
employer and employee would make their own separation decisions in
response to exogenous changes in labor demand, and their decisions
would be reported either as layoffs or quits, depending on which party
made them. One would expect, therefore, that the reported distinction
between these separation categories would tend to be more random and
less related to economic conditions in Japan than in the United States.
Before proceeding with the testing, a brief discussion is in order on
the data sources. For the United States, two data sources reported in the
Handbook of Labor Statistics, published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, are used. One classifies the stock of unemployed persons by
whether they are job-leavers or job-losers. The other source, though
discontinued as of 1981, reports the flow of monthly labor turnover in
manufacturing, broken down by quits and layoffs for previous years. For
those years, I use the annual averages of the monthly series.
The Japanese situation is a little more complicated. One must first
face the question of how to distinguish between quits and dismissals (or
layoffs), as the Japanese data do not directly distinguish between the two
categories. I use the data from two surveys, both reported in Yearbook of
Labour Statistics (Japan Policy Planning and Research Department,
Ministry of Labour, Sections B and C in various years). The Maigetsu
Kinro Tokei Chosa (Monthly Labor Survey) reports monthly labor
turnover rates for some nine industries, but it does not break them down
into quits and dismissals. The only published data source that can be
used for our purpose is the Koyo Rodo Tokei (Survey on Employment
Statistics), which reports on the annual number of separated persons
grouped by reason for separation. Although this survey does not ex
plicitly classify separations as quits or dismissals, the stated reasons for
separations facilitate such classification.
In particular, I define quits to be those whose separations are due to
employees© misdeeds, employees© conveniences, or marriage and con-
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finement, and dismissals to be separations due to termination of contract
or to employer©s convenience. 1 The reader is cautioned that these data
pertain only to regular employees, not to temporary employees or day
laborers. As a result, our findings cannot be generalized to the labor
turnover situation for the whole Japanese economy. However, since our
theory is concerned with the turnover situation for regular, or similar,
workers who invest in employment relations, our findings do offer valid
evidence. 2
To test if the quit-dismissal distinction is meaningful in the two
countries, I estimated the following regression for the quit and dismissal
rates, and for the ratio of quit and dismissal rates:
Yt =a0 +a l LGNP+a2Time,

(1)

where Yt is quit or dismissal rate or the quit-dismissal ratio, LGNP is the
deviation of the logarithm of the real gross national product from its
trend, and Time is the time trend variable. 3 The regression estimates are
reported in table 4.1.
The regression coefficient of immediate interest is a l . Our hypothesis
predicts it to be less statistically significant in Japan than in the United
States. As is clear in table 4.1, the estimates of a l are insignificant in all
of the Japanese regressions, but are significant with predicted signs in all
of the U.S. regressions except for the quit regression for all industry. 4
An eye-opener is the result for manufacturing, where the number of
observations are identical for both countries. All of the estimates of a {
for the United States are statistically significant at conventional levels,
but none of the Japanese estimates are. The U.S. findings of statistically
significant a l coefficients positive in the regressions for quit rates and
the quit-layoff ratio and negative in the layoff regression reaffirm what
is known already; namely, in the United States quit rates rise, and layoff
rates fall, when economic conditions improve, and vice versa when they
deteriorate. As a result, the ratio of quits to layoffs rises during upturns.
No such pattern emerges in the Japanese regressions. The evidence
presented in table 4.1 offers support of the proposition that transaction
costs are lower in Japan, at least for regular workers, than in the United
States, and that the U.S. labor market is characterized by what Hall and
Lazear (1984) called an "excess sensitivity of layoffs and quits to
demand" (PP-233-257).
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Table 4.1 Quit-Dismissal Distinction in Japan and the United States
Intercept
(f-values
Japan
All Industry (1955-85)
(1) Quit
5.076 (4.1)
(2) Dismissal
1.082(12.6)
(3) RATIO:
(l)/(2)
5.168 (3.9)
Manufacturing (1955-85)
(1) Quit
11.138 (7.0)
(2) Dismissal
2.597 (9.6)
(3) RATIO:
(l)/(2)
5.145 (4.1)
United States
All Industry (1967-83)
(1) Quit
455.766 (6.6)
(2) Layoff
478.483 (1.4)
(3) RATIO:
(l)/(2)
0.399(15.9)
Manufacturing (1951-81)
(1) Quit
2.191 (7.8)
(2) Layoff
1.892(17.0)
(3) RATIO:
(l)/(2)
1.243 (4.8)

LGNP

Time

R2

in parentheses)

0.707
0.244

(0.5)
(0.9)

0.127
0.004

(1.9)
(0.9)

0.83
0.09

-1.770 (-0.8)

0.080

(1.1)

0.53

-1.379 (-0.8)
0.612
(0.8)

-0.039 (-0.5)
-0.020 (-1.3)

0.76
0.16

-2.597 (-1.3)

-0.007 (-0.1)

0.45

-23.311 (-0.1) 28.178
-28.597 (-4.1) 281.759

(4.5)
(8.3)

0.93
0.91

(4.1)

-0.012 (-5.1)

0.79

13.035
(5.0)
-14.864 (-11.1)

-0.015 (-1.0)
-0.018 (-3.1)

0.69
0.88

-0.008 (-0.5)

0.70

2.299

20.113

(6.1)

SOURCES: Japan Ministry of Labour, Yearbook of Labour Statistics; Japan Productivity Center,
Katsuyo Rodo Tokei (Practical Labor Statistics) 1988,1989,1990; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1985.
NOTES: LGNP is the deviation of the logarithm of the real GNP from its trend. These regressions
adjust for a first degree autoregression in the residuals. See text for discussions on the definitions of
quits and layoffs.

Bonus Payments and the Compensation Structure
There is little doubt that the most distinguishing characteristic of the
Japanese compensation system is the importance of the bonus in earn
ings. Bonus payments are ubiquitous in Japan, being commonly made
to both blue-collar and white-collar workers (Hashimoto 1979; Hashimoto and Raisian 1987a,b; Freeman and Weitzman 1987). Bonuses are
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Table 4.2 Percent of Annual Total Cash Earnings Paid in Bonuses:
_______________Japan (1951-1987)_______________
Workers in All Industries
Size of Employment
5+
5-29
30+

1951
1955
1959
1963
1967
1971
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987

na
na
16.5
19.9
20.9
23.1
23.8
23.9
23.1
23.1
23.0

na
na
11.0
14.4
15.3
17.4
18.4
17.7
17.0
17.4
17.8

13.6
14.4
18.0
21.3
22.4
24.8
26.1
26.4
25.5
25.4
25.2

Workers in Manufacturing Industries
Size of Employment
5+
5-29
30 +

na
na
15.8
19.0
20.1
22.9
23.1
23.5
22.8
22.6
22.1

na
na
7.3
11.4
12.7
15.2
15.8
15.2
14.2
14.0
13.5

12.5
12.6
17.5
20.6
21.5
24.5
25.0
25.5
24.8
24.7
24.2

SOURCES: Calculated from the Maigetsu Klnro Tokei Chosa (Monthly Labour Survey) as
reported in Japan Policy Planning and Research Department, Ministry of Labour, the Yearbook of
Labour Statistics, 1988.
NOTES: Bonus payments are based on the official data on special payments of which the bulk is
bonus payments.

usually paid twice a year, once in July a gift-giving season coinciding
with obon (the occasion when the spirits of the deceased are cele
brated) and in December a time to prepare for the new year.
In previous work, I hypothesized that the Japanese bonus payment
represents the worker©s share in the returns to the investment in firmspecific human capital, and presented the analysis of that hypothesis
(Hashimoto 1979). Based on this argument, the greater bonus propor
tions in Japan, as compared to those in the United States, can be viewed
as reflecting the greater importance of firm-specific human capital in
Japan. More recently, Freeman and Weitzman (1987) argued that the
bonus is, at least in part, a profit-sharing payment to workers. Whether
bonus payments reflect workers© shares in their firm-specific human
capital (Hashimoto 1979) or an aspect of a shared economy (Weitzman
1984), there is no question that an average Japanese worker counts on
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bonus payments as a dependable source of income year after year.
During the bonus seasons, the public media are full of advertisements by
banks and retailers attempting to attract bonus money. Table 4.2 indi
cates that the bonus payment makes up a sizable share of the annual
earnings of Japanese workers, that its relative importance is greater for
workers in larger firms, and that its share tended to increase after 1951
to at least the early 1980s. 5
The high proportion of bonus payments in worker compensation
appears to be unique to Japan. 6 Table 4.3 summarizes compensation
categories for production workers in manufacturing industries in Japan
and the United States. The proportions of total compensation for direct,
indirect, and legally required insurance differed little between the two
countries. For example, in 1981, direct payments consisting of wages,
salaries, and bonuses amounted to about 75 percent of total compensa
tion in the United States and 77 percent in Japan. Indirect payments
(nonmonetary benefits) consisting of paid leave, in-kind payments, and
other nonpecuniary benefits amounted to about 17 percent in the United
States and 15 percent in Japan, and legally required insurance, such as
unemployment insurance, amounted to less than 8 percent in both
countries. It is in the composition of direct payments, i.e., wages and
salaries vs. bonuses, that one finds a sharp contrast between the two
countries. Bonuses for production workers are extremely rare in the
United States, amounting to less than 1 percent of total compensation,
whereas in Japan they amounted to 21 percent of total compensation and
more than 27 percent of direct compensation.
The importance of bonus payments appears to have increased in Japan
over time, but in the United States, the trend appears, if anything, to be
downward. 7 During the period examined in table 4.3, Japanese direct
compensation declined in relative importance, but this decline was due
solely to a declining proportion of wages and salaries (see rows (3) and
(1)). The relative importance of the bonus in Japan increased between
1965 and 1971, while it remained unchanged between 1971 and 1981.
Note also that both nonmonetary benefits and legally required insurance
grew in importance in Japan as well as in the United States during this
period. Finally, Japanese bonus payments do not appear to be incentive
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Table 4.3 Structure of Compensation Costs for Production Workers
in U.S. and Japanese Manufacturing Industries
(Percent)

(1)

Wages and Salaries
(2) Bonuses
(3) Sum of (1) and (2)
(4) Nonmonetary Benefits
Pay for Leave Time
Pay In-Kind
Benefits
(5) Legally Required
Insurance
(6) Total

Japan
1965 1971 1981

United States
1966 1972 1981

64. 6
18. 2
82. 8
12. 3
3. 2
4. 2
4. 9

82. 4
0. 6
83. 0
11. 4
5. 6
5. 8

61.,2
21.,3
82.,5
12.,3
3.,2
4.,1
5.,0

56 ,1
21,.3
77,.4
15 .1
4 .5
4,.4
6 .2

4. 8
5.,2
7,.5
100 100 100

79.0
0.5
79.5
14.4
6.2
8.2

74.1
0.4
74.5
17.5
6.7
10.8

5. 5
6.2
7.9
100 100 100

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics (1989), table 150.
NOTES: Figures don©t always add up to the indicated totals because of rounding. Wages and
salaries include basic time and piece rates, plus overtime premiums and shift differentials. Bonuses
include all bonuses and premiums not paid monthly. Pay for leave time includes pay for vacation,
holidays, and personal leave. Sick leave pay is included in benefits. Pay in-kind includes the cost to
the employer of goods and services provided free or at reduced costs, such as food or housing, or
cash allowances paid in lieu of pay in-kind. Benefits include private benefit plans. Japanese data
refer to regular employees in establishments with 30 or more regular employees.

payments, as conditions for receiving bonuses are rarely stated in
employment contracts. 8
I have argued elsewhere that bonus payments contribute to flexible
wages in Japan (Hashimoto 1979; Hashimoto and Raisian 1987a). It
should be noted, however, that flexibility is evident in all components of
earnings. It is well-documented in the literature that the base wage in
Japan is quite flexible, as it is renegotiated every spring at the time of
shunto (spring offensive). 9 The greater wage flexibility in Japan, as
compared to the United States, conforms to the prediction of the theory
developed in chapter 2.

Earnings Profiles and Worker Investment in Human Capital
I have argued in chapter 2 that there is greater investment in human
capital on the job in Japan than in the United States. The hypothesis is
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that this greater investment is the result of lower transaction costs, which
encourage the investment in information reliability and/or a lower cost
of investing in employees© technical skills.
On-the-job investment in human capital is ubiquitous in Japanese
firms. It is more extensive in larger firms, but its existence among
medium-sized and small companies should not be understated (Hashimoto and Raisian 1985). It would be incorrect, though, to conclude that
American workers have less human capital overall than Japanese work
ers, as many U.S. workers receive training through formal channels,
such as business schools, prior to entering the labor market. The point
here is that on-the-job investment is more important, relative to total
investment, in Japan than in the United States.
The following quotation (Hanami 1981) effectively conveys the im
portance in Japan of investment in human capital on the job:
... most of the employees are recruited when they are fresh out of
high school or college; the Japanese educational system as a whole is
oriented more toward general education than toward vocational
training. Therefore, an enterprise must train its labor force, either in
its own training facilities or on the job. During their long career at
the same enterprise, workers are likely to be transferred from one
job to another. They are trained and retrained, especially after each
move.. .(pp.28-29).

This description is in sharp contrast with the tendency for U.S. employ
ers to want their new hires to "come in the door having the craft, not
trying to learn the craft," and to expect them to "contribute to the bottom
line immediately."10

Earnings Profiles
Consistent with the claim that there is more investment in worker
skills on the job in Japan than in the United States, Raisian and I found
that earnings typically grow more rapidly with tenure for Japanese
workers than for American workers (Hashimoto 1985). Also, firmspecific experience has a greater earnings-boost effect than other types
of experience in Japan, the reverse of the U.S. pattern.
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Table 4.4 Importance of Firm-Specific Job Experience
in Earnings Profiles
(Male Nonagricultural Workers in Japan and the United States)
Growth in Earnings to Peak Year Due to:
Ratio
FirmSpecific
Total
Peak
Experience (%) (3)/(2)
Experience (%)
Year

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Japan
Small Firms
Medium Firms
Large Firms

24
33
27

235.6
267.4
242.8

150.4
141.0
205.2

.638
.527
.845

United States
Small Firms
Medium Firms
Large Firms

25
30
30

140.0
98.6
109.7

57.9
28.9
52.6

.414
.293
.479

SOURCE: This table is based on Hashimoto and Raisian (1985), table 6.
NOTE: These magnitudes are calculated from regression estimates of earnings profiles, holding
constant schooling and union status (for the United States).

Table 4.4 documents these patterns. This table is excerpted from the
findings reported in Hashimoto and Raisian (1985, table 6). We ran
regressions of the logarithm of earnings on a number of variables,
including years of tenure, total years of experience, and schooling.
Using the estimated regression coefficients, we then constructed earn
ings profiles for typical workers in Japan and the United States up to the
years when the earnings reached their peaks. Interestingly, the peak
years, reported in column (1), are not very different between the two
countries.
Column (2) reports the percentage growth in earnings between the
first year of employment and the peak year. The magnitudes in column
(2) represent d(logY)/dj obtained as follows. Think of the logarithm of
earnings, log Y, as being generated by a function/^©, ri), where./ is total
years of experience and n is years of tenure. Then(dlog7)/d/ =
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d(\ogY)/dj+d(\QgY)/dn, since dnldj= 1 for a worker who stays with the
firm until retirement. The terms on the right-hand side can be estimated
as the regression coefficients b and c, respectively, in the regression:
\ogY=a+bj+cn+ .... n A typical Japanese worker who continues to
work in a small firm is estimated to experience an almost 236 percent
growth in earnings. In contrast, earnings for an American counterpart
are expected to grow by only 140 percent.
According to the human capital hypothesis, earnings grow with
employment tenure because employees acquire both general and firmspecific experience. Columns (3) and (4) document the relative impor
tance of firm-specific experience in the total earnings growth. The
magnitudes in column (3) are calculated from d(logY)/dn in the above
equation. Column (4), which reports the ratios of column (3) to column
(2), indicates that for the typical Japanese worker in a small firm almost
64 percent of the earnings growth a little over 150 of the 235.6
percentage points is due to firm-specific experience. For a U.S. coun
terpart, a little over 41 percent-about 58 of the 140 percentage-point
growth in earnings is attributable to firm-specific experience. Thus,
firm-specific experience dominates general experience in raising earn
ings in Japan, but the opposite pattern is true in the United States. The
same Japanese-American contrast is observed for medium-sized and
large firms as well. 12

Long-Term Employment
Investments in employment relationships result in long-term employ
ment relationships. The so-called lifetime employment, shushin koyo,
system in Japan exemplifies this connection. The term is obviously an
exaggeration, as most workers do have to retire at a prespecified retire
ment age that is early by the American standard. 13 The term is a useful
one nevertheless, because it conveys the notion of the long-term employ
ment relationship that exists in Japan. To be sure, long-term employ
ment is observed outside Japan as well, but it seems indisputable that the
average Japanese worker stays with the same employer for a longer
period of time than an American counterpart. 14
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The fact that Japanese workers don©t change jobs as often as American
workers was demonstrated in my earlier work with Raisian (Hashimoto
and Raisian 1985, table 2). We found that in both countries job ac
cumulations are concentrated in the early work years, but stabilize much
sooner in Japan than in the United States. A typical Japanese male was
estimated to hold slightly more than 4.9 jobs before retiring, in contrast
to his American counterpart who was projected to hold about 11 jobs.
For females, the comparable figures were a little over 5 for Japanese
females and a little over 10 for American females. 15 These magnitudes
indicate that job turnover over the life cycle is notably smaller in Japan
than in the United States.
We reported another finding on the relative prevalence of long-term
employment relationships. That evidence had to do with the proportion
of workers who stayed with the same employers for 15 years
(Hashimoto and Raisian 1985, table 1). We found that, of Japanese male
workers who were 20-24 years old in 1962 and had worked five years or
less by then, 45.1 percent were with the same employers 15 years later.
The comparable magnitude for American male workers was 13 percent.
Of those who had worked over five years by 1962, the proportion was
more than 65 percent for Japanese males and about 30 percent for U.S.
males. Similar contrasts were obtained for other age groups as well.
Clearly, long-term employment has been more prevalent in Japan than in
the United States. We also found that those with more than 10 years of
tenure constituted a greater proportion of male employees in Japan than
in the United States, for both small and large firms. In both countries, a
greater proportion of employees was found to have long-term employ
ment in larger companies. Also, long-term employment was found to
prevail in Japan even among small firms, though to a smaller extent than
in large establishments.
Finally, it should be kept in mind that job mobility in Japan has shown
signs of increasing in recent years. As Aoki (1990) notes, some large
Japanese firms, as well as foreign firms located in Japan, responded to
the shortage of specialists and skilled workers by recruiting mid-career
personnel. To what extent such a trend will spread to the overall labor
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market in Japan, possibly phasing out the long-term employment prac
tice there, remains to be seen.

Worker Investment in Human Capital
How large are on-the-job investments in Japan and the United States?
This question was addressed earlier (Hashimoto and Raisian 1988) by
computing investment magnitudes for the two countries. Although this
question is discussed in detail in our paper, it is worthwhile to bring
together the evidence here, given its relevance to the present theory. Let
me present the findings in as nontechnical a way as possible, leaving the
technical procedure to the appendix to this chapter. A reader wishing to
follow every step of the calculation procedure might find it useful to read
the appendix first.
The computation procedure we used is based on Mincer©s (1974)
model, which in turn was an extension of the original model by Becker
(1962). I summarize briefly the main points of the procedure by refer
ring to figure 4.1. In that figure, workers who decide not to invest in
human capital are assumed to earn a competitive value of E0, or earnings
without investment, throughout their careers. If they were to invest part
of their potential earnings in any year, they would receive the values
indicated by the schedule labeled "earnings with investment." The
potential earnings in the y©th year of tenure is given by Yj+Cj. The
overtaking year, j*, occurs when the earnings with and without invest
ment are equal to each other. Earnings peak atj? for those who invest.
Finally, the shaded area indicates the total amount invested in human
capital. This amount is what was computed.
To perform the computation, it was necessary first to estimate
earnings-tenure profiles, holding constant other determinants of earn
ings. The earnings profiles were estimated by ordinary least squares
using the following familiar specification:
In Y=a+bg + cg2 +dj+fj2 +hX+u,

(2)

where Y represents usual weekly wages for U.S. data and average
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Figure 4.1 Earnings Growth and Investment
Potential
Earnings

Earnings With
Investment
Earnings Without
Investment

Overtaking
Year (/)

Peak
Year (/)

Tenure (y)

monthly earnings (including bonuses) for Japanese data; g is an estimate
of years of previous experience (age minus education minus years of
current job tenure minus six); j is years of tenure on current employ
ment; Xis a vector of control variables; u is the error term, and a, b, c,
d, f, and h are parameters to be estimated. 16 For Japan, X stands for
dummy variables for schooling categories. For the United States, X
includes a union-status variable along with schooling variables.
Table 4.5 presents a summary of the characteristics of earnings
profiles we estimated along with the computed values of investment
magnitudes. The underlying data for Japan are from the Chingin Kozo
Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey of Wage Structure) for 1980. These data are
available as cell averages cross-classified by education, firm size, years
of tenure, industry, age of worker, and occupation. Regression estimates
were obtained by weighting each of the variables by the square root of
the cell frequency. Data for the United States are from the May 1979
Current Population Survey containing observations on individual work-
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ers. We restricted the sample to male workers in private nonagricultural
industries for both countries.
As the chapter 4 appendix explains, the initial step in computing the
investment magnitudes in table 4.5 is to select an appropriate overtaking
year, which is when the current earnings of an investor become equal to
those of a noninvestor. It was determined that five years is a plausible and
theoretically consistent value (see the chapter appendix for this deter
mination). Using this value for the overtaking year, earnings for a
worker in a small Japanese firm in a nonagriculture sector are found to
peak in the 13th year of tenure at a value of 293 thousand yen per month
(column 1, table 4.5). The monetary value of investment is calculated to
be 6.9 million yen, which is equivalent to 2.3 years© worth of time. The
comparable investment magnitude for the United States is 1.3 years, a
substantially smaller investment.
As for workers in large Japanese nonagricultural firms, the overtak
ing year of seven was chosen, using the procedure outlined in the chapter
appendix. Using this value, the earnings are found to peak in the 25th
year at a monthly value of 444 thousand yen (column 2, table 4.5). The
monetary investment amounts to 19.3 million yen, or 4.8 years© worth of
time, much larger than for workers in small companies. The compara
ble investment magnitude for the United States is 2.2 years. Thus, the
firm-size difference in investment is larger in Japan than in the United
States. The results for Japanese manufacturing firms generally conform
to those for nonagricultural companies, but firm-size contrast in the
United States is less clear for manufacturing than for the overall nonagricultural sector. 17 Evidently, workers in large U.S. manufacturing
companies do not invest much more than those in small businesses.
It appears then that Japanese employees invest more in human capital
than their counterparts in the United States. The investment in nonagricultural enterprises measured in years is almost 77 percent greater
for small firms, and 118 percent larger for large companies, in Japan
than in the United States. Interestingly, the rates of return were found to
be rather similar for the two countries. 18 The investment magnitudes
reported above refer to total investments. What is relevant to our theory,
of course, is investment in firm-specific human capital. Under the
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Table 4.5 Summary of Earnings-Tenure Profiles in Japan and
the United States by Firm Size
Nonagricultural
Industries
Small
Large
Firms
Firms
Japan:
Overtaking Year
Peak Year
Monthly Earnings in
Overtaking Year
Monthly Earnings in
Peak Year
Estimated Investments
In Thousands of Yen
In Years
United States:
Overtaking Year
Peak Year
Weekly Earnings in
Overtaking Year
Weekly Earnings in
Peak Year
Estimated Investments
In Dollars
In Years

Manufacturing
Industries
Small
Large
Firms
Firms

5
13

7
25

5
13

7
30

213.41

241.11

194.93

223.83

292.84

444.20

278.10

480.05

6,942
2.3

19,313
4.8

7,269
2.6

22,271
5.5

5
20

6
30

5
25

5
31

275.98

322.12

268.91

312.84

338.22

445.38

360.12

418.43

19,209
1.3

41,564
2.2

25,807
1.7

28,838
1.6

SOURCES: Summarized from Hashimoto and Raisian (1987a,b, 1988). The underlying data are:
for Japan, the Basic Survey of Employment (1980); and for the United States, the Current
Population Survey (May 1979).
NOTES: The dependent variables in the underlying regressions are the natural logarithms of
monthly earnings (including bonus payments) measured in thousands of yen and usual weekly
earnings measured in dollars for Japan and the United States, respectively. The explanatory
variables include tenure, previous experience, schooling, and union status. The samples are for
male workers. Small firms are those with 1-99, and large firms with 1,000 or more, regular
employees.
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standard assumption that the amount of firm-specific human capital is
positively associated with total investment, the above findings of greater
worker investment in total human capital implies that there is greater
worker investment in firm-specific human capital in Japan than in the
United States. 19
Before leaving table 4.5, one limitation of the data used for the
calculations should be noted. In particular, the above calculations use
only the data on earnings and ignore payments to pension funds and to
other fringe benefits. It is possible that the returns to investments accrue
in these payments as well as in earnings. Unfortunately, the available
data do not contain enough information on these payments to facilitate
their inclusion in the calculation procedure. If the size of the shaded area
in figure 4.1 is positively associated with these other payments, our
Japanese-American and firm-size comparisons are valid. 20
The above results reinforce the evidence based on bonus payments,
which were found to be more extensively used in Japan than in the
United States (see table 4.3). Therefore, the investment magnitudes just
discussed can be viewed, together with the greater prevalence of bonus
payments in Japan than in the United States, as supporting the prediction
of our theory that Japanese workers invest more in the employeremployee relationship than do their American counterparts.

Sensitivity of Labor Inputs to Output Changes
Temporary workers, day laborers, and female workers in Japan
experience greater volatility in employment than male regular workers,
providing cushions for demand fluctuations in the long-term employ
ment environment for regular workers. Table 4.6 documents this ten
dency, using the data for the manufacturing industry. 21 It reports the
regression results relating year-to-year changes in employment to sim
ilar changes in output, separately for regular workers and temporary
workers and day laborers. The coefficients associated with output indi
cate the extent of employment sensitivity in elasticity terms. For exam
ple, the output coefficient for male regular workers of 0.3121 indicates
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Table 4.6 Employment Sensitivity to Changes in Output
Japanese Manufacturing, 1959-88
Coefficient

Regular
Workers

Temporary Workers
and Day Laborers

.3121
(4.84)
-.0102
(-1.47)
.445

.6152
(1.68)
-.0482
(-1.22)
.061

.5570
(4.49)
-.0291
(-2.16)
.406

.9149
(3.11)
-.0283
(-.89)
.236

Males
Output
Constant
R-Square
Females
Output
Constant
R-Square

SOURCES: Rodoryoku Chosa (Labor Force Survey) as reported in Japan Yearbook of Labour
Statistics, 1988, 1989, 1990. The output data are from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook
of Labor Statistics (1989), table 146.
NOTES: Figures in parentheses are f-values. Coefficients are OLS estimates of a and b in Dy=a
+bDz+e, where Dy and Dz are year-to-year changes in the logarithm of, respectively, the
dependent variables and manufacturing output, and e is the regression error term.

that a 1 percent increase in the rate of output production is associated
with a one-third percent increase in the employment of regular workers.
It is clear that, for both sex groups, temporary workers and day
laborers exhibit greater employment sensitivities to output changes than
regular workers. Note also that the output coefficient for male regular
workers is about 78 percent of the coefficient for female regular workers
(0.3121 vs. 0.5570), is almost half the size of that for male temporary
and day laborers (0.3121 vs. 0.6152), and one-third the size of that for
female temporary and day workers (0.3121 vs. 0.9149). Evidently,
female temporary workers and day laborers experience the most vol
atility in employment of the four groups studied in table 4.6. A similar
regression for U.S. manufacturing employment reveals an output sen-
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sitivity of 0.5802. 22 It is interesting that output sensitivities for male
temporary workers and female regular workers in Japan are similar to
the output sensitivity for the American workers as a whole. Male regular
workers in Japan do experience the least employment sensitivity to
changes in output.
The regression results in table 4.6 suggest that the lifetime employ
ment of Japanese male regular workers is supported by the cushions
provided by female workers and temporary and day workers. These
regressions are rather simplistic, however. They do not distinguish
employment responses to anticipated and unanticipated changes in the
rate of production, for example. It is also desirable to incorporate the
possible interdependence among employment, hours of work, and
inventories.
We saw earlier that male manufacturing workers in Japan invest more
in firm-specific human capital than do those in the United States. 23 If so,
the sensitivity of labor inputs to changes in demand should differ
systematically between the two countries. In particular, employment
should be less responsive, and hours of work and inventories more
responsive, to changes in the product demand for Japanese than for
American workers. How does the pattern of sensitivity in labor input
differ between the countries? Does it depend on whether changes in
product demand are anticipated or unforeseen? Is there evidence that the
Japanese response pattern changed after the slowdown in its economic
growth in the early 1970s?
To investigate these questions, I adopt the labor demand model
developed by Topel (1982), which is an extension of the interdepen
dent factor demand model originally developed by Nadiri and Rosen
(1973). 24
The model contains three equations corresponding to three endoge
nous variables: employment, hours of work, and inventories. Invento
ries are relevant for employment adjustments. 25 A firm has a choice of
responding to fluctuations in its product demand by adjusting its current
level of labor use, changing its inventories, or engaging in a combina
tion of both. Also, faced with an increase in the forecasted future
demand for its product, the firm may not want to wait for the increased

96

Evidence Bearing on the Theory©s Implications

demand to materialize before increasing its output. Instead, it may hire
more workers now and/or ask the existing workers to work overtime to
build up inventories. These considerations suggest that the exogenous
variable in the model is the product demand, and it is represented here
by forecasted values of shipments as well by the unforeseen deviations in
the current shipments from its forecasted value.
The model consists of three interdependent demand equations as
follows:
qt, Time Trend] (3)
o
T
Ht =fh[Et _ lt #,_!, /,_!, X,_ 15 e^ 2jqt+P qt, Time Trend] (4)
o
T

7,, Time
where/©s indicate that the left-hand side variables are functions of the
variables appearing in the brackets; Et, Ht, and /, are employment,
hours of work at time t (month), and inventories; Xt stands for invento
ries of intermediate stocks and materials; e denotes the expected values;
jS©s are the coefficients associated with the future values, qt +j, of
shipments; and qt is unanticipated current demand. 26 All of the variables
except the time trend variable are measured in natural logarithms.
The specification above is known as an interdependent stockadjustment model of factor demand. The underlying theoretical model
and the associated optimization problem are discussed in Topel (1982)
and will not be repeated here. The expectation operator, e, refers to
expectations formed by using the information available each month. The
planning horizon, t, was specified alternatively as four months, six
months, and nine months, but the findings differed little among those
specifications. 27 As a result, only the findings based on the nine-month
horizon are reported. The exogenous variable in the model is output
demand as measured by. the forecasted shipments, qt, and by unforeseen
deviations in the current shipments, qr Firms are assumed to choose the
magnitudes of the endogenous variables by taking into account the
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forecasted current and future demand as well as unforeseen deviations in
the current demand.
To construct the forecasted values of future shipments, it is assumed
that they depend only on the past values of shipments and not on other
endogenous variables. Since the underlying data are monthly, one must
take account of seasonality. As a result, various seasonally differenced
integrated-autoregressive-moving-average processes (ARIMA) were
investigated, and the best ones were chosen to generate the forecasted
values of shipment, eqt, which in turn are used as explanatory (ex
ogenous) variables in estimating equations (3) through (5). 28
Before discussing the estimation of the model and the findings, let me
address some problems in comparing data on employment, hours of
work, and inventories between Japan and the United States. First, as
noted in chapter 3, Japanese workers who are temporarily laid off (ichiji
kyugyoshd) are counted as employed persons, but in the United States
such persons would be counted as unemployed. 29 This difference is
potentially troublesome for comparing the employment sensitivity to
demand changes in the two countries. In particular, one would not detect
in the Japanese data changes in employment due to temporary layoffs, as
one would in the U.S. data. Thus, an estimate of employment sensitivity
would be understated for Japan.
Although one should keep a healthy respect for this problem, it
should be noted that temporary layoffs are rather rare in Japan. For
example, those who are temporarily out of work for any reasons
(kyugyoshd) amount to only about 2 percent of regular workers. 30 The
ratio of male ichiji kyugyosha to male regular workers, if the data were
available, almost surely would be much less than 2 percent. Therefore, I
do not consider this issue to be serious enough to discourage a com
parison of the employment sensitivity in the two countries as long as one
bears in mind the potential for understating it for Japan. 31
The second issue concerns hours of work. Abraham and Houseman
(1989) caution that the difference in the definition of hours of work
between the two countries may distort a comparison of the hours
coefficient: hours data refer to actual hours worked for Japan but to paid
hours for the United States. For example, changes in the vacation
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schedule alter the actual hours of work while keeping paid hours
unchanged. To the extent that this adjustment mode is used in both
countries, the difference in the definition of hours of work would make
the hours coefficient apparently smaller for the United States than for
Japan even if, in fact, it were the same. 32
There is yet another difficulty with the hours data for Japan. As noted
in chapter 2, typical Japanese regular workers spend a great deal of time
with their colleagues and superiors after work hours talking about
various aspects of work and personal lives over food and drinks, and
generally investing in the employment relationship. 33 Such expendi
tures of hours are unlikely to be reported in the data. Thus, the hours of
work data for Japan tend to understate the true numbers of hours that
typical workers spend in the marketplace, though perhaps the data
accurately measure the actual hours directly spent on production. Total
hours of work, including the informal time spent investing in the
employment relationship, may respond less to changes in the demand
for output than the hours spent on production.
TUrning to the third issue, it is generally agreed that Japanese firms are
less vertically integrated than American firms, with the former relying
on subcontractors to perform many of the production activities. As a
result, some of the inventories, which would be counted as input
inventories in U.S. firms, may be counted as output inventories in
Japanese firms. 34 If the response of output inventory to output demand
differs from that of input inventory to input demand, a comparison of
inventory behavior for the two countries could be distorted, since the
distinction between the two is ignored here.
Given the preceding difficulties in comparing data for the two coun
tries, one needs to be cautious in interpreting the estimate of the model.
If we were to find that the estimated employment sensitivity, which may
be an underestimate of the true sensitivity in Japan, is greater in Japan
than in the United States, we would have clear evidence refuting the
prediction of our theory. However, if we were to find an opposite
pattern namely, that employment sensitivity is smaller in Japan than in
the United States we could not claim such findings to be conclusive.
Instead, we could say only that the findings are consistent with the
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theory©s predictions. Similarly, our test can offer conclusive evidence
only against, but not in support of, the prediction of the theory regard
ing hours sensitivity: by finding that the estimated hours sensitivity,
which may be an underestimate of the true value for the United States, is
greater in the United States than in Japan, one would judge against the
theory©s prediction.
The data used to estimate the model for both countries are monthly
establishment data, seasonally unadjusted, for the manufacturing sec
tor. Japanese data refer to regular workers for both sexes and U.S. data,
to all workers. Unfortunately, the monthly U.S. data are not available by
sex. The Japanese data are gathered from Japan Economic Planning
Agency, Annual Report on Business Cycle Indicators, and the U.S.
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Business Statistics 1986,
A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business and the Citibank
Data File.
Of immediate interest are the coefficients associated with forecasted
current shipments, those for forecasted future shipments (Ej8^, EjS^-,
DjS3y, 7 = 1,2, ...), and those for unforeseen current demand shocks.
The estimated coefficients are reported in table 4.7. It should be men
tioned at the outset that the forecasting model estimate was less suc
cessful for Japan than for the United States. 35 The causes for the poor
Japanese results undoubtedly hidden in the data used could not be
determined. The poor performance of the Japanese forecasting equation
needs to be kept in mind when evaluating the findings.
Estimates of equations (3) through (5) were all statistically significant
according to the F statistics (available upon request). In table 4.7, all
coefficients are interpreted as elasticities. The coefficients associated
with the short-run product-demand variables the forecasted current
demand and unforeseen deviations in the current demand from its
forecasted value are of direct interest. Although firms must have
anticipated that there would be some deviations in the actual from the
forecasted demand, the exact magnitude of the realized deviation is in
fact unforeseen. As such, firms will respond by changing labor usage
and the inventory level.
The theory predicts the coefficients for the labor input variables-
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Table 4.7 Adjustments of Labor Inputs to Demand
Japan

United States

Employment Hours Inventories Employment Hours Inventories
(E)
(#,)
(/,)
(£,)
(Ht)
(/,)
Forecasted Shipments
(1) Unforeseen
0.0885
Deviations
(1.88)
(2) Current
0.0472
(3.47)
(3) Future

-0.0555
(1.89)

0.1200
(1.57)
0.1423
(1.88)
-0.0070
(0.12)

-0.1073
(-1-34)
-0.1811
(7.80)
-0.0975
(2.01)

0.2640
(2.99)
0.1214
(4.05)
-0.0745
(1.50)

0.0950
(2.55)
0.0053
(0.41)
0.0891
(4.18)

-0.0705
(-1.89)
0.0049
(0.37)
0.0247
(1.16)

SOURCES: The magnitudes are based on author©s calculation using data from the following
sources: Japan Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on Business Cycle Indicators (August
1987); the computer data bank, Citibank Data File; U.S. Department of Commerce, The Bureau of
Economic Analysis, Business Statistics 1986, A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business,
1987.
NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are f-values. The unforeseen deviations represent the difference
between the actual shipment and the forecasted current shipment. The forecasted future shipment
variables are based on nine-month forecasts, and the coefficients for future shipments are the sum of
the coefficients for the eight months following the current month. The unanticipated shipment
variable is the difference between the actual shipments and the current forecasted shipments.

employment and hours of work associated with the current demand
variables to be positive and the coefficient for inventories to be negative.
In other words, when the current product demand increases, employers
increase both employment and hours of work, but reduce inventories, to
meet the increased demand. As for coefficients associated with the
forecasted future demand, or long-run changes in demand, the theory
predicts coefficients for labor inputs and inventories to be all positive.
Thus, when the future demand is expected to increase, firms begin
building up inventories by increasing production now, and the increase
in the current production entails increases in labor inputs. Also, to the
extent that new employees need to be trained, companies may begin
hiring in advance of future increases in demand. As will be seen,
however, the findings associated with the forecasted future demand turn
out to be weak and uninformative.
The results of direct interest for this study concern coefficient differ-
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ences between Japan and the United States and among the equations for
employment, hours of work, and inventories. If there is a higher fixity of
employment cost due to greater investments in firm-specific human
capital in Japan than in the United States, one would predict the follow
ing patterns of contrast in the coefficients for the unforeseen deviations
in the current demand and for the current demand itself: (1) the coeffi
cients for employment would be smaller in Japan; (2) the coefficients for
hours of work and inventories would be greater in Japan; and (3) the
coefficients for hours of work and inventories would be larger than those
for employment in both countries. This last prediction follows from the
usual premise that a higher fixed cost is associated with employment
changes more than with changes in either hours of work or inventories.
The coefficients reported in table 4.7, rows (1) and (2) are consistent
with the predictions except for the positive but statistically insignifi
cant inventory coefficient in row (2) for the United States. The coeffi
cients in row (1) indicate that employment responds much less to
unforeseen deviations in the current demand in Japan (0.0885 and barely
significant) than in the United States (0.2640 and significant). The same
pattern of difference holds for the coefficient for the forecasted current
demand (row (2)), with Japan having the coefficient of 0.0472 and the
U.S.,0.1214, both statistically significant.
The weak employment response in Japan to short-run changes in
product demand in contrast to the U.S. situation, in which employment
responds significantly to these demand changes, is consistent with there
being a greater fixity of employment in Japan than in the United States.
Note also that for both unforeseen deviations and for the current de
mand, the Japanese coefficients for hours of work and inventories are
nominally (in absolute values) larger than for employment, but the
opposite pattern is observed for U.S. coefficients. In fact, the U.S.
coefficients for inventories are statistically insignificant. It appears,
therefore, that Japanese manufacturing firms rely more on adjustments
in hours of work and inventories relative to employment adjustment than
their U.S. counterparts when faced with short-run changes in product
demand. These findings are consistent with the proposition than in
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Japanese manufacturing high employment-cost fixity discourages the
use of employment adjustments to short-run changes in demand.
According to table 4.7, in the hours equation the coefficient associ
ated with unforeseen deviations in shipments is only slightly larger for
Japan than for the United States (0.1200 and 0.0950). In the same
equation, the coefficient for current demand is much larger for Japan
than for the United States (0.1423 and 0.0053), but it is insignificant for
both countries. In a recent paper, Abraham and Houseman (1989)
concluded that the average hours in Japanese manufacturing adjust no
more, and possibly less, than those in U.S. manufacturing. The findings
in table 4.7 suggest that the average hours in Japanese manufacturing
adjust slightly more than in U.S. manufacturing. The minor differences
between their findings and mine, undoubtedly, are related to differences
in the model specification and in the data used. 36
Given the difficulties of comparing the hours measure in the two
countries, the extent of distortions in the comparison of the hours
coefficient between the two is difficult to determine. What the findings in
table 4.7 suggest, then, is that Japanese manufacturing relies relatively
more on adjustments in inventory and in hours of work spent directly on
production activities, while U.S. manufacturing relies relatively more
on employment adjustment. It is noteworthy that the findings do not
contradict the predictions of the theory. Given the problems associated
with the employment and hours data noted earlier, however, the finding
that the estimated employment and hours coefficients conform to the
pattern predicted by our theory must be viewed with caution.
The coefficients for future shipments are mostly insignificant, and the
signs for the coefficients are uninformative in row (3). Although our
immediate interest is in the response coefficients to short-run changes in
product demand, the rather ambiguous findings for the future shipment
variable is disappointing. I have tried various equation specifications
and forecasting mechanisms, but to no avail. These coefficients are
based on a nine-month time horizon, but the coefficients based on threeand five-month horizons also were found to be insignificant. Taken
literally, this finding suggests that the current level of input use, and
particularly of employment, is not affected by forecasted future de-
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mand, a difficult proposition to accept. Moreover, the negative sign in
the Japanese inventory equation is the opposite of the theoretical expec
tation. 37 These anomalous findings are in contrast to the more sensible
findings for short-run changes in product demand reported in rows (1)
and (2). A plausible reason for the anomalies is that the estimated
forecasting equation for Japan performs more poorly in forecasting
future shipments than current shipments. If so, the forecasted future
demand variables would contain an unknown number of measurement
errors, and such errors would cause statistically insignificant estimates.

Japanese Experience in the Post-1975 Years
Japan experienced a rather drastic contraction in the growth rate of
her economy after the first "oil shock," which began in late 1973. 38 As a
result, many firms had to make major and sometimes painful-adjust
ments in the utilization of labor. An important public policy response to
this situation took place in 1975 in the form of the Employment Insur
ance Law. This law shifted the emphasis away from the usual concept of
an unemployment insurance subsidy directly provided to unemployed
workers to a system in which subsidies are given to employers, who, in
turn, provide compensation to workers on furlough. A noteworthy
aspect of this law was that it enabled the furloughed workers to remain
"employed" by the firm (Cole 1979; Taira and Levine 1985). Also, the
law provided for subsidies in circumstances where employers wished to
implement short-time schedules (Sorrentino 1976).
The changes that the Japanese economy experienced in the mid-1970s
can be viewed as the emergence of cyclical labor markets. In the regime
of high rates of economic growth such as those which prevailed in Japan
before 1970, changes in output demand were likely to be viewed as
reflecting long-run, or permanent, changes. After the mid-1970s, how
ever, the rate of growth slowed substantially, and demand changes came
to be viewed more as short-run business-cycle phenomena than perma
nent changes. 39
To investigate if the interrelated factor demand functions shifted after
mid-1970, I estimated the equations for employment, hours of work,
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Table 4.8 Adjustments of Inputs to Demand Shocks in Japan
(Split Sample: January 1967-December 1974 and January 1975-December 1986)
Employment (£,)

Hours (Ht)

Inventories (/,)

Pre-1975 Post-1975 Pre-1975 Post-1975 Pre-1975 Post-1975
Contrast
Contrast
Contrast
Forecasted Shipments
(1) Unforeseen 0.1663
Deviations
(2.72)
(2) Current
0.0730
(3.71)
(3) Future
-0.0036
(0.10)

-0.1295
(-1.60)
-0.0423
(1.72)
-0.0853
(1.66)

-0.0623
(-0.71)
-0.1510
(1.38)
0.2726
(3.08)

0.1947
(2.07)
0.0955
(0.67)
-0.2342
(2.09)

-0.2294
(-1.93)
-0.2466
(6.44)
-0.0173
(0.23)

0.2372
(1.51)
0.0957
(2.00)
-0.1354
(1.36)

SOURCES: The magnitudes are based on author©s calculation using data from the following
sources: Japan Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on Business Cycle Indicators (August
1987).
NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. The unforeseen deviations represent the difference
between the actual shipment and the forecasted current shipment. The forecasted future shipment
variables are based on nine-month forecasts, and the coefficients for future shipments are the sum of
the coefficients for the eight months following the current month. The unanticipated shipment
variable is the difference between the actual shipments and the current forecasted shipments.

and inventory (equations (3) through (5)) by splitting the sample as of
December 1974, and allowing all the coefficients, except for the inter
cept, to differ between the pre- and post-1975 years. The key coefficients
are summarized in table 4.8. In this table, the columns labeled
"post-1975 contrast" indicate the changes in the coefficients after Janu
ary 1975. The F statistics for Chow test (not reported) indicate that
the difference in the demand functions between the two periods is in
deed statistically significant at conventional levels. Although not all
of the coefficient differences are significant, some interesting patterns
emerge.
If Japanese firms came to view demand changes more as cyclical and
short-run phenomena rather than permanent phenomena after 1975,
then one would expect the employment sensitivity to short-run demand
changes to have decreased and the sensitivities of hours of work and
inventories to have increased. Therefore, the coefficients of immediate
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interest are those for the post-1975 contrast. As table 4.8 shows, the
signs for the coefficients for both the forecasted current demand and
unforeseen deviations in the current demand agree with this proposition
(rows (1) and (2)), though not all of the coefficients are statistically
significant. 40
Taking the estimated coefficients at face value, employment appears
to have become less sensitive to, and hours of work and inventories more
sensitive to, short-run demand changes. On balance, therefore, the
findings in rows (1) and (2) in table 4.8 point to the validity of the
proposition in question, though the case is far from being watertight. As
for the forecasted future demand reported in row (3), again the findings
are as uninformative as those in table 4.7. The coefficients for hours
of work and inventories have opposite signs to those which would
be expected, and the coefficient for hours of work is statistically
significant.

Summary
Our finding of greater ambiguity in Japan than in the United States for
the distinction between quits and dismissals is indirect evidence for the
proposition that transaction costs are lower in Japan. If so, theory posits
that there is more investment in employment relationships in Japan
than in the United States. The importance of bonus payments, the power
of firm tenure in raising earnings, the prevalence of long-term em
ployment, all point to the validity of this prediction. The investment
magnitudes calculated from earnings-tenure profiles also agree with
this prediction. In particular, Japanese male workers evidently invest
more in the employer-employee relationship than do their American
counterparts.
Consistent with the investment difference, Japanese employers seem
to rely less on employment adjustments, and more on adjustments in
hours of work and inventories, than U.S. employers when faced with
changes in product demand. Indeed, employers in the United States
appear to rely primarily on employment adjustments to address these
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changes. The greater reliance on employment adjustment in U.S. man
ufacturing than in Japanese manufacturing undoubtedly contributes to
the higher unemployment rates observed in the United States than
in Japan, though the extent of such a contribution remains an open
question.
Factor demand functions evidently shifted in Japan after the first oil
shock of 1973. Although not overwhelming, the evidence by and large
points to the conclusion that after 1975 changes in demand came to be
viewed by the decisionmakers as temporary cyclical phenomena,
whereas before 1975 such changes tended to be viewed as permanent.
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Chapter 4 Appendix
Analytical Framework of Earnings Profiles
This appendix sketches the analytical framework and the procedure
used in estimating the magnitudes reported in table 4.5. The following
discussion is a review of the procedure discussed in greater detail in
Hashimoto and Raisian (1988).
The slope of an earnings-tenure profile is frequently used as the sole
measure to describe the profile. Comparisons based only on slope
differences can be misleading, however. A greater slope does not neces
sarily mean a greater investment in human capital. It is desirable,
therefore, to examine a multitude of attributes to adequately describe the
underlying properties of the wage-tenure profile. To account for the
necessary attributes, Mincer©s model (1974) is adopted here.
Suppose a typical worker in the absence of human capital investment
would earn a competitive wage of E0 throughout his or her career. This
profile is depicted in figure 4. 1 . If the worker were to invest a portion of
his or her earnings potential in any period, observed earnings for they©th
year of tenure would amount to:
Y(j)=E0 +

t=o

r(f)C(t)-C(j),

(1)

where r(t) and C(t) are, respectively, the rate of return and the amount of
foregone earnings invested in year t. This relation is also displayed in
figure 4. 1 , where Y(f) is referred to as earnings with investment. Figure
4. 1 also indicates the potential earnings of the individual during they©th
year of tenure, i.e., Yj+Cj. At the peak level of observed earnings,
occurring atjp, investment in human capital ceases and C(/^)=0. It
follows, assuming that r=r(t) for all t, that
(2)
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Total investment in monetary units is then given by:
jp

j _
(3)

Total investment is depicted as the shaded area in figure 4.1, and
depends on earnings in the peak year, earnings capacity without human
capital accumulation, and the rate of return on investment.
Investments can also be measured in units of time. Defining the
proportion of work time that an individual invests as k(j) = Cj/Ej with
Ej=Yj+Cj, after some algebraic manipulations one obtains:
lnYj= lnE0 +r ^ k(t) + ln[l -k(j)]

(4)

and
" *<*).

(5)

The sum of the fractions of time invested is then given by:
j"

and depends on the very same variables, transformed differently, as the
monetary investments. Investments measured in monetary and time
units, in (3) and (6) respectively, can be compared across countries as
well as across firms of different sizes.
The estimation of the above model requires magnitudes that are not
readily observable, namely, the alternative earning capacity, E0, and the
rate of return on investments, r. To overcome this problem, we focus
initially on Mincer©s (1974) concept of the overtaking year, j*, the year
where observed earnings, Y(j*), are just equal to the earning capacity in
the absence of investment, E0 (see figure 4.1). If Cj declines with tenure,
as is expected theoretically, the overtaking year is bounded above by the
following relationship:
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(7)

For example, if the rate of return on investment is 10 percent, it will take
less than 10 years for a worker who invests to overtake a similar worker
who does not. To determine the rate of return, we solve for internal rates
of return, i, by equating the present values of observed earnings with
and without investments. This condition ensures the existence at the
margin of both types of workers in equilibrium. The rate of return, r, is
given by the relation:

where N is the last year of employment (see Blinder 1 976) . It is clear that
r> i and as N becomes large, r approaches i.
Thus, our estimate begins by selecting an arbitrary overtaking year,
7*, and then calculating the rate of return. A check is then performed to
see whether the inequality in (7) is satisfied; if it is not, that overtaking
year is discarded. Also, based on existing estimates of returns on postschool investments, we discard those overtaking years that imply a rate
of return exceeding 30 percent. For an eligible overtaking year, esti
mates of investments are obtained from (3) and (6).
There is another complication. Once we calculate total investments
for a particular./* for, say, small firms, what values of/* should be used
to calculate and compare the investment magnitudes for medium and
large firms? We dealt with this question by selecting the overtaking years
for medium and large firms by fixing the respective E0's so as to equalize
rates of return across the firm-size groups. 41 Once E0 is established for
either medium or large firms, the overtaking year can be inferred and the
investment magnitudes calculated.
Although our empirical work specifies an earnings profile that rises in
a quadratic pattern with tenure, we only use the information up to the
peak of the profile. In other words, depreciation, which eventually
brings down the wage profile, is not considered here.
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NOTES
1 Workers who separated for reasons of "own misdeed" are classified as quits, because in Japan
they are likely to resign rather than be fired. Classifying those as dismissed does not change the
qualitative findings reported here.
2 Recall that regular workers constitute the bulk of the employed workers in Japan (chapter 2).
3 The trend line for the real gross national product was estimated as a function of a time variable
and its square term.
4 The reader is reminded that the all-industry data for the United States refer to the stock of
unemployed workers grouped by reason for unemployment, and therefore are not directly com
parable to other data, all of which refer to flow of separated persons.
5 Regression analyses reveal that the bonus-earnings ratio increases with the educational
attainment of workers, firm size, and tenure in the firm. Regression estimates are remarkably stable
for years 1967, 1970, 1976, 1980, and 1981. For details of these analyses, see Hashimoto( 1979)
and Hashimoto and Raisian (1987a,b).
6 Although bonus payments take place in other developed countries, Japanese bonus propor
tions rank highest among the developed countries. For example, as of 1978, bonuses amounted to
8 percent of total compensation and 12 percent of direct compensation in West Germany, and
6 percent and 10 percent, respectively, in France. The United Kingdom and Canada as well as the
United States exhibited only small bonus payments. Korea also has bonus payments. According to
the recent research by Ito and Kang (1989), Korean bonuses began to appear around 1971. The
bonus-wage ratio is still low as compared to Japan, but it has been increasing since the early 1970s,
and by the early 1980s, the Korean ratio stood at about half of the Japanese ratio.
7 At this writing, there is some indication that the U.S. trend may be reversing, as firms
increasingly try to tie wages to performance. (See, for example, "GM©s New Compensation Plan
Reflects General Trend Tying Pay to Performance," The Wall Street Journal, 26 January 1988.)
8 In contrast, bonuses in the early years of industrialization, i.e., during the turn of the
century, tended to be incentive payments. Recall the related discussion in chapter 3.
9 See Gordon (1982), Hashimoto and Raisian (1987a,b), and Taylor (1989). See chapter 3 for a
discussion on shunto.
10 These quotes are from "Labor J^etter," The Wall Street Journal, 25 August 1987.

1 © Actually, the estimated regression includes j2 and n2 as well. Also, the magnitudes in table 4.4
are corrected for the fact that a change in the logarithm of Y is not the same as the percentage change
in K. For example, a percentage change from Y0 to 7, is given by (Y{ - YQ)/YO , which equals Y\IY0
1. A change in the logarithm of Y, d\ogY, is log(K,/y0), so that the correct measure of percentage
change is exp(dlogy) -1.
12 Note that the relative importance of firm-specific experience is greater in large firms than in
small firms, though the medium-sized companies tend to break this pattern for unknown reasons.
The reader is also referred to a recent article by Mincer and Higuchi (1988), in which they find from
microdata sets that upwards of two-thirds of the difference in turnover data between Japan and the
United States is explained by the steepness of earnings-tenure profiles. Their analysis indicates that
Japan©s rapid economic growth and rapid technical change, in particular-was a factor in the
emphasis on human capital investments on the job.
13 As we saw in chapter 3, mandatory retirement used to occur at about 55 years of age, but the
retirement age has been increasing for the past 15 years or so. Many firms now retire workers closer
to age 60.

Evidence Bearing on the Theory©s Implications

111

14 For the extent of long-term employment in the United States, see Koike (1977, 1988), Hall
(1982), and Hashimoto and Raisian (1985). It is usually thought that smaller firms have higher
failure rates; if so, smaller businesses are expected to have shorter durations of employment on
average. A potentially contrary piece of evidence should be kept in mind, however. Cole (1979,
87-90) reports that the proportion of workers in Yokohama who are job-leavers due to involuntary
discharge presumably including business failures tend to be highest in the largest companies
and lowest in the smallest businesses. No information is available, however, on the proportion of
those discharges due to business failures.
If failure rates were the predominant factor, competition would lead to higher wages in smaller
firms. Since wages tend to be lower in smaller companies, there must be more to firm-size
differences. As another factor, employees in larger firms have greater opportunities to change jobs
without changing employers. Indeed, Cole (1979, 80-81) found that intrafirm mobility increases
with firm size in both Yokohama and Detroit. Idson (1989) found that in the United States there is
more intrafirm mobility in larger establishments.
15 Interestingly, the pattern of male-female difference appears opposite in the two countries. In
the United States, males hold a greater number of jobs than females throughout their lives, but in
Japan females hold more jobs. This pattern may reflect, in part, the fact that in Japan the lifetime
employment practice applies mostly to males, and that females serve as a cushion for employment
fluctuations.
16 The quadratic tenure and experience terms are consistent with the fraction of time, k(t),
which declines linearly with t. See Mincer (1974).
17 In the original paper, we also reported the results for medium-sized firms with 100-999
employees. The computed values of investments increased monotonically with firm size for
nonagriculture enterprises in both countries and for manufacturing in Japan, but the pattern was
mixed for U.S. manufacturing. There, the investment magnitude for medium-sized firms was the
smallest (1.5 years) and, as shown in table 4.5, the contrast between small and large companies was
weak.
18 Computed rates of return on investments were rather similar for the two countries: 13 percent
for Japan and 16 percent for the United States in nonagriculture sectors, and 13 percent for Japan
and 17 percent for the United States in manufacturing. Firm-size differences in rates of return could
not be ascertained, because our procedure by construction equalizes the rates of return across firmsize groups.
19 However, see Hashimoto and Raisian (1988) for an attempt to decompose investment
magnitudes into firm-specific and general components.
20 Japanese firms pay annuities, a lump-sum amount, or a combination of both. Raisian and I
calculated pension values for nonagricultural workers in large firms (those with 1,000 employees
or more) in Japan and the United States. We then added them to the estimated investments in human
capital. The result still shows that Japanese workers have greater investments than their American
counterparts. Unfortunately, comparable data are not available for manufacturing. See Hashimoto
and Raisian (1988).
21 Table 4.6 updates the regression estimates reported in Hashimoto and Raisian (1987a,b,
1988).
22 The output coefficient for U.S. manufacturing isO.5802 (9.6), the constant is -0.0118(2.9),
and the /J-square is 0.75. The values in parentheses are /-values.
23 According to Hashimoto and Raisian (1985), a similar difference exists for aggregate
workers, not just manufacturing workers.
24 A major innovation introduced by Topel is in incorporating a sophisticated time-series
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analysis mechanism for forecasting current and future shipments. For technical details, see
Hashimoto (1990c).
25 1 do not explore the implications of the inventory parameters for generating the inventory
cycle in either country. For one such study for the Japanese wool textile industry, see Trivedi (1981).
26 The variable q, is calculated as the difference between the current shipment and the forecasted
value of the current shipment, (q,-eq,).
27 Because of the Almon-type restrictions of a polynomial of the third degree that I impose on
the pattern of /3,,©s, the four-month horizon is the shortest possible horizon. Computation costs
dictated that the experiment be limited to three alternative horizons.
28 The "best" specifications turned out to be:
f1L©-fI1L"-fI3L©3-f16L©6-f19Li9)M/

(5a)

for Japan, and
(1 -£3£3)U ~L)(l -L")q,=(l -6L©2)(1 -f,L-fuL" -f16L")M,

(5b)

for the United States,
where £ ©s and f©s are coefficients. These specifications were chosen to make the series u, to be as
purely white noise as possible. Also, it can be shown readily that d is unity for a fixed seasonally
and zero for a completely nonstationary seasonality.
29 The term ichiji means temporary and kyugyosha means those not at work.
30 See, for example, Japan Productivity Center, Katsuyo Rodo Tokei (Practical Labor Statis
tics), 1990, 238.
3 © Another potential difficulty is that the labor supply elasticity is likely to differ between the two
countries. The less elastic the labor supply, the less employment adjustment one is likely to observe.
If so, an observation of a small employment adjustment may reflect an inelastic labor supply rather
than the presence of firm-specific human capital. I owe this point to Todd Idson. There is an
identification difficulty here. An investment in firm-specific human capital necessarily makes the
labor supply inelastic at least in the short run. To the extent that this consideration is important,
what may appear to be the labor supply effect is in fact the effect of firm-specific human capital.
32 Available evidence suggests that changing the vacation schedule is an important mode of
employment adjustment in Japanese manufacturing firms (Hashimoto 1990c).
33 Also, the legal overtime premium is different between Japan and the United States. It is 25
percent above the regular pay in Japan in contrast to 50 percent in the United States. It is unlikely
that hours spent investing in the employment relations after regular work hours are counted as
overtime hours.
34 I owe this point to Robert Topel.
33 For the Japanese data, after numerous experiments with the model specification, it was found
that the best specification judged by the correlogram, Akaike©s information criterion, and correla
tions among the estimates - still did not reduce the residuals to white noise to the same extent that it
did for U.S. data.
36 Their model uses the Almon lag specification without specifying the interrelatedness of
factor demand or distinguishing between unforeseen and anticipated demand. Their independent
variable is output, whereas mine is shipment.
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37 Note, however, that before 1975 hours of work in Japan evidently increased significantly in
response to an increase in anticipated future demand. See table 4.8 for this result.
38 In 1974, Japan experienced the first postwar negative growth rate, 1.3 percent. Actually
the double-digit growth rate of the Japanese economy in the 1960s lasted only until about 1970.
However, the slowdown in the growth rate was most dramatic after the oil shock. See Nakamura
(1982, 168).
39 I owe this hypothesis to Jacob Mincer.
40 Akiyama et al. (1984, 12) estimated a somewhat different model from mine, and found that
both employment and hours of work adjustment became more sluggish after 1976. However, they
do not interpret their findings in terms of the emergence of cyclical economy in Japan after 1976.
41 Raisian and I also used a method in which we determined E0 for medium and large firms by
multiplying its value for small firms by an equalizing premium, calculated as the percent difference
in the present value of observed earnings between small firms and medium-sized or large firms.
Findings were generally similar between the two approaches. See Hashimoto and Raisian (1988)
for details.

Summary and Policy Discussions
Summary
The goal of this book has been to develop a unified understanding of
some of the notable labor market differences between Japan and the
United States. In Japan, as compared to the United States, for example,
levels of employment tenure are high, employer-employee attachments
strong, and earnings-tenure profiles steeply sloped. Moreover, indus
trial relations in Japan contain some unique institutions, such as joint
consultation and consensus-based decisionmaking, and work organiza
tion exhibits a great deal of flexibility.
Often overlooked is the significance of the commonly observed
phenomenon of Japanese employers and employees spending a great
deal of informal time together after work hours. 1 In my view, this
expenditure of time, at least in part, is an investment in the employment
relationship, reflecting the overall greater investment in firm-specific
human capital in Japan than in the United States. This investment
difference results in a stronger employer-employee attachment in Japan
than in the United States, as evidenced by the considerably smaller
number of days lost in labor disputes in Japan. Interestingly, the two
countries seem to have been diverging in this respect. The days lost in
Japan started to follow a downward trend around 1960, but in the United
States the trend has been moderately upwards in most of the postwar
years.
The two economies also differ in the ways that employment, hours of
work, and inventories adjust over the business cycle. Layoffs seem to be
used much less frequently in Japan than in the United States, with
adjustments in hours of work and inventories assuming a greater impor
tance. Workforce reductions tend to be achieved with less reliance on
115

116

Summary and Policy Discussions

outright dismissals in Japan than in the United States. The difference in
the mode of workforce reduction undoubtedly is a factor behind the
lower unemployment rates in Japan.
Many of the modern industrial relations practices that are sometimes
considered unique for Japan are not simple carryovers from the feudal
era. Instead, they appear to be relatively recent innovations whose
evolution has been in response to changing labor market conditions
induced by rapid economic growth. The developers of these institu
tions employers, employees, policy makers were guided by the pro
cess of rational economic decisionmaking. In that process, their deci
sions inevitably had to take into account the constraints imposed by the
transaction-cost environment. Put another way, the rapid pace of eco
nomic growth was the primary mover and shaper of the institutional
changes, with culture and tradition via the transaction-cost environment
serving the roles of conditioning factors.
For example, the celebrated Japanese practices of lifetime employ
ment, seniority wages, and bonus payments all first began to appear in
some form during the primary phase of industrialization in the early
1900s. Their appearance was the result of the need to stabilize the
employment of skilled workers because, as the process of industrializa
tion accelerated, acute labor shortages developed and labor turnover
became high. Yet, the employment and wage systems, as we know them
today, were by no means prevalent before World War II. In fact, it was
not until 10 to 15 years after the end of the Second World War, with the
advent of sustained rapid economic growth, that many of these features
became widespread throughout the Japanese economy.
The reasons behind the labor market differences between Japan and
the United States are complex. To make the investigation manageable, I
began with a premise that many of the labor market differences between
the two mirror the contrasts in the strength of employment relationships.
Based on this premise, the theory was formulated in chapter 2 by
incorporating transaction-cost considerations into human capital theory.
Transaction costs in this analysis denote costs of communicating infor
mation between the employer and the employee, as well as among the
employees, including the costs of convincing the other party of the
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information©s veracity. This approach resulted in a simple analytical
framework for investigating the manner in which economic growth
interacts with the transaction-cost environment in shaping labor market
institutions.
An innovation in the approach is the distinction drawn between two
types of investment: investment in firm-specific technical skills, and
investments in the reliability of information exchanged between em
ployer and employees, and among employees. These investments taken
together constitute what is referred to as firm-specific human capital,
and they help shape many of the labor market institutions and practices.
Note that the human capital literature has tended to focus on technical
skills, but in my view an investment in the reliability of information is
just as important, if not more so, in promoting a successful production
team. It is this latter type of investment that takes place in the Japanese
joint consultation system, quality control circles, consensus-based decisionmaking, and time spent outside the company environs with
coworkers.
The following analytical results emerge from the theory. An autono
mous increase in the investment in information reliability encourages
the investment in technical skills. Similarly, an autonomous increase in
the investment in technical skills stimulates the investment in informa
tion reliability. I investigated how the interaction between the two types
of investments affects the choice of contract type and the quality of
industrial relations. For that purpose, contracts were characterized as
ideal, fixed-wage, or flexible-wage. The results suggested that an in
creased investment in information reliability is likely to be accompanied
by flexible contractual arrangements.
The theory©s most significant message is that investments in both
technical skills and in information reliability may be stimulated by
technological change and that stimulation is greater the more elastic the
cost functions underlying these investments. It was argued that the cost
function associated with the investment in information reliability is
more elastic in a lower transaction-cost environment. This result points
to an interaction between technological progress and low transaction
costs as an explanation of why the Japanese style of industrial relations
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became widespread in the country after the late 1950s. A plausible
interpretation of the sequence of events that took place may be as
follows.
The productivity enhancement campaign (seisansei undo) that began
with the establishment of the Japan Productivity Center in 1955, encour
aged rapid economic growth. The accompanying technological prog
ress, which began to accelerate in the early 1960s, stimulated the
investment in firm-specific technical skills. The increased investment in
technical skills, in turn, encouraged the investment in information
reliability, and this whole process was boosted by the low-transactioncost environment that prevailed in Japan. The increased information
reliability further stimulated the investment in technical skills. The
result of this process was a strengthening of the employer-employee
attachment, which became manifest in such labor market institutions as
joint consultations, consensus-based decisionmaking, and enterprise
unions, all of which became widespread in Japan after the late 1950s.
The transaction-cost-based explanation of the Japanese industrial
relations system may facilitate an understanding of how the economy
coped with the two oil shocks in the 1970s. The first crisis, in late 1973,
dramatically reduced the rate of economic growth in the country. During
the 1970-73 period, real GNP grew at 8.1 percent per year, but the
growth rate fell to a mere 0.6 percent in the 1974-75 period. 2 At the
same time, Japan became plagued with an accelerated rate of inflation.
The rate of increase of the consumer price index rose from 9 percent in
1972 to 25 percent in 1974. As is well-known by now, a substantial wage
increase demanded by the unions after the first oil shock contributed to
the decline of the economy in the 1974-75 period. Unions evidently
realized that the wage-hike demand was a mistake, and no such demand
was made during the second oil shock in the late 1970s. In fact, the rate
of wage increase dropped from 6.4 percent in 1978 to 6.0 percent in
1979, though the rate rose slightly to 6.3 percent in 1980. 3
The low transaction-cost environment contributed to the resilient
performance of the Japanese economy during the two oil crises and
afterwards. The key ingredients to the recovery were the effective costreducing effort, the low rate of labor disputes, productivity improve-
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ments, and labor market flexibility. As Onitsuka (1988) notes, "workers
did not oppose the introduction of robots and other factory-office auto
mation because the lifetime employment scheme guaranteed them job
security. Other examples of labor-management cooperation, such as the
©quality circle© and ©zero defect movements,© also tended to reduce costs
and improve labor productivity..." (p. 21).
Finally, it is sometimes claimed that the racial and ethnic homogene
ity of the Japanese population fosters harmonious industrial relations in
that country. To the extent that population homogeneity leads to low
transaction costs, this claim may have some validity. As will be noted
later, however, it is not the population homogeneity per se that lowers
transaction costs. Rather, the critical factors are homogeneity in the
attitude toward work, the willingness to learn new skills, and the spirit of
cooperation.
The theory developed in chapter 2 is not designed to yield explicit
relationships among variables, with identifiable parameters that can be
estimated. Instead, its purpose is to generate qualitative propositions
and provide a framework to help develop a unified understanding of the
various labor market institutions. In addition, transaction costs are not
observable, so it is not possible to test directly the proposition that
transaction costs are lower in Japan than in the United States. Instead,
one must rely on indirect evidence. A skeptical reader may be inclined to
discredit any such evidence put forth to support the theory. Faced with
this prospect, it would be tempting to begin by asserting that transaction
costs are lower in Japan than in the United States and then investigate the
implications of such an assertion.
Although such an approach is defensible, an even simpler approach
would be to start by asserting that the investment in firm-specific human
capital is greater in Japan than in the United States. This approach could
yield a unified understanding of the differences between the two coun
tries in the shape of the earnings profile, wage flexibility, and labor
turnover. In asking why Japanese investment in firm-specific human
capital is greater and transaction cost lower, however, one may gain
additional insights. For this reason, chapters 3 and 4 examine the
influences that may bear on transaction costs, focusing on the factors
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that may help explain the difference in firm-specific human capital
investment between the two countries.
In constructing a satisfactory test of any theory, one must ask what
phenomena will be observed if the theory is to be refuted. To this end,
the quit-dismissal distinction was investigated in chapter 4. Although
the underlying data have some problems, I found the evidence by and
large to support the theory. In particular, the prediction examined is that
the quit-dismissal distinction in Japan is less closely related to economic
conditions than it is in the United States. One would expect that in Japan,
where transaction costs are hypothesized to be low, it would be unclear
as to which party initiated separations in a large proportion of cases. As
a result, one would expect the reported distinction in the Japanese data to
tend to be arbitrary and independent of economic conditions.
In the United States, where transaction costs are hypothesized to be
high, the employer and employee would make their own separation
decisions in response to exogenous changes in labor demand. The
resulting separations would be reported either as layoffs or quits, de
pending on which party made the decision. Based on these considera
tions, one would expect the reported distinction between the two separa
tion categories to be more random and less related to economic
conditions in Japan than in the United States. The regression analysis
indicates that the quit-layoff distinction in manufacturing is statistically
significant for the United States, but ambiguous for Japan, thus confirm
ing the prediction based on the transaction-cost argument.
Needless to say, it would be useful to have more direct evidence on the
magnitude of transaction costs in both countries. However, these costs
are difficult, if not impossible, to measure directly, and one probably
would have to rely on anecdotal evidence like the example in chapter 3 of
the compliant Japanese worker in contrast to the resistant American
worker. Much more evidence along this line is needed, however, before
one could hope to fully document the transaction-cost differences. Also
discussed were some of the institutions in Japanese industrial relations
which, along with traditional and cultural factors, point to the existence
of low transaction costs in Japan. It is hoped that these discussions help
clarify my perspective in this study.
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Policy Discussions and Suggestions for Future Research

TUrning to the policy implications of this study for the United States,
let me focus on the relationship between the employment system and the
overall economic performance. This focus is appropriate, as the interna
tional competitiveness of the American economy is a critical policy
concern for the United States. The key ingredients for an internationally
competitive economy are the abilities of its labor force to adapt flexibly
in an environment of continual innovation and to produce quality prod
ucts in a cost-effective manner. These abilities, I argue, are fostered by
investment in the employment relationship, and they seem to charac
terize Japan©s labor force. What lessons can one learn from the Japanese
experience?
Since labor is the predominant input to production in the U.S.
economy, an improvement in labor performance would seem to be a
most direct way to deal with the sluggish productivity growth of that
economy. Besides, such an improvement would in turn stimulate invest
ments in technology and physical capital. Note that the emphasis of this
study contrasts with that of Jorgenson et al. (1987), as discussed in
chapter 3, who argue that Japan©s high rates of growth in capital and
intermediate inputs were largely responsible for the rapid growth in
Japan©s output between 1960 and 1979. Growth in physical capital
undoubtedly played a role in Japan©s postwar economic performance,
but this study emphasizes the importance of investments in industrial
relations systems in making the machines run efficiently. 4
Labor productivity is realized at the firm level. Activities in a firm
involve teamwork among its employees, as well as between the em
ployer and the employees. The teamwork is supported by the firm©s
industrial relations system. Therefore, the industrial relations system
critically influences the performance of workers in the firm. The effec
tiveness of that system, in turn, depends on the quantity and quality of
investments made to maintain and improve it. The postwar Japanese
experience seems to indicate that such investments help foster a strong
sense of identification with and commitment to the company on the part
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of both the management and the worker. Cole (1979) summarized the
Japanese industrial relations system this way:
At the heart of the distinctiveness of the Japanese approach is the
attempt to maximize the harmonization of individual and organiza
tional goals. Most of the key postwar personnel innovations can be
understood in this light. Moreover, this attempt is made not only by
providing incentives for workers to adopt management-defined or
ganizational goals, but also by attempting to maximize the achieve
ment of worker-defined goals so long as they do not conflict with
high priority management goals (p. 253).

As discussed earlier, I have distinguished two kinds of investments for
improving an industrial relations system: investments in technical skills
and investments in information reliability. Japanese workers are trained
not only in technical skills, but also in the skills they need to be effective
team members, skills which promote information reliability. To main
tain these skills, Japanese firms continuously train and retrain workers
as required within their own organizations, and utilize skills in a flexible
manner within their own or subsidiary organizations (see chapter 4).
These practices constitute the central features of the Japanese private
sector training, which has played a key role in human resource develop
ment for Japan©s modern industry. In contrast, training in U.S. firms
tends to focus on narrowly defined skills, and becoming effective team
members has not been its main objective. 5
Private sector training was also instrumental in the development of a
skilled workforce in the United States; thus, at first, the Japanese
experience would seem to parallel the American experience. There are
notable differences, however, between the two. Japan has relied pri
marily on firm-level strategy rather than on government programs,
public vocational schools, and training institutions for the promotion of
private sector training. Japanese workers develop and accumulate skills
useful in the specific firms in which they are employed rather than in the
economy at large.
Laws and public policies have played important roles, while often
leaving much room for private sector decisionmaking. Japanese public
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policies on training have focused on ensuring the availability of educated
and trainable new workers to all industries, leaving the provision of
industrial training up to the individual firms. 6 The foundation for the
Japanese training strategy has been the educational system, which
focuses on basic education and serves primarily to guide students to a
sector of the economy rather than to specific tasks. Once employed,
Japanese workers build on their solid basic education by acquiring firmspecific training. As a result, vocational and professional schools have
been less common in Japan than in the United States. Training that
American workers receive at vocational and professional schools is not
firm-specific. As a result, these workers can change their place of
employment without a loss of their earning power.
The cornerstone of Japanese private sector training is the employee
rotation system, whereby an employee is rotated among different tasks
on a regular basis. This practice fosters the formation of intrafirm
general, though firm-specific, skills. Since these skills are useful in
many divisions within the company, a decline in demand in one division
does not necessarily lead to layoffs of affected workers. The resulting
job security encourages employees to acquire firm-specific skills and
welcome new technologies, and strengthens the employer-employee
attachment.
In addition, joint consultation promotes the harmonization of indi
vidual and organizational goals. The resulting bond between employees
and their firm again increases the incentive to invest in firm-specific
skills. This way, Japanese training practices contribute to the decrease in
the job turnover of skilled workers. The open labor markets that exist are
limited to older workers, farm workers who migrate to the cities on offseasons, or unskilled and part-time workers, many of whom serve as
buffers to the lifetime employees. In contrast, the U.S. approach to
training has contributed to the high mobility of skilled workers among
firms, and even among industries and occupations.
The Japanese training practice has had an obvious payoff in terms of
the high quality of manufactured products. The connection between
training and product quality has an obvious implication for the interna
tional competitiveness of firms© products, as evidenced by the stream of
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successful Japanese products in recent years. The importance of pro
moting high product quality is most visible in the operation of the
celebrated just-in-time, or kanban, system. 7 The successful operation
of the kanban system depends critically on the continuous flow of zerodefect parts and components. The supply of highly reliable components
is assured when workers are trained and motivated to produce them.
Such training and the nurturing of motivation seemingly rank very
highly in the Japanese industrial relations system.
Are some of the Japanese practices importable to the United States?
The analysis in chapter 2 suggests that many of the practices were
endogenously determined, having evolved in response to the needs
generated by rapid economic growth and as a reflection of Japan©s
cultural values and tastes. Merely copying Japan©s endogenously deter
mined institutions and practices, therefore, will not necessarily prove
successful in the United States. Cultural values and tastes are among the
exogenous variables which shape the cost function underlying the in
vestment in information reliability. The key to a successful adaptation of
the Japanese practices, therefore, is to ascertain how American ex
ogenous variables differ from those of the Japanese and determine how
they may be manipulated to bring about the desired outcomes. The
question, therefore, is how to fashion an industrial relations system in
the United States that would achieve results similar to those of the
Japanese industrial relations system, but be conditioned by American
cultural and traditional values.
Consider, for example, the frequently asked question, "Would greater
wage and labor market flexibility raise productivity?" Our theory sug
gests that this question is posed incorrectly. Wage flexibility, for exam
ple, is endogenous, and it doesn©t make sense to ask if imposing greater
flexibility would improve productivity. Costs of investments in the
employment relationship investments in technical skills and informa
tion reliability-are the exogenous variables. What this study shows is
that a low transaction-cost environment for these investments promotes
labor market flexibility and productivity. If an economy is in a high
transaction-cost environment, a flexible-wage contract may not be effi
cient, and forcing such a contract onto this economy will lower output.
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Another example relates to worker participation in decisionmaking.
There is evidence indicating that, on balance, some forms of worker
participation have helped increase productivity in American firms. 8 The
question remains unanswered, however, as to what type of participation
under what conditions is most likely to be effective. Here again, such
forms of participation as joint consultation, quality control circles, and
consensus-based decisionmaking are endogenous phenomena. They
may have worked relatively well in Japan, but there is no guarantee that
they will be equally effective in all American firms. Imposing worker
participation in a high transaction-cost environment is likely to result in
friction and conflict that waste time and other resources for everyone
involved.
It is clear, therefore, that a rush to borrow the "Japanese system" in the
United States or elsewhere will not always be successful. Robert Hayes
(1981) describes the American tendency for rushing-to-borrow in the
late 1970s as follows:
. . .U.S. businesses found themselves increasingly displaced in
international markets and, more recently, in their home markets as
well. This sudden weakness has come as a shock to many American
managers who, in searching belatedly for causes and explanations,
have often looked for dramatic, easily imitated or purchased solu
tions: quality circles, government assistance, and the use of intel
ligent robots.... There are no magic formulas just steady pro
gress in small steps and focusing attention on manufacturing
fundamentals. This is why their [Japanese] example will be so hard
for American companies and American managers to emulate
(p. 65).

Not surprisingly, therefore, attempts to adopt quality control circles
in the United States appear to have met with mixed results. 9 The data
could not be found that would indicate the exact extent of success with
QC circles in the country, but the available literature suggests that they
have not always been successful. 10 To be sure, QC circles in Japan
haven©t always been successful either, but it seems safe to infer from the
literature that the probability of success has been higher in Japan than in
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the United States. The strong attitude of individualism, distrust between
employees and management, management©s failure to involve unions in
setting up QC circles, middle management©s fear of being bypassed in
decisionmaking processes, all are said to have contributed to the failure
of QC circles in some American firms.
This book has argued that Japan©s low transaction-cost environment
was the key factor in the successful implementation of many of the
Japanese-style practices. It is also asserted that racial and ethnic homo
geneity, as well as cultural and traditional influences, have contributed to
this environment. It doesn©t follow, however, that there is no possibility
of creating a similar environment in the United States. To the contrary,
the experiences at some of the Japanese transplant companies suggest
that it is possible to do so. In particular, the experiences at NUMMI
(New United Motor Manufacturing), Honda of America Manufactur
ing, Diamond-Star Motors, Subaru-Isuzu Automotive do suggest that
the productivity of American workers can be boosted if an effort is made
to create a low transaction-cost environment. 11
A major thrust at these and other operations has been to develop a
sense of teamwork by involving workers in decisionmaking and by
improving employer-employee relations. 12 Most have also adopted an
elaborate screening of job applicants. My investigation of some of the
Japanese automobile transplants makes it clear that they have devoted, at
least initially, far more resources to screening and assessing employees
than their parent companies do. 13 The large expenditure of resources in
these activities is understandable given the Japanese firms© desire to
assemble homogeneous workforces from the highly varied American
labor force. In the case of Diamond-Star Motors and Subaru-Isuzu
Automotive, their respective state employment agencies performed
initial screenings before the surviving applicants were put through
company assessment procedures. To approximate the Japanese work
force characteristics, these transplants hired consulting firms to develop
their assessment procedures. Representatives of a consulting firm re
tained by Diamond-Star Motors spent about a month and a half in Japan
observing Japanese worker characteristics, and subsequently developed
procedures to identify key characteristics in American applicants that
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would be conducive to implementing the Japanese approaches to train
ing and labor relations. Assessment procedures usually involve a multistep testing of the applicant©s general ability, the ability to work effec
tively with others, problemsolving skills, manual dexterity, diligence,
and other qualities. A Japanese manager at Diamond-Star Motors indi
cated that one of the key qualities that the Japanese parent company,
Mitsubishi Motors, looked for was the willingness to accept flexible job
assignments. The process is evidently quite selective. Only about 10
percent survived the screening and the assessment procedures at Dia
mond-Star Motors and Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, which also employed
a consulting firm to develop its assessment procedure. Some U.S.
workers who were hired at Honda, Ohio, reportedly were surprised at
being asked numerous questions seemingly unrelated to work, as well as
at the long duration of their interviews, which were attended by com
pany executives and vice presidents. 14 As noted in chapter 2, careful
screening of job applicants is a device for creating an environment of
low transaction costs on the shop floor.
Once hired, these workers reported attending frequent meetings with
management concerning production matters. These meetings are an
important part of training. 15 The frequency of such meetings at the
Honda plant in Ohio is indicated by the new slogan, "let©s Y-gaya," which
means in fractured Japanese, "let©s have a bull-session."16 In the Japanese
transplants, the management and workers share the same table for
lunch, thereby creating an informal setting for reliable information
exchange. This way, workers on the shop floor hopefully develop an
increased sense of participation in the firm©s decisionmaking process. It
is noteworthy also that layoffs and dismissals have been rare in these
operations.
Productivity at NUMMI after only one year of operation was re
ported to have increased by 48.5 percent over what it was at the old
Fremont plant under General Motors (GM) management. 17 Absen
teeism and drug use, which had plagued the plant, dropped dramatically
after NUMMI took over. 18 NUMMI©s efforts at productivity enhance
ment continue with the slogan "let©s kaizen" or "let©s improve."19 Also,
in contrast to the old Fremont plant, the quality of the automobiles
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produced at NUMMI has been highly rated. 20 What little evidence there
is on productivity at NUMMI indicates that, in the first year of opera
tion, NUMMI ranked in productivity somewhere between the Fremont
plant and a Toyota plant in Japan. 21
Honda©s operation in Ohio is another interesting example. Honda in
Japan is known for its emphasis on nurturing the sense of teamwork
among its workers. This emphasis was imported to the Ohio operation.
At the Ohio plant, employees, referred to as associates, are encouraged
to acquire skills and training by continually interacting with one another
on the shop floor rather than through formal training sessions. 22 Clearly,
such learning by interaction is more effective the lower the transaction
costs among co-workers. A lowering of transaction costs is achieved, in
turn, by an elaborate screening of new hires mentioned earlier. Produc
tivity at the plant reportedly approaches that of Honda©s plants in Japan,
and the quality of the automobiles produced in Ohio is said to equal that
of Japanese-made Hondas.
This and other newly emerging evidence suggest that some of the
practices of Japanese industrial relations may be imported success
fully. 23 It is too early to tell, however, what the effective way to do so is.
Also, while the screening of job applicants initially was quite intensive
in these transplants, the intensity appears to have lessened for subse
quent hiring. A question arises as to how these firms will maintain a low
transaction-cost environment as their workforce compositions change
with turnover. As is clear by now, a low transaction-cost environment
encourages investments in the employment relationship. The resulting
long-term commitment to and identification with the employment rela
tionship promote productive behaviors. It is only after a low transactioncost environment is created that firms can achieve "harmony" between
the goals of the worker and the goals of the organization.
Interestingly, these considerations suggest an agenda for future re
search on the use of subcontractors. Japanese manufacturers are said to
use subcontracting to a greater extent than their American counter
parts Japanese firms are less vertically integrated than U.S. firms. A
hypothesis worth investigating is that Japanese firms have opted to lower
transaction costs on the shop floor by limiting the scope of operations
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within the firm. One way of limiting the scope of operations is to rely on
subcontractors to perform some of the production activities. 24
As a strategy to create low transaction-cost environments, most of the
Japanese transplants have chosen to locate near rural towns in the
Midwest and Canada, where the available workforce is more homoge
neous than in urban areas. They have also shied away from hiring
workers with previous experience in automobile industries, choosing
instead to train young workers and workers with little industrial experi
ence. They have employed extensive screening of job applicants. As
noted earlier, Japanese transplants have taken steps to instill in the
workers a sense of participation in the decisionmaking process by
creating informal settings in which to hold frequent discussions with coworkers and supervisors alike.
An effort to emulate the Japanese workplace cannot proceed without
regard to other social goals, however. For example, an attempt to
homogenize the workforce may conflict with the laws and policies for
promoting equal employment opportunities. In fact, Honda in Ohio
ended up facing a job discrimination charge brought about by the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 25 Racial and ethnic ho
mogeneity are not the necessary condition for lowering transaction
costs. What is needed is to "homogenize" the workforce in certain
characteristics that are the keys to creating a low transaction-cost en
vironment, such as pride in producing quality products, willingness to
learn new skills, and a spirit of cooperation with co-workers (as opposed
to homogeneity strictly along racial and ethnic lines). Such an approach
is unlikely to run afoul of the equal employment goal. Public policies on
education obviously have some role to play in instilling these charac
teristics in the future workforce.
Clearly, borrowing Japanese practices must be done in a very selec
tive way in order to fit American needs and circumstances. That is
exactly what the Japanese have done borrow from the United States
and Western Europe to fit Japanese needs and circumstances in mod
ernizing their economy after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, and during
the critical postwar years with the productivity enhancement campaign.
Finally, the role of economic growth must not be overlooked. In
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particular, recall the earlier argument that the rapid pace of economic
growth and the accompanying technological change were the prime
movers in developing many of the successful Japanese industrial rela
tions practices. As discussed in chapter 2, an outlook for sustained
economic growth stimulates the incentive to invest in human capital just
as it encourages the investments in physical capital. An important goal
of macroeconomic policies is to generate such an outlook. Thus, the
present study has revealed a link between macroeconomic policies and
the goal of increasing worker performance, a link that has not been
stressed in policy discussions.
Let me end this book with a discussion on future research. It would be
illuminating to evaluate the applicability of the Japanese training and
labor relations approaches to the U.S. labor force by studying the
Japanese transplants in the United States. The preceding discussions
suggest that the Japanese automobile transplants may be of particular
interest. One of them, the Honda Motor Company of Ohio, is now
exporting automobiles to Japan, and others will soon follow suit. These
companies appear poised, therefore, to demonstrate the feasibility of
importing Japanese employment practices to the United States. How are
these transplants succeeding in implementing their parent companies©
employment practices in the different environment of the American
labor force and employment practices? What modifications are neces
sary in these practices to ensure their success in U.S. firms? What
characteristics of the American labor force are likely to enhance the
effectiveness of Japanese practices in the United States?
In trying to answer these questions, I would propose the following
hypotheses: (A) transplants invest more in screening new hires than
their parent companies do, given the heterogeneity of the American
labor force; (B) transplants invest less in the employment relationship
than their parent companies do because of the high investment costs and
high propensity for mobility associated with U.S. workers; and (C) in
trying to import their parent companies© practices, these transplants
must have taken steps to adjust to the characteristics of the American
labor force and labor market practices.
Some of the issues, then, that must be clarified include the following:
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1. To what extent are these firms succeeding in adapting their Jap
anese approaches to new-employee screening, employee training, em
ployee rotation, joint consultation, the kanban system, quality control
circles, the compensation system (do they give as substantial bonus
payments as their parent companies do?), and the employment system
(given that layoffs are rarely used, how do they utilize workers when
demand is low?).
2. What steps are being taken to deal with such features of the U.S.
labor force as the high propensity for mobility, the heterogeneity, the
level of basic skills, and attitudes toward work?
3. To what extent is the trainability of U.S. workers a factor in
selecting a site?
4. How much time and money are spent on screening and training
new employees?
5. What are employees© perceptions of the manner in which the
Japanese approach affects their motivation and productivity?
6. Which characteristics of U.S. labor practices might enhance the
effectiveness of Japanese practices when applied to the American labor
force?
7. What aspects of the Japanese practices would be counterproduc
tive if adopted without modification in the United States?
As noted earlier, I have begun an investigation along the lines discussed
above.

NOTES
1 This phenomenon implies that the conventionally measured hourly productivity is overstated
for Japanese workers. I calculated elsewhere that taking into account the extra hours that Japanese
workers spend with one another after work increases the average Japanese hours of work by 10.4
percent and that this increase, in turn, implies a widening of the productivity gap between Japan and
the United States to somewhere between 58 and 67 percent in favor of the United States. See
Hashimoto (1990a). Such a calculation, however, must be interpreted with caution. In particular, it
is inappropriate to conclude that Japanese workers are low productivity workers. There is ob
viously the issue of how to measure productivity. Clearly, the time expenditure by Japanese workers
has paid off in terms of their increased competitiveness in international markets. What is not clear is
whether Japanese workers have been over-investing their time.
2 The factual discussion on this experience draws heavily on Onitsuka (1988), which contains
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an informative discussion on the macroeconomic performance of the Japanese economy during the
oil crisis.
3 Also at work was the expansion of the money supply. The first oil shock took place against the
background of the easy-money policy that preceded it, but when the second oil shock arrived
policymakers responded swiftly with anti-inflationary measures. See Onitsuka (1988).
4 It is interesting to recall the observation by Hayes (1981) that Japanese machines are not that
much newer than those in the U.S., but that they just run newer.
5 The cross-training practice at Japanese automobile transplants appears to have created some
problems for American workers who came in with specific skills. For example, tool and die makers
at the Mazda plant in Flat Rock, Michigan reportedly were insulted by the requirement that they
learn lesser jobs, such as operating a crane (Fucini and Fucini 1990, 92-93).
6 See Levine and Kawada (1980) for an informative discussion on the role of industrial training
in Japanese economic development.
7 As noted in chapter 3 (note 66), the kanban system was pioneered by the Toyota Motor
Company in the 1950s, and became widely adopted by other Japanese manufacturers after the late
1970s. Under this system, materials, parts, and components are produced and delivered only when
they are needed.
8 Levine and Tyson (1990) found that of the 29 studies found in the literature only two
concluded that participation hurts productivity. Fourteen studies found that participation increases
productivity and the remaining 13 were inconclusive.
9 See chapter 3 for a discussion on quality control circles in Japan. The first quality control
circle in the United States was implemented in 1974 at Lockheed Missile and Space Company, with
subsequent success. Quality circles grew rapidly afterwards, and as of the early 1980s there were
over 3,000 circles in American firms (Blair and Ramsing 1983). See Cole (1979, 1980) for a list of
U.S. firms adopting quality control circles, as well as a discussion of their motives.
10 See, for example, Blair and Ramsing (1983). Drucker (1990) argues that many QC circles
failed in American plants because they were established without statistical quality control, the main
benefit of which is to provide rigorous and reliable feedback between production and workers
involved.
11 To be sure, such a suggestion must be interpreted with caution, since it is unclear if the
successful experiences so far will survive the test of time. NUMMI was established in 1984 as a
joint venture between General Motors (GM) and Toyota. Honda of America Manufacturing in
Marysville, Ohio started production in 1978. Diamond Star Motors is a joint venture between
Mitsubishi and Chrysler, and production started in 1988. Its plant in Normal, Illinois with over 470
robots is said to be the world©s most technologically advanced. (See "Shaking Up Detroit," Business
Week, 14 August 1989.) Subaru-Isuzu Automotive in Lafayette, Indiana began production in 1989.
As NUMMI inherited the old Fremont plant operated by GM and employed many of the former GM
workers, its experience seems particularly useful for ascertaining the effects of Japanese-style
operations in the United States.
12 In the ensuing discussion, I rely on the informative book by Shimada (1988), as well as on my
own research in progress, for the facts regarding the U.S. operations of Japanese automobile
manufacturers.
13 A Japanese manager at Subaru-Isuzu Automotive stated that if their parent companies in
Japan were to engage in such extensive screening and assessing, they would quickly lose their
applicants to other firms.
14 See "How Does Japan Inc. Pick Its American Workers?", Business Week, 3 October 1988, for
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similar evidence on the intensive screening at Mazda Motor Mfg. in Michigan as well as at
Diamond-Star Motors. According to a survey of 83 Japanese transplants and 41 U.S. manufactur
ing plants, in 1985 a Japanese transplant spent an average of $759, and an American plant $411, to
hire a new worker (Higuchi 1987). These figures do not include the value of time spent on
recruitment.
15 Based on the same survey mentioned in note 14, Higuchi (1987) reports that in 1985 Japanese
transplants spent an average of $967, and American automobile manufacturers, an average of $306,
to train a new hire. These figures are only indicative as they do not include the value of time of
trainers and trainees.
16 The term Y-gaya evidently was invented at Honda. It is made up from the Japanese
onomatopoeia wai-wai and gaya-gaya which convey the noise level in a typical "bull session."
17 What is noteworthy is the fact that the productivity improvement occurred in spite of the fact
that the plant and equipment were largely inherited from the old Fremont operation and that many
of the workers were the same as those who worked at that plant. (See Shimada 1988, 32.)
18 The absenteeism at the old GM plant was reported to be 20 percent, but it now stands at
2 percent. See "Shaking Up Detroit," Business Week, 14 August 1989.
19 Kaizen also underlies the approaches at Honda, Diamond-Star, Subaru-Isuzu as well as at
Mazda in Flat Rock, Michigan. See "How Does Japan Inc. Pick Its American Workers?", Business
Week, 3 October 1988.
20 According to Shimada (1988, 42), Consumer Reports in 1986 rated the Novas produced at
NUMMI somewhere between 3.6 and 3.8 out of the maximum attainable of 5.0, while other
American-made automobiles averaged 2.0 to 3.0.
21 In terms of hours of labor, including production and nonproduction workers, it took 29.1
hours at the GM Fremont plant (1978), 19.6 hours at NUMMI (1986), and 18.0 hours at a Toyota
plant in Japan to produce an automobile (Shimada 1988, table 1). This type of comparison
obviously must be interpreted with caution, because, for example, automobile models differ among
plants.
22 In Honda©s Associate Development Center, located adjacent to the main automobile plant in
Marysville, there are seven classrooms and additional instruction facilities, some with computer
equipment and others with laboratories attached (to teach welding techniques, for example).
23 The recent failure of the United Auto Workers (UAW) to organize Nissan workers at its
Tennessee plant is another indication that some Japanese practices can work successfully in the
United States. Had these practices not been working well at Nissan, one would have expected a
much stronger support for unionization than was realized at the election. (The UAW bid was
defeated solidly by more than a 2-1 margin.) The only issue that the UAW could find to rally prounion sentiment was the alleged lack of safety associated with the rapid pace of work. Evidently,
however, it was not a convincing issue to the workers at large. Several years earlier, the UAW also
tried to organize the Honda plant in Ohio, but withdrew its effort and an election was never held. It
should be noted that both Diamond-Star Motors and Mazda Motor Manufacturing are UAWorganized. The fact that they are both joint ventures-with Chrysler and Ford, respectively
obviously is the main reason for their unionization. Mazda©s experience with its UAW workforce has
been turbulent, according to Fucini and Fucini (1990). Diamond-Star doesn©t appear to have
experienced major problems with its union, perhaps because its workforce, unlike the one at
Mazda, consists largely of those with nonautomotive backgrounds.
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24 See Aoki (1990) for discussions on the Japanese firms and their use of subsidiaries and
outside suppliers.
25 Honda was accused of giving high preference in hiring to workers from the Marysville area to
the exclusion of the more racially mixed labor pool available in Columbus. It paid $6 million to
about 370 blacks and women to settle the case.
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